Large-scale refugee flows, typically occurring in developing countries, inspire the formation of transnational networks that pose new issues of policymaking, direction, execution, and legitimacy. Institutional responses to the presence of refugees, often in the poorest and least well-administered areas on earth, comprise reactions at the local, national, and transnational levels, including both intergovernmental and voluntary organizations. These responses produce ad hoc organizational entities to deal with unanticipated difficulties. Even after news of a refugee flow is spread, governments can still adopt an isolating policy but more likely will be forced to turn to such transnational networks for help. In a widely felt political disturbance, the positions of the great powers will have a substantial conditioning effect on the handling of refugees. Whatever the pattern of response, refugees tend to involve the asylum state in transnational networks in order to cope with local repercussions as well as care of those in fight. Later, the emphasis may well shift from emergency to diplomatic networks as efforts are made to find a means of liquidating refugee incidents. The character of these networks is shifting and unpredictable, conditioned by specific circumstances. Nevertheless, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other intergovernmental bodies serve as natural nuclei for expansion. More integrated modes of organization currently are of doubtful utility.
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1. This has been the case at least since 1971, when the tremendous exodus of Bengalis to India accompanied the creation of Bangladesh. Some two-thirds of the world's 12 million refugees are in Africa and Asia, according to recent estimates. For additional statistics, see the annual World Refugee Survey (New York: U.S. Committee for Refugees).
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2. By networks, I mean interlocking organizations and persons who set policy or administer programs that have to do with services to refugees. These networks are characterized by active communication, some common tasks, and the common concern of coping with one or more situations posed by refugees. Any network may include national, transnational, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental actors in various proportions, but all are characterized by their extension beyond national boundaries. They may or may not exist for long periods and can be formed for only a single task. The skills of some of the actors make it likely that at least some of them will reappear in more than one incident.
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3. In 1981, UNHCR had personnel in more than 50 countries; see U.N. Doc. A/Ac.96/594 (10 Aug. 1981). Furthermore, through nongovernmental organizations, other intergovernmental bodies, including the yet wider U.N. Development Programme network, and through diplomatic missions in Geneva and New York, UNHCR can establish contact with refugee situations anywhere. Whether the governments involved want such attention is another question.
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4. As of mid-1981, the convention of the 1967 Protocol, which has equivalent effect, had 90 adherents, and more were expected. This does not mean that governments universally refrain from forcible repatriation or easily grant asylum. See U.N. Doc. A/Ac.96/593 (31 July 1981).
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5. It does not automatically follow from the existence of refugees, even those caused by fighting, that the Security Council or the General Assembly will take up the matter.
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6. Cooperation for the development of the Mekong River Valley, involving Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, dates back to the 1950s. It is supervised through the U.N. Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific. After interruptions caused by war, at least some cooperation for planning is under way again. Yearbook of the United Nations 1978 (New York: United Nations, 1980), p. 583. Cambodia did not take part in the small-scale renewal because of the lack of agreement on who represents the country.
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It is clear that a relationship between support for economic development, most of which does not come from the United States, and refugee assistance cannot be avoided. Afghanistan asserts from time to time that Pakistan fabricates stories about military attacks on the refugee camps in order to get more assistance. For example, see New York Times, 20 Nov. 1981, p. 16. Interviews in Pakistan during 1981 indicated that officials concerned with refugee affairs understood that the American proposals, which were directed mainly at stabilizing the situation in the Persian Gulf and checking Soviet influence, necessarily affected, if not determined, the level of assistance for refugees funneled through multilateral channels.
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8. Actors in transnational networks depend on the consent of a host government for their ability to operate. They have little ability to act without status granted by a host and hesitate to do so in order to avoid damaging future operations and relationships.
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After the pacification, some of the refugees, aided by UNHCR and private groups, sought to return but were harassed by the Zairean soldiers whose indiscipline has caused so much damage since 1960. See Africa Contemporary Record 1978-1979, p. B580.
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10. In fact, the unwillingness of Thailand to give additional thousands of Cambodians asylum resulted in a shifting mass of miserable people around the border, where armed camps of several political movements deepened the dangers. The result was improvisation of relief efforts so that the internal networks of trade and smuggling brought some life-saving supplies into Cambodia. UNICEF and the ICRC led the way at the worst of the crisis during 1979-80. UNHCR and its networks dealt exclusively with those refugees who had asylum.
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11. At the same time, the better the services become, the easier it is to postpone repatriation and to become dependent on camp life. Moreover, refugees who become administrators have a good position from which to try to develop political influence. In either case, termination of refugee status becomes more difficult.
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12. Formally speaking, it is always in control, and the intergovernmental organizations go to considerable lengths to protect this formal dominance, even while acting so as partially to undermine it.
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13. The importance of conventional diplomatic networks should not be overlooked. A skillful and sensitive ambassador of a national government can often make suggestions that an international officer would hesitate to voice.
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14. The Ethiopian Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation claimed in the Executive Committee of the UNHCR's program that Ethiopia had only once, in 1978, received the attention it deserved. He asserted that the provision of assistance to one area and not adjacent areas could contribute to the influx of refugees. While this government was grateful for a contribution of $14 million for returnees, much more was needed. U.N. Doc. A/Ac.96/SR.33 (22 Oct. 1981). His appeal referred specifically to displaced persons as a source of refugees.
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15. To state this point in another way, when a security issue enters the agenda of government, it is likely that other issues will take second place. For an extended treatment, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), ch. 2.
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16. This action at least implies that the right of emigration, declared in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, may be denied.
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17. Most of the Zimbabweans who wanted to return from Mozambique or Zambia had to wait only a few weeks after the end of fighting, and within a few weeks the entire repatriation had been executed with UNHCR as the lead agency. UNHCR also was asked to help with the reintegration of the returnees. A brief description appears in U.N. General Assembly, Official Records: 35th Session, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, pp. 29-30.
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18. UNHCR officials list this resettlement in a country of first asylum as a success at low cost, but unreleased reports commissioned by UNHCR cast some doubt on assumptions made about spontaneous resettlement and the costs of such enterprises.
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19. Sudan summoned a conference to consider its plans in June 1980. See [Sudan] National Committee for Aid to Refugees, Documentation for the Conference and Final Report (Khartoum, 1980).
