Revenue Sharing and Structural Features of American Federalism

Abstract

This article examines the impact of general revenue sharing on three structural features of American federalism: (1) governmental entities (number and employ ment) ; (2) institutions and actors' roles; and (3) behavioral perspectives. Revenue sharing will probably inhibit the further proliferation of special districts, sustain some town ships that might atrophy, increase public employment levels, and foster or accentuate the secular shift of state govern ment toward a service-oriented component of the federal system. General revenue sharing is both a cause and an effect of pluralistic power patterns. It is an important resource for political-administrative generalists in counteracting the influence of functional or program specialists. The generalist coalition, however, exhibits fragile features when compared with the strengths of policy making subsystems in Washing ton. Existing competitive, taut, and tension-laden inter governmental relationships are in part the product of partic ipants' perceptions. General revenue sharing appears to have relaxed tense relations by altering behavioral perspectives.