The American Concern in Cyprus

Abstract

In the wake of Vietnam and in the era of the Nixon Doctrine of low profile, the United States is hard pressed to justify direct intervention in so-called backyard wars. Still, a policy dilemma exists for America: whether to run the risk of doing nothing in such disputes and hope they do not escalate into conflicts of sweeping international propor tions ; or to find when and in what ways to become involved in order to further its national interests. When such a dispute involves two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) treaty allies, as it does with Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, the policy options are less clear. Recognizing that a positive action toward one side would alienate the other—and that no action could likely alienate both sides—the U.S. chose the policy of quiet diplomacy, thus becoming the honest broker trying to keep the Cyprus crisis within manageable proportions. Even when America had to take strong diplomatic recourse in the crises of 1964 and 1967, the goal was strict impartiality in order to perpetuate the southeastern flank of NATO and to maintain the fragile stability in the eastern Mediterranean. This article deals with the considerations that brought America into attempts to settle the postindependence dispute in Cyprus and how this has affected its international relations, particularly with Turkey.