Presidents,Politics,and International Intervention

Abstract

In repudiating isolationism after World War II, the internationalists did not specify any principle of discrimination for our involvement beyond an undisputed interest in saving Europe. Two conditions prevented a thoughtful sifting of American interests and opportunities after World War II: the need to mobilize American political consent for an international role and the obtrusiveness of the Soviet Communist enemy. Furthermore, the political costs that the Truman administration incurred after 1948 by appearing to let Nationalist China fall led every presidential administration since then to adopt a cover-all-bets strategy toward the Communist world. The Korean war predisposed the voting public to want some solution, and they turned to Eisenhower. The election of 1956 indicated a broad public confidence in him; yet, his critics were able to capitalize on anxieties over his apparent complacency about the foreign developments that Sputnik triggered in 1957. Kennedy used foreign policy as a political opportunity, capitalizing on the demands of foreign policy to expand his popularity quickly. Johnson gave himself over to a military solution in Vietnam in an effort to keep ahead of public impatience over the war. The Nixon administration's early strategy seems to be to encourage a reduction of public attention to Vietnam and other foreign-policy issues and a return to deferential public attitudes reminiscent of Eisenhower's first term. That may be essential to win public acceptance of any feasible Vietnam settlement. As for the future, Vietnam makes it possible now to abandon the cover-all-bets strategy.