The Political-Structural Basis for Economic Performance

Abstract

Focusing on France, Great Britain, Sweden, and the United States, this study attempts to answer two basic questions. First, how does one explain the variation across these countries in the organizational structure and the power of the working class? Second, for the period since 1950 how does variation in the organizational structure, the power of the working class, and the structure of the state influence such economic performances as inequality in the distribution of income and rates of change in economic productivity? Whereas the discipline of economics generally explains these performances with economic variables, this article is distinctive in demonstrating that political variables are also important. The findings indicate that the encompassing group structure of Swedish labor unions has maximized equality in income distribution and high rates of change in economic productivity while the fragmented and nonencompassing group structure of American labor has had the opposite effect. Sweden and the United States are polar opposites, with the British and French cases falling between the two extremes on most variables.

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References

1. For example, see Theodore J. Lowi , The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: Norton, 1969); Kwang Choi, “The Political Economy of Comparative Growth Rates” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1979); idem, “A Statistical Test of the Political Economy of Comparative Growth Rates Model” (Paper delivered at the Eastern Economic Association, May 10-12, 1979); Grant McConnell , Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1966); Robert J. Lieber , “Interest Groups and Political Integration: British Entry into Europe,” in Pressure Groups in Britain, eds. Richard Kimber and J. J. Richardson (London: Dent, 1974); Robert Hanneman, “Long-Run Changes in Economic Inequality in Britain, France, and Germany, 1850 to 1970: A Political-Sociological Explanation” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1979). The following paper by Mancur Olson was especially helpful and explicitly contains several of these hypotheses: “The Political Economy of Comparative Growth Rates,” in U.S. Economic Growth from 1976 to 1986: Prospects, Problems, and Patterns, Studies Prepared for the Use of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

John D. Stephens , The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (New York: Macmillan, 1979).

idem, Elites in French Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

Colin Crouch , The Politics of Industrial Relations (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Andrew Martin , The Politics of Economic Policy in the United States: A Tentative View from a Comparative Perspective (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1973).

6. Herbert Stein , The Fiscal Revolution in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).