Abstract
Communist China in 1949 held that there was no middle ground between alignment either with the United States or the Soviet Union. From the time of the Bandung Confer ence, however, Peking accepted nonalignment as possible and legitimate. Its approach to nonalignment states was made in identification of Communist China with underdeveloped coun tries under a nationalist leadership, struggling against imperi alism. The United States was cast in the role of leader of imperialism, and the common struggle was against American imperialism. Thus the Chinese Communists sought to lead the nonaligned states away from the United States rather than toward the Communist camp. A "soft" line was generally used except toward India, against which attacks were launched to extend China's territorial position and to create fear of China's power. The controversy with the Soviet Union over "revision ism" led finally to attempts to detach aligned and nonaligned states from Moscow. Russia was covertly charged with align ment with American imperialism. The underdeveloped states were urged to follow a policy of self-reliance since it was dan gerous to accept assistance from either the United States or the Soviet Union, and the situation in China precluded offers of substantial assistance.
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