Abstract
Pessimism about the usefulness of national advisory commission studies of episodes of collective violence results in part from undue attention to the short-term fate of commission recommendations that particular governmental actions be taken in response to the violence. The major part of the true usefulness of commissions lies rather in their special ability to transmit to the public and to political leaders find ings of fact about the causes and consequences of episodes of collective violence. It is chiefly through the persuasiveness of these findings that commissions actually do make a signif icant contribution to the determination of public policy. The quality of commission findings about collective violence, and hence their persuasiveness, can be improved to the extent that the social sciences provide commissions with a better understanding of commonly-used analytical concepts, such as "political action," "cause," "intent," "leader," "demand," "grievance." With examples from current commission litera ture (chiefly the Kerner Report), it is argued that sharpen ing these analytical tools can pay large dividends in public understanding of, and response to, episodes of collective violence.
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