Domestic Constraints on Alternative Chinese Military Policies and Strategies in the 1970s

Abstract

China's ability to mobilize and deploy military power in the 1970s will be determined largely by domestic political, economic, and military trends. A continuing political struggle for authority between central and regional power groups is not likely to undermine significantly the dominance of the Shenyang, Peking, Nanking, and Canton Military Regions, nor alter the fact of a coalition government—presently under the guidance of Chou En-lai. Economic trends toward increased regional self-interest and self-sufficiency may be arrested in part by the efforts of central authority to retain control over the most important sectors of the military industrial mobilization base. To some degree, Chinese central leaders may be able to import advanced technology with which to improve their leverage over domestic adversaries. However, continued emphasis on agriculture and a shortage of investment resources may be expected to severely constrain budgetary resources available for either imports or weapons development. The role of the military in society is likely to remain significant, although it seems clear that Chou En-lai and others wish to reduce their influence over the civil polity. All military leaders, with the exception of a minority concerned with nuclear weapons, may be expected to retain a primary interest in internal security problems, namely, the problem of stability. Thus, because such problems require conventional rather than nuclear weapons, those leaders are likely to alter the mix of resource allocations to weapons in favor of a better balance between the two systems. Strategic defense rather than offensive capability, is likely to retain first priority.