Cooperation and Conflict at the Horn of Africa: A New Regional Bloc Between Ethiopia,Eritrea,and Somalia and Its Consequences for Eastern Africa

Abstract

In January 2020, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia proposed to form a new regional bloc, occasionally referred to as the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC). This article assesses which factors have contributed to making this proposal and contemplates potential effects for the complex security challenges, political tensions among the neighbours, and existing institutional environment in the region. Drawing on the scholarship on comparative regionalism and overlapping regionalism, we show that a genuine interest to independently address security challenges in the Horn of Africa, as well as domestic concerns, are core motivations for the leaders in all three states. However, the HoAC proposal bears the risk of further alienating partners in the region and undermning security efforts of other regional organisations, most importantly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, and the Eastern Africa Standby Force. Thus, the promises and pitfalls of this new bloc could shape the regional architecture and cause new political challenges in the region.

Introduction

On 27 January 2020 the heads of state and government of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia – President Isaias Afwerki, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo – held their third trilateral meeting (Horn Diplomat, 2020) after the 2018 peace deal in Asmara, Eritrea. They agreed on a Joint Plan of Action for 2020, which focuses on consolidating peace, stability, and security as well as promoting economic and social development in the region (Eritrea - Ministry of Information, 2020). They also proposed to form a new regional bloc at the Horn of Africa (HoA), occasionally referred to as the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC).

The proposal came as a surprise to the casual observer of regional politics in the HoA. Cooperation between the three states was unthinkable until very recently. With Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s historic visit to Eritrea in 2018 (Associated Press, 2018), the state of conflict between the two countries came to an end – and Abiy Ahmed was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. Ethiopia and Somalia also share a violent history, not the least in Ogaden (Vaughan, 2019). Moreover, neighbours Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan further aggravate and complicate regional politics. Relations at the Horn are complex, complicated, and characterised by deeply ingrained rivalries between the countries in a conflict-ridden region.

Regional cooperation affects the everyday life of people. It helps to address cross-border challenges, such as trade and sustainable environment, and is key to tackle peace and security threats. Yet, states need to provide resources, for example, staff, to make regional cooperation work. The new bloc would be an addition to the three states’ memberships in several existing regional organisations (ROs), ¹ including the continental African Union (AU) and the regional Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Additionally, Somalia applied for membership in the East African Community (EAC) in 2012.

Following the developments in early 2020 and in light of the complex political context in the HoA, it is worthwhile to reflect on why the three states, nonetheless, suggest to pursue the path of regional cooperation – and what this means for people from the region. Two interrelated aspects deserve special attention in this regard. On the one hand, why do the three states at the HoA consider establishing yet another African RO in the first place? On the other hand, what are the potential consequences of establishing another RO and which challenges need to be addressed upfront in this respect?

In order to address these questions, we draw on the pertinent scholarship on regionalism and overlapping regionalism. We reflect on the motivations and rationales of the three leaders to push for the creation of yet another RO in Africa and the potential consequences that arise for the regional context and institutional environment in the HoA.

We proceed as follows. First, we discuss the potential reasons why the three states consider forming the HoAC organisation. We consider prominent explanations in the literature and assess to which extent they apply in this particular case, in particular domestic considerations in the three participating states and potential benefits in their security and economic relations. Second, our analysis shifts to the potential consequences that would arise from a new RO. We take into account both the political context with neighbouring states in the HoA and the existing institutional environment on the continent. We elaborate on the first reactions to the HoAC proposal from both neighbours and the media in the region and conclude with possible scenarios for the near future.

Why Do States Form Regional Organisations?

Regional cooperation and integration have been in the limelight of research for several decades (overview: Bach, 2016; Söderbaum, 2016). The literature offers a multitude of approaches to explaining why states seek to cooperate at a regional level in formalised institutional settings. To name a few actors want to achieve substantive gains from cooperation in institutions, for example, trade and security (Mattli, 1999), governments seek to gain legitimacy and reputation with domestic and international audiences (Söderbaum, 2004), powerful states within the region or outside facilitate or hamper the emergence and maintenance of regionalism following their economic or geopolitical preferences (Grieco, 1997; Katzenstein, 2005), and domestic and transnational coalitions request deeper cooperation (Solingen, 1998).

The proposed HoAC promises to address transnational and cooperation problems of the three countries and bring about gains especially in the area of peace and security. In a conflict-ridden region like the HoA, the establishment of a regional body dedicated to peace and security issues could be beneficial for the three states. A new RO could bring about substantive gains in peace and security matters, not least by further normalising the relationship between them. It would help deal with negative externalities from domestic security threats emanating from the three countries, especially the transnational activities of Al-Shabab and rebel groups. As a new outlet, HoAC would also help to bring forward new regional norms and understandings of peace and security in line with understandings and preferences of the three leaders.

In terms of economic gains, closer cooperation bears the potential to support economies and trade. However, it does not become immediately apparent how HoAC would strengthen economic ties between the three states. A significant part of the trade in the region is still small scale, local, informal, partly illegal, and shows very limited complementarity between the three states (Byiers, 2016). On the one hand, landlocked Ethiopia as the most advanced economy has an interest in strengthening transportation links and access to the sea in order to foster its integration into the world market; “Ethiopia wants access to the sea […] and once it gets that, it will have diversified from reliance on Djibouti” (Mutambo, 2020). Ethiopia could also use HoAC to export goods and energy to its neighbours, for instance, from the new Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Reuters, 2019). On the other hand, Somalia and Eritrea do not benefit as much. Somalia has neither a reliable economic base to substantially export goods nor the financial resources to import Ethiopian goods (Love, 2009). Due to the long-lasting confrontation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, economic ties have to be (re-)established. Trade between Eritrea and Somalia is negligible. Hence, the HoAC proposal does not seem to be motivated by economic concerns.

A third potential explanation relates to domestic politics. The creation of a new regional bloc could be an opportunity for state leaders to show their success on the regional stage. With national elections in Ethiopia and Somalia approaching, both Abiy Ahmed and Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo need to gain support to be re-elected. Especially in Ethiopia, the transition process resulted in requests for more democratisation and liberalisation. Engaging in regional cooperation, not the least with a former long-term rival, could signal to both domestic and international audiences that Abiy Ahmed indeed plans to fulfil his promises. Moreover, putting the HoAC proposal on the table right before elections could deflect from ongoing domestic crises in both countries. By contrast, Eritrean authoritarian ruler Isaias Afwerki reportedly pushed for the creation of the HoAC as an opportunity to gain regional reputation and side-line IGAD, which he has boycotted for several years due to IGADs stance on basic principles of good governance and the influence of Kenya (Mutambo, 2020).

In contrast to the explanations related to security and trade gains as well as the quest for domestic or international legitimacy, power-based and domestic coalition-oriented explanations, do not provide expedient insights into why the three states proposed the HoAC. None of the three states can be considered extremely powerful as such, despite Ethiopia’s democratic, economic and military growth in recent years. The HoAC proposal rather needs to be seen in the light of the states’ ongoing rivalry with Kenya, which has been meddling in their domestic politics, which we will further discuss below. Domestic and transnational coalitions at this point do not request deeper cooperation between the three countries.

Taken together, the proposal to form the new HoAC, at this juncture, is motivated by the concerns over and the potential to cooperatively address security issues in the region as well as their domestic politics. With these potential benefits and intentions in mind, however, the problem will lie in providing HoAC with sufficient resources. It is doubtful that the three states provide necessary political and financial resources and send sufficiently skilled personnel to staff the organisation. This holds especially true for Somalia. Although regional efforts in the security domain heavily rely on external funding (Engel and Mattheis, 2020; Stapel and Söderbaum, 2020), it is unclear whether and why external actors, such as the European Union and Germany as the most prominent donors, would fund another organisation in competition to the existing ones. From their perspective, the HoAC proposal could be seen as a simple rent-seeking endeavour to attract additional resources.

What are the Potential Consequences of Establishing a New Regional Bloc?

Although organisations “are easier to maintain than to construct” (Keohane, 1984: 102) and the creation of new institutions generates transaction costs, the number of ROs has steadily increased in recent years. This trend goes hand in hand with a higher number of member states per RO as well as broadening policy scopes (Panke et al., 2020). Today, it has become almost inevitable that ROs simultaneously share member states and policy competencies. The scholarly debates therefore increasingly focus on the complexity of regionalism around the globe. The establishment of HoAC would create an additional layer of complexity for regional politics in the form of overlapping regionalism and the potential for forum shopping, and risk further complicating diplomatic relationships in the HoA.

We speak of the phenomenon “overlapping regionalism” when a state is a member of more than one RO and these ROs share at least one similar policy competency (Panke and Stapel, 2018a). Other bodies of literature deal with this phenomenon as regime complexity (Alter and Meunier, 2009) and inter-organisational relations (Koops and Biermann, 2017). Overlapping regionalism is present around the world. All states and all ROs are subject to these overlaps to some extent. Yet the phenomenon is particularly prevalent in the African context with twenty-two existing ROs as they additionally maintain quite similar mandates (Panke et al., 2020). The overlap between multiple organisations creates costs and coordination problems. Given that states’ financial, administrative, and political capacities are ultimately finite, it remains puzzling why they end up being members in several ROs with similar policy mandates at the same time (Panke and Stapel, 2018a). Moreover, increasing overlaps between ROs significantly affect regional governance since incompatible rules and norms of multiple ROs increase non-compliance (Panke and Stapel, 2018b).

Confronted with this complexity, the literature on forum selection and forum shopping addresses why and under what conditions states choose a certain institution or organisation over another, create a new one, or abandon existing ones. The scholarly roots of the forum-shopping literature can be found in law studies (e.g. Helfer, 1999; Sykes, 2008) and later developed with a focus on trade and economic issues (e.g. Alter and Meunier, 2006; Busch, 2007). The majority of these studies draw on rational-choice assumptions (implicitly or explicitly). States seek to minimise transaction costs by selecting a forum that promises to efficiently solve a particular problem (e.g. Jupille et al., 2013; Snidal et al., 2002). They choose the organisation that offers (1) the best available degree of formal competencies within the respective policy area, (2) a relatively strong influence within the organisation, and (3) the highest available degree of institutional capacity and experience (Henneberg and Plank, 2019). States can select between different suitable options (forum-shopping), dramatically change an existing institution, and create a new institution (Jupille and Snidal, 2006). They usually push for the creation of a new institution when the existing ones are not open to reform or blocked by other states (Urpelainen and Van de Graaf, 2015).

However, rational choice driven logics, as put forward in the forum-shopping literature, cannot sufficiently explain forum selection in the security realm. Drawing on the example of regional cooperation against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region, states’ preference for reducing transaction costs is partly overridden by the aim of seeking a maximum of protection of national prestige and state sovereignty in security affairs. Creating a new regional body provides domestic elites with the opportunity to reshape the perception of their activities. They are enabled to introduce a narrative that lets the state or the incumbent regime take a lead in building a new regional institution and thereby a lead in addressing a particular security problem (Henneberg and Plank, 2019).

Once established, HoAC would become a direct competitor of IGAD and create additional overlaps with the AU, EASF, COMESA, and potentially the EAC. IGAD’s efforts in managing conflicts in Somalia and Sudan have been quite successful in recent years. In South Sudan, the conflicting parties within the government (Henneberg, 2013; Henneberg and Plank, 2015), which have fought a civil war since 2013, finally reached a power-sharing agreement in February 2020 following a negotiation process facilitated by IGAD (e.g. Gebru, 2020). However, IGAD lacks the structures for effective economic integration. It also suffers from ineffective governance structures, poor communication, insufficient resources, and a lack of qualified personnel (Byiers, 2016). HoAC might further aggravate these challenges as IGAD member states Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia might revert resources and political clout to the HoAC. At the same time, the proposal could also be an attempt to put pressure on IGAD to reform, as suggested by Urpelainen and Van de Graaf (2015). Yet as a new and small RO, HoAC would struggle to gain significance vis-à-vis IGAD.

HoAC’s overlaps in the security realm would also be extensive with the AU and EASF. It might further complicate inter-organisational relations in the HoA as the AU recognises IGAD as a central pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (African Union, 2012) and its Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 2020). Adding to this complex and complicated situation, the establishment of HoAC would require all actors to develop inter-organisational relationships in order to sustain effective regional security.

As mentioned above, economic considerations do not seem to feature prominently in the strategic calculations to propose the HoAC. The new RO would also add another layer in the complex web of ROs in the economic and trade domains. IGAD is one of eight Regional Economic Communities (African Union, 2020b) as well as a building block for the African Economic Community and the African Continental Free Trade Area (African Union, 2020a). Yet IGAD’s progress in the economic sphere is bleak, and it has limited political traction in this area (Byiers, 2016). Several countries in the HoA, therefore, joined COMESA or consider joining the EAC in the future. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent HoAC will venture into the economic field and will then create frictions and fragmentation with COMESA and the EAC.

With the HoAC proposal, the three countries potentially alienate regional neighbours who need to face the loss of strategic influence in the region with their announcement to create a new organisation. The reactions, especially from Djibouti and Kenya, accordingly did not signal that they would welcome the initiative with open arms.

Djibouti is a direct neighbour of all three states – and a potential candidate to become an additional HoAC member. The three states uphold the possibility of Djibouti joining them: “They also expressed their appreciation for, and their readiness to cooperate with, their friends and partners, […] The three leaders agreed to closely consult with their Brothers, Heads of State, for the realization of the aspiration of their peoples for effective Horn of Africa” (Africa News, 2020). Bringing in Djibouti would be important for bolstering security governance in the HoA. Yet, Djibouti is also home to IGAD and hosts the US Combined Joint Task Force – HoA. The HoAC proposal therefore threatens to undermine Djibouti’s strategic position. Beyond security concerns, the Chinese-built, 750- km-long Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway (Agence France Presse, 2016) currently is the only sea access for Ethiopia and generates significant income for Djibouti’s ports. Djibouti likely fears that emerging transport links through Eritrea and Somalia that may be created in the context of the HoAC initiative could undermine its position as an economic and logistical hub in the region.

Regional powerhouse Kenya plays a prominent, to some extent even dominating, role in IGAD. The HoAC initiative certainly is an attempt by Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia to curtail Kenyan influence in their domestic affairs and broader regional politics. They increasingly seek to protect national prestige and state sovereignty in security affairs, and establishing an additional regional bloc certainly helps in this regard (Henneberg and Plank, 2019). Moreover, Kenya’s Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project with Ethiopia and South Sudan would lose insignificance once the proposed HoAC takes on economic issues. As Kenya worries about losing influence in the region, it does not come as a surprise that the HoAC proposal was criticised and branded “anti-IGAD” (Munene, 2020).

The new regional initiative also has implications for political relations beyond the African continent. Since the “Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden” was only recently established under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, the HoAC proposal presents an opportunity for Eritrea and Somalia to showcase once more their political alternatives to their partners and neighbours (Verhoeven, 2020; Vertin, 2019).

Mixed responses to the HoAC proposal are evident beyond official statements. After the announcement, former Minister for International Cooperation of the Somalian State of Jubaland, Adam Aw Hirsi, initiated a survey on Twitter. He asked: “Do you think the creation of a brand-new regional body Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC) is a good idea?” (Aw Hirsi, 2020). The 1022 respondents in the non-representative results were generally in favour of the proposed HoAC (Yes 57.5%, No 35.8%, and “I need to have my say” 6.7%). Likewise, the ensuing discussion mirrored both the poll and the broader media discussion where people from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia were slightly in favour of the proposal, whereas commentators from Djibouti and Kenya showed a stronger tendency to express their disapproval (e.g. Africa Intelligence, 2020; The Brief , 2020; Twitter, 2020).

Conclusion

Significant progress towards regional peace and development have characterised the HoA in recent years. Domestic changes in Ethiopia, peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and burgeoning cooperation attempts in the region all are promising. In addition, the revolution in Sudan and the peace agreement in South Sudan open up new prospects for the conflict-ridden greater HoA. The proposal to form a HoAC regional bloc between Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia could be another step in this direction. Their cooperation promises to bring about lasting peaceful relations among the states in the HoA. Regional cooperation between the three states is urgently needed – also beyond the security realm.

Moreover, such an institution could boost the prestige of all three state leaders and foster regional trade and infrastructure, at least if Djibouti were to be included. Against that backdrop, it is important to remember that the three states are far from stable. Security risks could easily undermine soaring plans for cooperation. Especially in Somalia, the security situation is still highly fragile. The federal government relies on international forces to secure the country, fails to provide basic services, and is not well positioned to invest in larger economic and security projects. As the new regional bloc would create many problems, it is an optimistic domestic move and a signal to improve and update economic cooperation in the region within existing, complex regional frameworks.

Yet the potential disadvantages regarding funding, capacities, and overlap with other existing institutions are substantial. In fact, only a few agree that a new RO is necessary. An additional institution creates functional problems and alienates neighbours. The potential risks for regional relations are evident. The HoAC proposal might create more distrust; bring about additional conflicts in Eastern Africa; deteriorate the relations with close neighbours, in particular, Djibouti and Kenya; and complicate cooperation in other institutional settings. A weakened IGAD and fragmented security cooperation in the region could negatively impact peacekeeping activities in the greater HoA region, most imminently in Somalia and South Sudan.