Cuba: A Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Political Power by the Application of Unconventional Warfare

Abstract

The form of violence resorted to by Fidel Castro and his followers was guerrilla warfare. In contrast with the traditional coup d'état of Latin-American politics, the Cuban revolution led by Castro involved protracted military warfare and sweeping social, economic, and political changes. Among the factors which appear to correlate with Castro's successful seizure of political power are the undermining of the moral authority of the regime of Fulgencio Batista; the exploitation of the charismatic qualities of Castro's style of leadership; the attraction of support among the peasantry; the initial retention of middle-class adherents; the application of the military doc trines of guerrilla warfare; and the neutralization of the power of the United States. Lessons drawn from this seizure of power must be stated cautiously and, inevitably, will reflect our preconceptions. The Cuban experience, however, suggests that guerrilla warfare is not exclusively a problem in military tactics, that publicity may promote the interests of a guerrilla movement, that the motivations of guerrilla leaders probably originate in distinctive traits of personality, that persons with rural backgrounds and residence provide indispensable support for a guerrilla army, and that each guerrilla movement appears to incorporate certain unique elements. An extensive commit ment to guerrilla warfare, accordingly, may not represent the most appropriate response of a highly industrialized country to hostile guerrilla activity in another country. The United States, in order to cope with the problems associated with guerrilla warfare, requires a relevant model of the future which allows for change.