Here Today,Gone Tomorrow—Nuclear Deterrence in the 1990s?

Abstract

The United States faces a curious yet profound dilemma: we want to reduce the world's nuclear weapons but do not know how to do so without increasing rather than decreasing the threat that these weapons will be used. More and better of everything is clearly no answer; but it is not axiomatic that less is always more secure. Indeed the danger with small nuclear forces is that even marginal alternation in agreed-upon numbers can create a possibly decisive difference in the real balance of power. Nor does a defensive strategy—specifically the use of antiballistic missile systems—offer the technological panacea to render nuclear weapons obsolete. All systems leak; the question is, How badly? Anything much less than a perfect defense would more likely fuel an arms race—resulting in escalation on both the offense and the defense—than end it. In the end, what we need are analytically derived combinations of offense and defense by which we can realistically achieve dramatic weapons reductions without commensurate reductions in national security.

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References

1. Speech on Offense/Defense Mixtures, Science and Technology Seminar Series, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 18 Jan. 1983.

2. See Robert H. Kupperman , “Arms Control: The Impossible Dream,” Washington Quarterly (Fall 1983), in press.

3. For more information, see Robert H. Kupperman and Donald M. Kerr , “A New Nuclear Force Architecture,” Washington Quarterly, 5(1):119-130 (Winter 1982).

4. A key issue here is the important destinction between point defense—defense of our ballistic missile systems—and area defense—defense of our cities. Point defense should not prove destabilizing, because it only diminishes the other side's ability to launch a successful first strike. By contrast, a substantial but imperfect city defense would undermine the other side's ability to retaliate punitively and thus destabilize the balance of power.

5. Because the Soviets at present cannot launch a simultaneous attack of all their weapons against all U.S. force targets, there is no window of vulnerability inhibiting our capability to retaliate against their cities. Bombers and cruise missiles are inherently weapons of retaliation, whereas ICBMs and the next generation of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) can be used in either a city-busting or silo-busting mode. As long as we presume that our submarine force at sea is immune to surprise attack, this tends to reduce first-strike incentives even in the face of an effective ICBM/SLBM active defense.

6. For more information, see Robert H. Kupperman , Debra van Opstal , and David Williamson, Jr. , “Terror, the Strategic Tool: Response and Control,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 463:24-38 (Sept. 1982).