Reducing the Incentives to Proliferation

Abstract

There are two very different kinds of incentives to nuclear proliferation. We are used to seeing nations deter potential enemies and win political concessions with such weapons. A newer, very different, kind of incentive stems from the economic overlap between peaceful electric power reactors and the production of weapons-grade plutonium or enriched uranium; there may now be an economic cost to steering away from the bomb, rather than a cost to making it. Reducing the political-military incentives to proliferation will require a case-by-case approach. Some of these incen tives can be decreased by extending the American nuclear umbrella, as for Europe and Japan. But a serious problem can then emerge in preventing proliferation by such "outlaw states" as South Africa, Israel, and Taiwan. For much of the world, moreover, the bomb will be more of a political- prestige item than a military tool, so that a superpower nuclear umbrella would be redundant or counter-productive. Reducing the economic incentives will also require a case-by- case approach. This cannot be achieved by simply cutting off technological assistance in the nuclear field. Rather, it must be done by using such assistance as a subtle "carrot" or "stick," to persuade the leaders of countries like Brazil and Japan to stay away from bombs.