Why States Go—And Don't Go—Nuclear

Abstract

The incentives and disincentives for countries to go nuclear comprise a combination of military, political, and economic concerns and motivations. These vary over time for different countries. For countries allied to one of the two nuclear superpowers, concern about their military security is not a predominant factor, while it is the decisive one for the non-nuclear countries who are not under the nuclear umbrella of a superpower and who perceive serious threats to their security. For countries without acute security problems, the political and economic motivations are the predominant ones and these include such incentives as strengthening their independence and increasing their status and prestige in the world. The disincentives are largely potential, ranging from effective security guarantees through adequate supplies of conventional armaments to assurances concerning future supplies of fissile materials. Incentives to go nuclear appear to outweigh the disincentives. Only drastic measures by the nuclear powers in the way of security assurances, nuclear disarmament, and the creation of a more just political and economic world order can serve to prevent the emergence of a proliferated world.