The Cuban Boatlift of 1980: Strategies in Federal Crisis Management

Abstract

The Cuban boatlift of 1980 has had considerable implications for public attitudes and official actions toward overall immigration and refugee policy. The flotilla was a political liability for the Carter administration in Florida, and seemed to underscore nationally the administration's image of poor executive leadership. It occurred at a time of extreme difficulty for President Jimmy Carter, corresponding with the failure of the mission to rescue the American hostages in Iran, and with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's resignation. The chief executive was facing a decisive challenge for the democratic nomination for the presidency from Senator Edward Kennedy and was struggling to keep campaign commitments to balance the federal budget, which antagonized several democratic constituent groups. Nevertheless, the boatlift problem had to be met. While it was a surprise to the American public and to most policymakers in Washington, the Cuban boatlift had been forecast by intelligence agencies three months prior to the arrival of the first boats. It exemplified the federal government's lack of control over the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers, uninvited and without immigration clearances. However, a close examination of the crisis reveals a number of opportunities that the federal government had to prevent or control the crisis and provides a framework for responding to similar experiences in the future.