Abstract
Russian and Chinese national interests tend to ward opposition. The Sino-Soviet alliance is wholly due to seizure of power by Chinese Communists and to conflict with the same enemies. Economic, military, and diplomatic dis parities have created a lopsided material dependence of Com munist China on the Soviet Union, resulting in divergent views on priorities within the alliance, and have caused them to dis agree on proper strategy in relation to the United States, anti- imperialist revolutionary movements, and independent neutral powers. Among states governed by totalitarian, ideological parties, these disagreements have naturally assumed the form of different interpretations of the common doctrine. Lacking other means of effective pressure on the Soviets, the Chinese have developed these differences into a systematic challenge to Soviet ideological authority. A Soviet attempt to evade this challenge and to preserve unity on the basis of toleration of in evitable differences and adjustment by compromise has failed; both sides have recognized the inevitability of factional schism for some time. They have built two rival Communist camps with separate policies. Underlying opposition of national in terests is increasingly appearing, and doctrinal differences are hardening. Though a serious attempt to return to policy co ordination is unlikely, the formal bond of the alliance may well continue as reinsurance against the common enemy so long as both countries are ruled by Communist party regimes.
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