Indochinese Refugees: The Law and Politics of First Asylum

Abstract

By early 1981, almost six years after the communist victories in Indochina, the flow of Indochinese refugees seemed to have become self-perpetuating. The recipient states consequently started to take measures to reduce the flow. While the methods employed have been criticized, the result seems to have been a downward trend in new arrivals. There was also progress with respect to the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) from Vietnam in early 1982. This factor and simultaneous changes in U.S. resettlement processing from first-asylum areas helped to modify what previously had been a tragic anomaly in the refugee program: the mode of departure, rather than reasons for departure, had become a principal criterion for bestowing refugee status, thus turning the process into a human obstacle course where those willing to risk the perilous flight to first-asylum areas were rewarded with refugee status. The new momentum in the ODP and signs of a diminishing flow were certainly welcomed in the first-asylum countries—mainly the ASEAN members of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. However, fears of being left with a residual refugee population still remain and may encourage the ASEAN countries to limit first asylum further and to explore alternative strategies of response.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

1. ASEAN was established in 1967, and the five ASEAN members have coordinated their refugee policies closely. The other main firstasylum area is Hong Kong. In addition, about 263,000 Vietnamese went directly from Vietnam, mainly the northern part, to the People's Republic of China (PRC).

2. The Reagan administration originally had proposed 120,000 Indochinese admissions—out of 173,000 total refugee admissions—but reduced this figure due to congressional opposition. Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs , Report to Congress, Proposed Refugee Admissions and Allocations for Fiscal Year 1982 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1981). By comparison, the ceiling for fiscal year 1980 was 168,000, out of 221,000 total admissions. A similar figure was authorized for fiscal year 1981, although only 132,035 Indochinese were admitted.

3. The immediate effect of the Thai policy was a diversion of incoming boats to Malaysia, both spontaneously and directed by local Thai officials in the South. See Bangkok Post, 5 Jan. 1982.

4. There are no authoritative figures on the proportion of category 4(e) arrivals for recent years. The State Department has the raw data but has not released any tabulations, even though the extent of economic refugees in the Indochinese flow has been a central point in the U.S. debate. Some officials suggest that maybe 40 percent of recent arrivals fall in the 4(e) category. An analysis of a sample in early 1980 found about 60 percent to be in the somewhat larger category 4; see U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee , Indochinese Refugees: The Impact on First Asylum Countries and Implications for American Policy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980).

5. See, for example, Errol de Silva , “Rebel Activities Mount in Laos,” Bangkok Post, 19 July 1981.

6. More may want to join those who have been resettled in the PRC from Thailand, totaling 2700 so far.

7. For a Malaysian perspective, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad , “Vietnamese Refugees and ASEAN,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 1(1):6 (May 1979).

8. Marjorie Niehaus , “Indochinese Refugees: Causes, Impact, Prospects” (Issue Brief, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Apr. 1981).

9. Thai officials also returned several Lao in the 1977-79 period despite objections from the Laotian government, the UNHCR, and the United States. These Lao were simply sent back across the Mekong River. At least some were killed by Laotian forces who patrolled the border to intercept insurgents, and who could not—or would not—distinguish between guerrillas and noncombatants.

10.

10. For a more balanced analysis, which takes into account the consequences of a long war, natural disasters, international isolation, and pull factors, see United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sadruddin Aga Khan, Special Rapporteur , Study on Human Rights and Massive Exoduses, E/CN.4/1503 (31 Dec. 1981).

11.

11. The Lao resistance movement remains strong in the Nongkhai and Ubon camps. For instance, resistance leaders in the Ubon camp organized a rally of 10,000 who denounced Soviet and Vietnamese imperialism and submitted a petition to the local UNHCR representative for a separate peace zone in southern Laos. The demonstration was timed to coincide with the U.N. international conference on Kampuchea in July 1981, which focused on Soviet and Vietnamese imperialism in Kampuchea. See Bangkok Post, 14 July 1981.

12.

12. For further discussion, see Astri Suhrke , “ASEAN: Adjusting to New Regional Alignments,” Asia Pacific Community, 12:11 (Spring 1981).

13.

13. See Peter A. Poole , The Vietnamese in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).