The Turn toward Peace

Abstract

Several cumulative forces produced the test-ban treaty. There was mutual realization that we are in the final arms race and that neither side can "win" it. A deep rift between Russia and China and growing polycentrism in East Europe made it impossible to believe longer in the myth of an overhanging Red monolith, while understanding grew that Russia's position since 1945 has been basically defensive. We remembered at last what World War II had done to her, as the power stalemate enforced a growing acceptance of the con sequences of that war. This long-delayed mood was unex pectedly and powerfully accelerated by the epochal work of Pope John XXIII, who moved the Roman Catholic church into accommodation with the postwar world and toward a true world community. All of these great forces focused on President Kennedy, and he voiced them magnificently in three historic addresses, proving again that both vision and courage are essential to world leadership. But can he really succeed in making the long-delayed peace? The records of 1955 and 1960, when President Eisenhower's initiatives for peace were frustrated in Washington, are not likely to be repeated by Kennedy's associates. The tactics of the great forces which profit from the Cold War are also now fully known. Kennedy has demonstrated a capacity for greatness in world leadership, but his place in history could be reduced from eminence to mediocrity, or worse, by failure to extricate us from the quagmire in South Vietnam or by carrying on a long, drawn-out struggle with China for control of her harbors, islands, and small neighbors. The nuclear age requires peace with China, too.