After the 2020 presidential election, some state-level officials endorsed antidemocratic rhetoric, and a smaller faction took action against the election results. To fortify American democracy, safeguarding election certification from politically motivated interference is imperative. We explore the potential of nonpartisan certification of elections for mitigating antidemocratic actions, arguing that such a practice would shield the certification process from political pressures that might compel politicians to attempt election overturns. Through an original survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of Americans, we analyze how nonpartisan certification impacts elected officials’ public approval. The results indicate that our proposed reform is an incentive-compatible solution by which elites in government can maintain support without acting against the electoral process. Furthermore, we demonstrate that there is broad support among all segments of the public for empowering nonpartisan commissions to certify elections.
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