The Taming of the Stew

Abstract

Based on a case study of food safety governance, this article examines how rule-makers can employ additional intermediaries to address agency problems between the rule-makers and the initial intermediaries upon whom they rely to govern targets of regulation. Reliance on additional intermediaries can reduce agency problems between rule-makers and initial intermediaries, without replicating those problems between the rule-makers and the additional intermediaries. This analysis also reveals that, in some cases, intermediaries make rules, which blurs the distinction between rule-makers and intermediaries. Moreover, in complex governance networks, such as the food safety system, it is misleading to attribute the origin of many governance standards to authoritative “rule-makers.” Instead, standards emerge out of network interactions. The article concludes that by favoring the term “regulator” rather than “rule-maker,” the RIT model can avoid mischaracterizing rulemaking in complex regulatory systems without compromising its explanatory power with regard to reliance on intermediaries.