Intergovernmental Redirection

Abstract

Intergovernmental reformers have long attempted to remedy the system's more apparent defects, especially the recent buildup in federal-state-local relations as Washington's involvement became broader and deeper. These remedies have included incremental and procedural changes, rationalization of federal aid and program delivery instruments, and total overhaul of the system through functional realignment. Efforts in the past have proved only marginally successful, essentially due to the fact that Congress had become the dominant architect and defender of the system. The world of intergovernmental relations changed dramatically from 1978 on, due to the poor performance of the economy, antitax and antispending sentiment, public-sector retrenchment, and fiscal deterioration at the federal level. Decentralization, competition, and fragmentation characterize the contemporary do-it-yourself federalism. President Reagan's proposed swap, turnback, and trust-fund package of New Federalism seeks to capture these changes in a system realignment. I examine these changes in light of whither intergovernmental relations go in the 1980s.

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References

1. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) , The Federal Role in the Federal System: Hearings on the Federal Role (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1980), p. 50.

2. John W. Burgess , “The American Commonwealth: Changes in Its Relations to the Nation,” Political Science Quarterly, 1:9-33 (1881).

3. ACIR , A Crisis of Confidence and Competence (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1981), pp. 3-7.

4. See Deil S. Wright , Understanding Intergovernmental Relations (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1978), p. 8.

5. Carl W. Stenberg , “Beyond the Days of Wine and Roses: Intergovernmental Management in a Cutback Environment,” Public Administration Review, 41(1):10-19 (Jan. 1981).

6. ACIR , The Federal Role in the Federal System: An Agenda for Restoring Confidence and Competence (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1981), ch. 4.

7. See Donald Haider , When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying (New York: Free Press, 1974), ch. 2.

8. See Richard P. Nathan , The Plot that Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency (New York: John Wiley, 1975), ch. 2; and The Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1982, Special Analyses, H (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 1981), pp. 239-247.

9. For a research summary on block grants, see Intergovernmental Perspective, 7(2):8-17 (Spring 1981).

10.

10. ACIR , 1981, Changing Public Attitudes on Government and Taxes (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1981), pp. 3-5.

11.

11. ACIR , Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1980-81 Edition (Washington, DC: ACIR, 1981), pp. 7-9.

12.

12. ACIR , An Agenda for Restoring Confidence and Competence, ch. 4.

13.

13. Acceptance Speech of Ronald Reagan at the Republican National Convention, Detroit, MI, 26 July 1980.

14.

14. See The White House , Federalism: The First 10 Months—A Report from the President (Washington, DC: The White House, 1981).

15.

and National Tax Journal: New Directions in Federal Tax and Expenditure Policies, 35(3):231-306 (Sept. 1982).

16.

16. Rochelle Stanfield , “Reagan's New Federalism,” National Journal, 9:357 (27 Feb. 1982).

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17. A. J. Davis and S. K. Howard , “Perspectives on a `New Day' for Federalism,” Intergovernmental Perspective, 8(2):9-21 (Spring 1982).

18.

18. See David Broder's coverage of the National Governors Association 1982 Annual Meeting, Washington Post, 10-12 Aug. 1982, p. 1.

19.

19. ACIR , The Future of Federalism in the 1980s (Washington, DC: ACIR, July 1981), p. 8.