Abstract
The United States alliance with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan is a form of armed intervention in the in ternal affairs of China. Today it is clear that the aims of that policy cannot be realized in the visible future. The costs of maintaining Chiang Kai-shek far exceed the American invest ment in nonmilitary help to other Asian lands; preoccupation with armed answers to the challenge of poverty obscures American understanding of the real needs of all underdeveloped countries. State Department justifications for continued non- recognition of China are threadbare; defining functional alter natives is not easy. Outstanding Sino-American issues are negotiable, given the will on both sides. The future of Taiwan most likely would be settled, once serious "recognition talks" began, by compromise between Peking and the Taiwan succes sors to Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Recognition by the United States and the United Nations would greatly enhance the in ternational prestige of the People's Republic of China. It would mean serious modifications in the cold war and accept ance of the implications of a prolonged period of competitive co-existence. Recognition, therefore, is not something to be lightly undertaken without a clear alternative program and dy namic concepts and means of winning the "battle" of competi tive co-existence. Continuation of our present policy will, however, lose that battle to the Communist bloc by default.
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