Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Perspective on Their Reform

Abstract

Since 1937, five major governmental studies have analyzed the problems of independent regulatory commissions in the government and have prescribed reforms. The Presi dent's Committee on Administrative Management (1937) pro posed the departmentalization of independent commissions. The First Hoover Commission (1949) relied heavily on vesting responsibility in the chairmen. The Second Hoover Commis sion (1955) dealt almost entirely with improving internal pro cedures and separating the functions of prosecuting and deci sion-making. The Landis Report (1960) stressed the need to appoint better qualified commissioners. In 1971, the Presi dent's Advisory Council on Executive Organization (Ash Coun cil) criticized their multiheaded direction, the judicial cast of their activities, and the misalignment of certain functional re sponsibilities. These several reports, however, failed to deal with regulatory programs in the departments. It is important to focus on such factors as soundness of objectives, quality of leadership and professional staffing, influence of regulated groups on agency regulation, relation of rulemaking to adjudi cation, and the experience of departmental programs. The greatest need is to focus attention on strategies likely to be useful in achieving public purposes.