Abstract
Non-proliferation is basically a political objec tive, which because of the technical nature of the problem and because the world is faced with the likelihood of the rapid spread of nuclear technology, requires technical means of implementation. It should be obvious that tech nology as such cannot solve what is essentially an issue of international politics, but the two have to complement each other. This point has not been well understood by the world's arms control community. International safeguards, as currently administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, have a number of definite—and expected—technical limitations. Moreover, if the system of safeguards is to be effective, answers will have to be found for a number of political questions, such as "What is a meaningful level of nuclear armament for a country?" or "What international sanctions would be available in the event of the diversion of nuclear material?" At the same time, unlike other verification measures in various arms control agreements, the system of nuclear safeguards has special features which make it uniquely feasible if applied under correct circumstances. Safeguards can be a meaningful and powerful tool of an inter national non-proliferation regime if combined with political and other considerations and properly orchestrated.
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