Committees and the Norm of Specialization

Abstract

The need for congressmen to specialize and acquire expertise in a limited number of policy areas is so universally conceded as to be labelled a norm of legislative behavior. Specialization is intimately tied to the ability of Congress to make informed voting decisions on a wide range of issues; congressmen often rely upon expert colleagues for information and advice on bills beyond their own expertise. More importantly, specialization, especially as facilitated by the committee system, is an adaptive response to the resource advantages possessed by the executive branch; specialization facilitates congressional performance of the oversight function. In order to determine why and in what areas a congressman will specialize, attention must be given to the member's goals, personal and professional background and electoral situation. Levels of specialization differ across the House and Senate, between national and state legislatures, across committees, and over time. Specialization, particularly as manifested through the committee and subcommittee systems, has both intended and unintended consequences. Foremost among the latter is the differential access to government specialization provides various groups. Finally, the extent of specialization will be affected by changes in the committee system.