Abstract
As the debate over the merits and demerits of technology trade between East and West gathered force in the 1970s, an awareness slowly dawned that the issues at stake touch the fortunes not only of the United States but those of her allies as well, including Japan. Japan's own success with technology imports, beginning only a few decades ago, gives grounds for new fears regarding future competitiveness on the part of a reinvigorated Soviet economy. Further, Japan's raw-materials vulnerability and the importance of export markets to her economy have led some to suggest that Japanese technology trade with Communist nations might leave her leadership politically vulnerable to pressure from Moscow and elsewhere. As this article demonstrates, such fears are largely groundless. The Japanese and Soviet approaches to technology transfer for economic development display far more differences than similarities. Likewise, in terms of a potential Japanese export dependency on Soviet markets, Tokyo remains more critical to Moscow than the reverse. From the perspective of Japanese import dependency, especially in the energy sector, a review of the statistical picture that can be drawn up for Japanese-Soviet energy cooperation in Siberia reveals that the Soviet contribution to Japan's energy balance, even in 1990, will be quite minimal. The real issue, this article concludes, arises from the need for the United States to develop a policy for the control of technology trade between East and West that will reflect the needs and perspectives of all Western allies, rather than those of the United States alone.
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