Abstract
The Franco-German treaty does not represent a move toward genuine European unity; it is a mistake in terms of promoting unification in that it is an exclusive treaty. An adequate defense of Western democratic values requires a multinational treaty that includes all the North Atlantic countries, one which repudiates authoritarianism, dogmatism, and exclusive nationalism and provides for mutual consulta tion and close co-operation on all levels. World War II was followed by a period of political and economic weakness in Europe during which old-style nationalism appeared to wane. Recovery, which Western Europe owes to the United States, led, at least in France, to the resurgence of old nationalism, which turned against the United States, and to the revival of hegemonic aspirations. NATO, conceived not solely to defeat the Soviets but also to strengthen democracy, freedom, and wel fare within Western civilization, was weakened as Europeans came to lose much of their fear of Soviet military aggression. It is principally President de Gaulle of France who does not believe in a united Europe or in an Atlantic community or in the United Nations. He is unable to understand that neither the United States nor Great Britain is as passionately national istic as he is He is anxious to assure primacy for France in Western Europe and to make of continental Europe a third force in world affairs. In view of this, the United States should not attempt to exercise its hegemony as such but should, rather, set an example of true co-operation and consultation.—Ed.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
