Maritime Doctrines and Capabilities: The United States and the Soviet Union

Abstract

During the past two decades, the sea power of the Soviet Union has undergone remarkable growth in size as well as capability. At the same time, that of the United States has suffered steady decline. Moscow has moved deliberately to exploit its new-found maritime outreach for political purposes, while ensuring that its sea power will be capable of successfully discharging far more important wartime functions. The maritime lessons that clearly have been assimilated by the leaders in the Kremlin have just as obviously been ignored by Western governments in general and the United States in particular. Unless these present trends are reversed, the outlook for Western industrialized nations—heavily dependent on use of the seas as they are—is grim. Indications from the Reagan administration suggest that a resuscitation of the American Navy is about to begin. There is a very long way to go, however, and if in the meantime U.S. allies and friends do not make a serious effort to assume their fair share of the burden, they may find themselves left in the lurch if the United States is ultimately forced to take unilateral action to protect its own interests, the needs of its allies notwithstanding.