The Persian Gulf: British Withdrawal and Western Security

Abstract

When the British government in January 1968 announced that it would withdraw from the Persian Gulf before the end of 1971, American security planners on the Middle East became uneasy. In their view, the central struc ture of the Western security system east of Suez would be dismantled at a time when the United States could not replace it adequately. The primary anxiety was to protect the Gulf sources of oil supply for Western security, industry, and international-payments balances. Britain's last-minute patch work designed to knit the shaykhdoms together in a durable union seem less promising, given the endemic territorial dis putes from which no riparian state is exempt, than Anglo- American efforts to erect a stable regional system in the Gulf. The paper, written so soon after the British pull-out, rests on an assessment of the structure that has now largely been taken down. For the time being Iranian military build-up in the Gulf enjoys Western support. The continued token American naval presence at Bahrain and the residual token British pres ence in the sultanate of Oman offer limited reassurance against possible Soviet attempts to establish a naval anchorage in the Gulf. The old system, undeniably, has gone. The new has not yet taken firm shape. At this stage, it is best not to project the outcome, but to keep one's fingers crossed.