Arms Control in a Nuclear Armed World?

Abstract

Beyond a continuing effort to inhibit further nuclear proliferation, the proper shape and direction of arms control policies for a nuclear-armed world are not at all apparent. Many of the more popular arms control ideas that are discussed in the hypothetical context of a nuclear-armed world do not fare well under close critical examination. Specifically, the arms control value of attempts by well- established nuclear-weapon states at nuclear deemphasis, of issuing broad nuclear guarantees of the security of non- nuclear states, and of proffering advanced conventional weaponry in lieu of nuclear weapons are not viable save under very restricted conditions. Probably the most challeng ing arms control question for a nuclear-armed world will pertain to the area of nuclear weapon safety. Technical assistance to new nuclear-weapon states could greatly reduce the risks of accident or the anxieties that must attend recognized first-strike vulnerabilities, but such assistance would also, unfortunately, remove an important argument discouraging proliferation and render a crude capability more ready—for a wide variety of possible policy ends. The arms control challenge in a nuclear-armed world will be a need to accommodate some nuclear use and a readiness to exploit the reactions to such use for the end of greater international stability.