Abstract
No fundamental change is expected in the Ger man foreign policy on the basic issue of the reunification of Germany. New aspects of the German problem are: the Soviet threat re Berlin, the Soviet proposal for a draft peace treaty for Germany, the May 1959 East-West conference of foreign ministers and conditional arrangement for a summit meeting. Although the Soviets have now defined their policy more clearly and frankly, the Western powers already knew that the two Germanies cannot "be reunited in freedom." There is no real support in Western Germany for the prolonged divi sion of the country. The Western Allies and the Federal Re public of Germany have declared that "an essential aim of their common policy [is] a peace settlement for the whole of Germany." Members of the Atlantic Alliance have also adopted this view. The presence of Western forces in Berlin is justified by the right of occupation of the belligerent powers, and new treaties concerning the city can only worsen the situa tion. The United Nations does not have the machinery to guarantee the security of Berlin. Recognition of the East German government is too high a price for a new treaty ar rangement. Soon other concessions would have to be made, and Berlin and the Western community may have to be sacri ficed. Peace and security in Europe cannot be had by appeas ing the Soviet Union since Communist expansion will surely thaw any "frozen" status quo.—Ed.
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