In the 1980s European policies regarding the use and control of nuclear weapons will reflect two different developments. The first is the scope and duration of the current debate about nuclear deterrence and defense, which has dominated public discussion since NATO's decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Less obvious is the second, the emerging agenda concerning the requirements and limits of British and French nuclear independence, the program of nuclear modernization, and the goals of arms control negotiation in Europe. Crucial to the outcomes will be the evolving views of new European leaders and the policy choices of the United States.
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References
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1. For the Western side alone, the present estimate of warheads stored on European soil is approximately 6000 or more. This does not include warheads that may be brought to Europe in the event of conflict, or those designated for systems presently deployed outside of Europe but with assigned responsibilities for European targets.
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2. For one account of the German experience in the 1950s, see my Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
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3. A more analytic statement of this hypothesis can be found in Stephen F. Szabo, ed., The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans (London: Butterworths, 1983), pp. 43-75.
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4. Ibid.; Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
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5. An extensive analysis of these and other trends can be found in David Capitanchik and Richard Eichenberg, Public Opinion and Defence, Chatham House Papers in Foreign Policy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).
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6. Perhaps the earliest statements of this argument appeared in his discussion paper prepared for the Woodrow Wilson Center Security Program of the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., in 1981.
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7. For a more extended discussion of the specific historical interactions over NATO's intermediate-range nuclear weapons plan of 1979, see my “The Present as Prologue: Europe and Theater Nuclear Modernization,”International Security, 5 (4): 150-168 (Spring 1981).
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8. The exception here is Italy, which reportedly was the only NATO nation that had actually had a parliamentary vote on possible deployments on Italian soil prior to the formal NATO vote of December 1979.
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9. For one sharp statement of this view, see Klaus Bloemer, “Freedom for Europe, East and West,”Foreign Policy, 50: 23-38 (Spring 1983).
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10. See, here, the articles on the various national debates in Capitanchik and Eichenberg, Public Opinion and Defence.
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11. Perhaps the most complete examination of the present French defense debate is David Yost's France and European Security, Adelphi Paper Series (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983, forthcoming).
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12. A reflection of this is Hedley Bull, “European Self-Reliance,”Foreign Affairs, 61(4): 874-892 (Spring 1983).
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13. These are the results of the first phase of the Ford project, cited in the author's Note and reported in Sicherheit—zu Welchem Preis? ed. Catherine M. Kelleher and Wolf-Dieter Eberwein (Munich: Gunther Olzog Verlag, 1983).
14.
14. For one discussion of these questions, see the European Security Study Project Report, Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980's (New York: St Martin's Press, 1983).
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15. The Schmidt speech is reproduced in Survival, 20 (1): 2-10 (Jan.-Feb. 1978).
