Democratic governments often promise political change, but have difficulty delivering it. The capacity of each state to formulate and implement innovative forms of policy varies across nations. In particular, it is affected by the structural features of the state itself, of state-society relations, and of social institutions in each nation. This article focuses on one facet of the structure of the state, the organization of the politics-administration nexus, in Britain and France. Its purpose is to compare the impacts of different forms of politician-civil-servant relations on the capacity of governments to innovate. After a consideration of the general problems associated with governmental innovation, four conditions conducive to innovation are identified. The dimensions of the politics-administration nexus associated with the position of the chief executive, interministerial coordination, departmental innovation, and the character of the higher civil service in both nations are examined, with a view to ascertaining the extent to which these conditions are present in Britain and France. Finally, the implications of this analysis for the United States are reviewed.
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57.
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