Sino-Soviet Military Relations

Abstract

Military relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China were never as close as many have assumed, and since 1960 they have been virtually nonexistent. The Chinese have accepted a penalty to their military power as part of the cost of challenging Moscow's leadership in the Com munist world. For the Soviets, the cost has been slight, though they have expended whatever leverage in mutual relations their selective military aid once gave them. In the postwar con cluding phase of the Chinese civil war, Soviet support to the Chinese Communists was quite limited. During the Korean war, considerable supply of weapons was provided, though China was compelled to purchase this materiel. Only in the post-Stalin period was selective assistance given to building a Chinese capacity to produce its own conventional weapons and even more circumscribed support to nonweapons nuclear de velopment and to modern aircraft and missile development. But, as a consequence of declining political relations, as ear lier noted, even this assistance was virtually cut off in 1960. Moreover, the Soviets have clearly kept a close leash on mili tary commitments to support Communist China. These limi tations on weapons and commitments, limiting in turn Chinese freedom of action, have clearly been one of the sources of the Chinese impetus to acquire their own nuclear military power.