Abstract
The character and capabilities of the Rapid Deployment Force formed by the Carter administration in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan do not reflect sufficient appreciation of the two pivotal conditions governing any U.S. attempt to mount a credible military defense of its vital interests in the Persian Gulf region: (1) the lack of secure military access ashore in the region, and (2) an unavoidable reliance on forces already committed to the defense of Europe and other areas outside the Gulf. The problem of access is critical, since the present RDF is composed largely of units whose ability to go ashore is dependent upon uncontested prehostilities entry into ports and airfields, and whose ability to sustain combat, once ashore, is contingent on the availability of a massive, land-based logistical infrastructure. In effect, the utility of the RDF as an instrument of U.S. military power in the Gulf region has been staked on the presumed political goodwill under crisis conditions of unstable potential host regimes whose security interests are not identical to those of the United States. In lieu of secure access ashore, the present RDF should be replaced by a sea-based and sea-supplied intervention force supplemented by enhanced amphibious assault and other forcible-entry capabilities.
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