The Negotiated Guilty Plea

Abstract

Plea-bargaining engenders disquiet, partly be cause it is not a formally recognized part of the criminal process and partly because its results are unobserved and largely uncontrolled. These results are frequently arbitrary and often do not meet correctional needs. Finally, existing plea-bargaining practices are marked by fears of unfairness and corruption and an air of hypocrisy. A procedure resem bling plea-bargaining is needed to provide a place in the crimi nal process for ameliorative discretion to work, but existing practice is badly in need of reform. The President's Com mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the National Crime Commission) concludes that such reform is possible. Its recommendations are designed to make these negotiations a legitimate part of the system, to exploit their potential for improving decisions on what is to be done with the convicted offender, and to design a more suitable role for the trial judge. When plea- bargaining is considered in the setting of the criminal justice system, it becomes apparent that procedural reform will not suffice without additional men and money. Moreover, changing the plea system brings to the surface troublesome questions concerning the position and function of the prose cutor, defense counsel, and judge. Resolution of these issues must accompany procedural reform.