Abstract
A new four-power balance is emerging in East Asia. This is the product of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the re-emergence of Japan, and the trend toward a reduced United States military role in the region. The balance will create new problems, but new opportunities as well. It will involve increased fluidity, competition, and maneuver. Yet, in a basic sense, the balance may prove to be relatively stable, because dramatic realignments among the major powers in the region do not seem likely in the next decade. Hopefully, the balance may tend to reduce the dangers of local conflicts escalating into confrontations between major powers. Some developments, such as a Sino-Soviet war, a decision by Japan to "go nuclear," or increased big-power confrontation in the Indo-China area, could upset the balance. However, if these dangers can be avoided, the new quadrilateral balance may over time prove to be an improvement over the bipolar balance of the past. Virtually every country in the region will have to reassess its situation, interests, and policies, in some respects. The United States should move to implement the Guam Doctrine and adjust its policies toward China. It should maintain its alliance with Japan and the stability of U.S.-Soviet strategic relations, but it should use what influence it can to prevent a Sino-Soviet war or a decision by Japan to acquire nuclear weapons.
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