Defining the Nation: National Identity in South Sudanese Media Discourse

Abstract

German

This article examines debates about national identity in the media landscape of post-referendum and post-independence South Sudan. Having never existed as a sovereign state and with its citizens being a minority group in Sudan, collective action among South Sudanese has historically been shaped in response to external pressures: in particular, the aggressive nation-building pursued by successive Khartoum governments that sought to Arabize and Islamize the South. Today, in the absence of a clear-cut enemy, it is a major challenge for South Sudan to devise a common identity that unites the putative nation beyond competing loyalties to ethnicity, tribe and family. Analysing opinion pieces from South Sudanese online media and placing them in the context of contemporary African nationalism, this article gives an initial overview of the issues that dominate the public debate on national identity: fear of tribalism and regionalism, commemoration of the liberation struggle, language politics, and the role of Christianity.

Keywords

South Sudan nation and state building public debates Südsudan Nationen- und Staatenbildung Medien Öffentliche Diskussion

In July 2011, South Sudan declared itself independent from the Republic of Sudan, an occasion accompanied by headlines proclaiming the “birth of a nation” (Leopold 2011). But while South Sudan has received international recognition for its claim to statehood by virtue of joining the United Nations, the question of what kind of nation has been born or whether there is but one nation in the new state cannot be answered quite as easily. Not unlike the beginning of nationalist projects in Ireland, Croatia or, in fact, the United States, South Sudanese collective action and collective identity have historically been primarily reactive and can be traced back to resistance to external forces. In the case of South Sudan, the “other” – which is instrumental in defining the identity of the group “self” (Said 1979) – has been the North Sudanese riverain elite in its attempt to forcefully impose an Arab-Muslim national identity on the whole of Sudan (Khalid 1990: 387; Lesch 1998: 3; Sharkey 2008).

South Sudan's History of Resistance

The territory and peoples of present-day South Sudan were for the first time united under a single rule following the Turco-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan by Muhammad Ali's troops in 1821.¹ Throughout the nineteenth century, the South's integration consisted primarily of being the target of slave raids to fill the domestic and military demands in the Muslim North, Egypt, and the Middle East (Gray 1961: 5–6). While the South remained largely unaffected by the Mahdist wars (1881–99), it nonetheless fell under British control after the latter's defeat in 1898, though “pacification” lasted until well into the 1920s (Beshir 1968: 19; Johnson 2011b: 10). In response to nationalist uprisings in Egypt and Northern Sudan, Britain instituted the “Southern Policy”, segregating the South from the North while devoting precious few resources to development (Woodward 1979: 10–12; Collins 1983). Thus, when the Southern policy was repealed in 1946 and the South, where “a regional Southern identity had begun to take root” (Rolandsen 2011: 109), became part of independent Sudan in 1956, it had hardly any trained personnel and Southerners were severely underrepresented in the new administration (Johnson 2011b). This underrepresentation combined with economic neglect and the central government's “policy of Arabization and Islamization in the South” (Johnson 2011b: 30) sparked the Anyanya² insurgency, the first civil war lasting from 1955/1963 until 1972. The South attained regional self-government with the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Treaty until it was unilaterally dissolved by the president at the time, Nimeiry, in the early 1980s, which together with the nationwide introduction of sharia law in 1983 triggered the founding of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the second civil war from 1983 to 2005 (Kymlicka 2004). Extraordinarily bloody – estimates for total war-related deaths are in the range of 2 million (Leitenberg 2006) – and displacing even larger numbers of people, what had initially been a war between the government of Sudan and the SPLA also became a war between different Southern factions when the SPLA split in 1991 (Nyaba 1997; Rolandsen 2005). This South–South war also led to a more rigid conception of ethnic identity as the warring parties resorted to presenting the war as being fought between Dinka and Nuer, two of the South's largest ethnic groups (Hutchinson and Jok 2002).

While 1821 is the most convenient and conventional cut-off point, it would be foolish to believe that “what is known as the southern Sudan today, has no history before A.D. 1821” (Arkell 1955: 2 cited in Abd al-Rahim 1969: 3). The Shilluk (Mercer 1971) and Zande (Ivanov 2000) empires have been the subject of an increasing amount of scholarly interest, and Stephanie Beswick (2006), employing oral history, actually traces Dinka history all the way to the fourteenth century and establishes continuities from the pre-colonial times to the present, e.g. as relates to “Dinkaphobia”.

Anyanya literally means “snake venom”.

By the turn of the century, it had become obvious that neither side could win the war militarily. With exports from Southern oil fields (since 1999) making peace more attractive and the 9/11 attacks putting the Islamist regime in Khartoum (in power since Omar al-Bashir's coup in 1989) under renewed international scrutiny, a series of internationally sponsored peace negotiations starting with the 2002 Machakos Protocol led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA) in 2005, granting self-government to the South under SPLM leadership and providing for a referendum on the region's future status to be held by 2011 (Ahmed 2009). Although the SPLM/A, in contrast to the Anyanya, had not called for Southern independence but rather for a reformed, unitary “New Sudan” (Garang 1992), the movement's position had shifted in the course of the 1990s and there were very few proponents of unity left after John Garang died in a helicopter accident shortly after the signing of the CPA. The results of the referendum in January 2011 (more than 98 per cent in favour of independence) are, alas, evidence of a remarkably universal preference for separate statehood.

Even from this cursory overview of South Sudan's history it can be gleaned that the presence of an aggressive and often predatory “other” – be it the central government or a rival faction in the South – that serves to unify those under attack has been a near constant. Thus, confronting and fighting a common enemy has been more important in defining the South Sudanese nation than have internal dynamics of unifying around a positive common denominator (shared ancestry, language, destiny, etc.). With South Sudanese living in their own state for the first time in history, the question arises of what will hold it together now that the North–South divide no longer serves to “mute intraregional differences [and] ethnic or tribal fragmentation” (Deng 2005: 65). Presently, relations with the Republic of Sudan remain tense, and the short independence period has already seen outbreaks of violence in the contested area of Abyei (Johnson 2011a), as well as a public spat over the division of oil revenues (Gettleman 2012).

But while an external enemy or cultural disparagement from the outside “may be a necessary condition for the birth of nationalism, it is not a sufficient one” (Berlin 2001: 346). If it is true that “exclusion from power and relative resource deprivation serves to heighten the cultural identity and solidarity of subordinate groups” (Markakis 1999: 75), then the lack of North Sudanese oppression – as welcome as it is for obvious reasons – may strain the sense of togetherness in independent South Sudan. As one of the world's poorest countries, South Sudan is not in a position to buy loyalty with hand-outs to the population; hence, appeals to nationalism and a widely accepted “imagined community” (Anderson 2006) would be a much more plausible option (Herbst 2000: 126). Alas, this is not a process that happens automatically, as “identification has to be made to matter, through the power of symbols and ritual experiences, for example” (Jenkins 2008: 6). And loyalty does not come free: “People are loyal to ethnic, national, or other imagined communities not because they were born into them, but because such foci of loyalty promise to offer something deemed meaningful, valuable, or useful” (Eriksen 1999: 55).

Africa's “New Nationalism”

Questions of nationality and nationalism are thus of great political importance to South Sudan because the ability to define the contours of the nation and thereby the conditions of citizenship are key instruments for political entrepreneurs to gain or hold onto power (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent 2007). For although African states have since at least the 1980s been deficient to such an extent as to inspire a litany of academic attributes (swollen, rotten, criminal, privatized, failing/failed, to name but a few), attachment to the idea of the nation seems to persist regardless of the state's performance (Young 2007; Weiss and Carayannis 2005).

State nationalism in Africa in the early postcolonial period often continued to equate nationalism with the liberation struggle and resisting European colonialism (Smith 1983: 37). It was hence by and large characterized by the promotion of an inclusive idea of the nation and a deliberate attempt to overcome and deny ethnic and tribal loyalties (Chabal 2009), as the new elites “demanded a more or less complete flattening of the ethnic landscape” (Davidson 1992: 102–103). The lack of a “relevant other” to oppose has made it very difficult for post-independence countries to develop a strong nationwide identity (Herbst 1990: 130).

In recent years, however, as the widespread failure of the original template of integrative nation-building became impossible to ignore, sub-Sa-haran Africa has seen a powerful return of politicized ethnicity (Berman 1998: 333) as well as the emergence of a form of “new nationalism” (Ake 1996) to fill the void.³ This “new nationalism” brought with it a surge of exclusionary concepts of the nation and a concomitant rise in xenophobia and identity-based conflicts (Geschiere 2009; Kohnert 2008). Côte d'Ivoire's vicious struggle over ivoirité (Marshall-Fratani 2006) and South Africa's anti-immigrant riots (Neocosmos 2010) are but two instances where debates about autochthony and indigeneity – that is, debates about who rightfully belongs to the nation – have turned sour. The “wave of democratization” that has swept across Africa since 1990 has also played a significant part in this (re-)activation of ethnicity as ruling elites have resorted to manipulating ethnicity as a means to cling to power. “‘Government by the people’ requires a definition of the people and thus raises issues of identity” (Ottaway 1999: 316). Thence, in Bronwen Manby's (2011: 15) words, Sudan should be warned that “defining nationality on the basis of ethnicity, or applying discriminatory criteria in practice, is a recipe for trouble”.

For further contributions on the issue see also the special issue of Africa Spectrum, “New Nationalism and Xenophobia in Africa”, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2009), online: <www.africa-spectrum.org>.

In this context, the aim of this article is to elucidate the various ideas about South Sudan's collective national identity that circulate in the country itself by sifting through evidence of how questions of national/collective identity are perceived and debated in journals from South Sudan. I will rely on the debate in online journals as an important source of images of national identity based on the assumption that our knowledge and understanding of the world is generated by discourses (Foucault 1972; Spivak 1988; Parker 2000). Discourse in Foucault's sense refers to “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault 1972: 49), hence “a discourse is something which produces something else (an utterance, a concept, an effect)” (Mills 2004: 15). In this context, texts – written or spoken – create meaning, values, and norms and distribute them in a social context (Braidotti 1994: 260); discourse is then to be understood as “the network of circulation of texts, meant both as material, institutional events and as symbolic or ‘invisible’ effects” (Braidotti 1994: 260). The most problematic aspects of discourse analysis are its “eclectic and unsystematic” theoretical framework (Wodak and Weiss 2004: 70) and the lack of a clear-cut, universally accepted methodological approach (Flick 2007: 431). These points are, however, not too damaging to this particular endeavour since an exploratory analysis actually warrants an eclectic approach.

For the purposes of this analysis, the Diskursstrang – a thematically homogenous discourse (Jäger 1993) – is South Sudanese national identity; each online article constitutes one of the discourse fragments, and the level of analysis is online media.⁴ The primary reason for restricting the focus of this investigation to online media is the paucity of alternative sources from South Sudan (e.g. opinion polls⁵). Given the relative accessibility of online articles and the ease of being able to interact and have a dialogue with the author (for instance, by way of comments that appear underneath the article), online newspapers are currently the best available source that permit an approximation of local discourse on the matter of national identity.

It should, however, be clear that conducting a full-fledged discourse analysis, which would include a micro-analysis of each text, lies outside the scope of this article.

The only nationwide opinion poll that I am aware of and will refer to was conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in September 2011 (The International Republican Institute 2011).

The newspaper clippings dissected for the sake of this analysis date from January 2011 to September 2011, bridging the referendum in January, the declaration of independence in July and the first couple of months afterwards. The expected and desired outcome of the analysis is not to gain a definite overview of South Sudan's internal debate but rather to grasp some of the more prominent themes that have emerged in the post-referendum and post-independence period. While it is unclear how many South Sudanese actually read these articles,⁶ they are nonetheless valuable as sources of public discourse (which includes the diaspora both as audience and authors) because members of the administration and the opposition as well as renowned academics count among the authors and (presumed) readership.

Only 7% of respondents said that they regularly (every day to a few times per week) access news on the Internet, as opposed to the 64% who regularly get news via radio (The International Republican Institute 2011: 69).

The Media Landscape in South Sudan

Given the young state's short lifespan, the diversity of media sources on hand is quite remarkable; especially considering that there is no state-run government newspaper and only one national TV station, one national radio channel, and one national news agency (Jimbo 2011a). Some online media are run by the diaspora in Europe and North America (e.g. South Sudan Nation) and others receive funding from foreign donors (e.g. the Gurtong Media Project). While officials are keen to insist that the state of press freedom in the South is incomparably better than the Khartoum regime's notoriously harsh treatment of journalists (Sudan Tribune 2011a), members of the press have on numerous occasions been harassed, incarcerated and even suffered physical abuse and torture (Jimbo 2011b) – typically for reporting stories detrimental either to the SPLM (Rhodes 2011) or to individuals from the government's inner circle, like President Kiir's daughter (Adams 2011b). In fact, James Okuk, one of the authors cited in this article, was arrested – allegedly for anti-government statements he had posted online (Garang 2011). While keeping these circumstances in mind, the variety of opinions and the frankness of criticism in many articles speak to the validity of analysing them as expressions of a relatively free and open public discourse.

The online newspapers scoured for information are: Gurtong, South Sudan News Agency, Sudan Tribune, New Sudan Vision, South Sudan Nation, The Citizen, The People's Voice, The New Nation, Sudan Votes and The Juba Post, which has since ceased operation. Before going into the detailed content of debates in the press, one general finding has to be noted: The majority of articles focus primarily on what the national identity is not supposed to look like. To illustrate this fact, I will first present those points of view that argue or warn against a particular form of collective and national identity before moving on to those that present a positive idea or notion of the nation.

Tribalism: We Shall Overcome

A common enemy that shows up in articles from news media across the spectrum is the spectre of tribalism.⁷ Given the fact that South Sudan is home to more than sixty tribes (there is no agreement on the exact figure) with no ethnic group in a numerical position to establish majority nationalism reminiscent of European nation-building, fear of tribalism as a divisive factor is hardly surprising (Cook 2008: 89–90). Additionally, many people in South Sudan, especially those living outside the cities, have very little interaction with the state, which is – according to Achille Mbembe (2001: 87) – one of the major reasons people turn to communitarian structures like clans or tribes.

For the purposes of this analysis it is immaterial whether today's tribes and chiefs are of precolonial origin, a legacy of British colonial authoritarianism (Mamdani 1996, 2009) or a bit of both (Spear 2003). The key is that they impact individual and collective identification and thus have acquired political salience.

Nasredeen Abdulbari (2011), lecturer at the International and Comparative Law Department at the University of Khartoum, therefore praises the draft constitution⁸ for its inclusive definition of citizenship while refraining from equating citizenship with a particular ethnic, cultural or religious identity:

The transitional constitution defines South Sudan as “a multi-ethnic, multicultural, multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-racial entity where such diversities peacefully coexist” (Government of Southern Sudan 2011).

Wisdom therefore dictates that nations, states, and governments concentrate directly on how different identities could peacefully live together, and establish a strong nation, rather than sparking unnecessary debates over the identity of the state.

Joana Adams (2011a), a regular contributor to South Sudan Nation based in Juba, makes a similar point in even stronger language:

It is a serious judgement of error to entertain desires to give Southern Sudan a single, national cultural identity. The CPA was negotiated with the understanding that South Sudan is [a] multi-ethnic, multicultural, multi-religious, and multi-racial society.

Amongst state officials, there also seems to be an awareness of the need to overcome tribal allegiance with national allegiance in order to make way for a functioning state. During independence celebrations, President Salva Kiir called on the citizens of South Sudan: “You may be a Zande, Kakwa, Lutugo, Nuer, Dinka or Shiluk, but first remember yourself as a South Sudanese” (Sudan Tribune 2011b). On another occasion, Kiir appealed especially to the younger generation to refrain from tribal tendencies, as nation-building required building a national conscience (Kiir 2011). For his part, Kuol Manyang, governor of Jonglei State, reminded new graduates of the police academy that they “are now police of the nation not for the tribe” (Mayar 2011). At the presentation of the South's new national anthem, South Sudan's information and broadcasting minister stated that its “words like unity, harmony and peace that advocate for one tribe in the new nation […] should be kept at the fingertips” (Wudu 2011). Meanwhile, David Marial Gumke, Rumbek East County commissioner, warns of inter-ethnic conflict. “Unless we abandon tribalism and sectionalism in the country […] we cannot build a peaceful nation.” Instead of concentrating on the differences between different tribes like Nuer, Dinka, Shilluk, Azande, Acholi and Bari, “we should all be united now and call ourselves South Sudanese” (Mon 2011). And the poet Kuir Garang (2011) argues that

it's high time South Sudanese started to see that too much focus on one's tribal needs is the express lane to most of Africa's frictional tribal nonsense and political instabilities.

Alleged overrepresentation of Dinka in key government positions is a further complaint among writers. The charge of “Dinka domination” goes back to the days of the Southern Regional Government (SRG) under Abel Alier in the 1970s and early 1980s (Jendia 2002: 102) and facilitated the Nimeiry government's dissolution of the SRG (Johnson 2011b: 51). A columnist at the South Sudan News Agency also traces the root causes of internal conflict in South Sudan to alleged Dinka domination in political affairs and deems the SPLM politburo “a rubber stamp used by one ethnic group (Dinka) to dominate others by using their numbers to impose decisions on others” (South Sudan News Agency 2011). Elhag Paul (2011), a frequent commentator on various websites, similarly accuses the government of “Dinkocracy” and failing to deliver unity and peace. But he does not spare his own ethnic group, Equatorians, which he also sees as guilty of tribalism. Hence, the lesson to be learnt is that “supporting crooks because they come from our tribes is not nationalism at all” (Paul 2011). Less drastic in his choice of words but no less critical of perceived Dinka overrepresentation in government, Jacob K. Lupai (2011a), who, like Paul, contributes to several outlets, laments that 12 out of 32 national ministers and 7 out of 15 government advisors hail from the same ethnic group. Riak G. Majokdit does not focus exclusively on the Dinka but sees a more general threat of domination by larger ethnicities. According to him, the South Sudanese nation will not prosper

if big nationalities, such as Nuer (Naath), Dinka (Muonyjang), Azande or Colo […] abuse their God-given numeric [strength] to dominate small nationalities politically, economically, culturally and socially (Majokdit 2011).

While acknowledging the problematic nature of appointments based on tribal allegiance rather than qualification, Dr. Jok Madut Jok (2011b), undersecretary of the Ministry of Culture and Heritage and a renowned academic, is more critical of journalists' style of commenting. He claims that instead of focusing their criticism on individuals, journalists accuse ethnic groups as a whole of wrongdoings and corruption.

The long-term effect of this is that we have further polarized our country along ethnic lines when the aim was to close the gap so that we have a nation united by a sense of loyalty and belonging (Jok 2011b).

Framing grievances with the government along exclusively ethnic lines prevents the rise of multi-ethnic coalitions that could serve to allow each and every tribe to feel like an equitable part of the state and the nation. Responsible journalism therefore ought “to calm the already volatile ethnic make-up of our country, with a view to forging a future of citizenship in the nation rather than in the tribe” (Jok 2011b).

University of Toronto geology student Chol Marol Deng (2011) presents quite a different approach to the issue of tribal strife: He sees a reconciliation between Dinka and Nuer as an essential step on the way to forming a nation; these two ethnic groups constituted the major opponents in the South–South civil war that erupted in the years following the SPLM/A's split into two factions in 1991, during which both groups suffered from cycles of reciprocal violence, killings and displacements (Hutchinson 2001: 318). “For people to feel the full meaning of freedom, forgiveness is necessary between those that were involved in any conflict” (Deng 2011). Reconciliation is also at the core of Jok Madut Jok's (2011a) plea because “domination of the national platform by certain ethnic groups at the expense of others can only produce citizens who give no loyalty to the nation”.

All in all, the majority of commentators decry tribal allegiance as detrimental to a strong national identity while being wary of domination by demographically strong ethnic groups. Crucially, as Jok (2011b) points out, the very fact that writers describe problems in ethnic terms serves to reinforce the salience of ethnicity and tribe.⁹

According to the opinion survey, however, tribal identity does not appear to be such a dominating factor as some make it out to be. Only 3% of respondents consider themselves only part of a tribe, while 6% feel more part of a tribe than they do South Sudanese. On the other hand, 49% said that they only consider themselves South Sudanese; a further 23% feel more South Sudanese than part of a tribe and 18% feel as much South Sudanese as they do part of a tribe (The International Republican Institute 2011: 63).

Regionalism and Federalism: Unifying or Splitting the Nation?

The question of subnational loyalties also crops up in relation to an issue that is linked to but distinct from tribalism: regionalism. Though South Sudan has never enjoyed proper statehood, it does have experience with self-government going back to the Southern Regional Government from 1972 through 1983. During its last years of existence, one of the most critical issues became the proposal to split the South into three distinct regions: Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile (Johnson 2011b: 53). While this proposal proved to be merely a ploy by the Nimeiry government to dismantle Southern self-government altogether, the tension, ill will and dissent it bred in the South has not been forgotten (Beswick 2006: 207–208).

Therefore, a conference of three Equatorian governors that called for a federalist system of governance (Stephen 2011) stirred strong emotions and responses in the media. Isaiah Abraham (2011a), a Juba-based journalist, opines that regionalism is destined to undermine the very unity that John Garang fought for: “The drawback in the long run after we have chosen to go regionalism would be that we will never be Southern Sudanese but groups.” On another occasion, Abraham accuses a group of Equatorian exiles of trying to put a wedge between Nuer and Dinka. He warns that devolution to regions will not stop competition but merely create a new locus for strife:

Advocates of decentralization, federalism or regionalism have one agenda in mind: the division of our society. They must not be allowed! Alas, they easily forget that experience has shown that when people go for regions, even within regions the chopping will continue among the same group of one region (Abraham 2011b).

Dr. James Okuk (2011), who works for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also comes out “against decentralization of government power politics in South Sudan at the moment before achieving ‘detribalization’ first as this breeds serious detrimental tribalism in the process”, a development that he already sees underway in what he calls the “‘Dinkanization’ and ‘Nuerization’ of government power politics in South Sudan”.

On the opposite side of the spectrum, Joana Adams (2011a) argues clearly in favour of federalism as opposed to centralism: “I can proudly be a South Sudanese and an Equatorian without contradiction, and being one does not negate being the other.” In her assessment,

every Southern tribe is a nation by itself, occupying a distinct territory where they are sovereign. Therefore what South Sudan needs to do is to build a “super-nation” – the nation of South Sudan.

Dr. Justin Ambago Ramba, secretary general of the opposition United South Sudan Party (USSP), has also stated that tribalism, regionalism and uneven development are not the inevitable products of a federalist system since they can also be witnessed in a unitary state. The true culprits of tribalism are ethnic entrepreneurs that play on ethnic identity.

Just as a carpenter can use tools to produce many different products, so can those who manipulate the distribution of power and employ identity (Ramba 2011a).

These sentiments are echoed by Chol Marol Deng (2011) who argues that “tribalism is only a tool that politicians, especially those that come from large tribes, use to keep them in power […] at the expense of all regardless of tribe”. The common people should realize that they have a lot more in common with each other than with those in power, regardless of membership in a tribe. As Cherry Leonardi (2011a: 236) recently argued, resistance to a predatory government rather than ethnicity may in fact be where “a shared Southern Sudanese culture and memory is most apparent”.

In the debate about decentralization and federalism, memories of the SRG's demise play an important part in shaping perceptions. Yet, unlike with tribalism, views do not skew quite as negatively toward decentralization because perspectives tend to vary according to a writer's political and geographical location.¹⁰

According to the opinion survey, 35% would prefer stronger state governments while 63% would prefer a stronger national government. It would have been interesting, though, had results been differentiated by region (The International Republican Institute 2011: 31).

Diversity or Homogeneity?

To Minister of Higher Education Dr. Adwok Nyaba (2011), the “process of national liberation […] was indeed the attempt to forge a unity from the many ethnic communities that comprise South Sudan”. The country's 67 different ethnic groups must not be an impediment to genuine South Sudanese nation-building. Nyaba's idea is that the various tribal traditions should come into contact with each other by way of democratic processes until they eventually erode and are integrated into an inclusive, progressive and knowledge-based national (as opposed to tribal) identity. Jacob K. Lupai (2011b), by contrast, does not take issue with the fact that regional and tribal allegiances are likely to persist because difference is not necessarily an obstacle to unity as evidenced by the near unanimous vote in favour of independence: “It is therefore fair to say that whatever differences exist among people, the differences should not be allowed to overshadow the independence of South Sudan.” Further, a united South Sudan requires not only tribal unity but also a harmonization of pastoralist and sedentary cultures.

Dr. Jok Madut Jok (2011a) depicts a history of togetherness in South Sudan that manifested itself only in negative experiences of slavery and oppression and in consequent acts of defiance, rebellion and resistance. The quest now is to develop a positive association with nationhood:

To forge a collective national identity, so that the citizens are able to see their citizenship in the nation as more important than citizenship in ethnic nationalities, it is important to view cultural diversity as an asset.

By promoting the cultural heritage of all of South Sudan's ethnic groups equitably and on a national stage, the state should enable each and every citizen to feel like a proud member of the South Sudanese nation and state. Avoiding ethnic marginalization and disenchantment with the state is particularly crucial for South Sudan as it constituted the very reason for breaking away from the North in the first place (Jok 2011a). Jok's appeal is repeated in similar words by Justin Ambago Ramba (2011b). Instead of pursuing the course of action preferred by the Northern elites – eliminating diversity in order to impose a single (Arab, Islamic) identity – South Sudan has to take another path. In order for national institutions like the army to function, they have to be inclusive and prevent the marginalization of segments of society. Only in this way will “national institutions have the capacity to eradicate tribalism by realizing inclusiveness and fair representation” (Ramba 2011b).

A practical suggestion for how to manage cultural diversity in a nation-state is presented by R. Mou Run, who picks up on a long-running debate on the Gurtong website.¹¹ Run advocates instituting a “House of Nations” to be included in the future constitutional make-up as a means “to counteract the tyranny of the majority, the democratic deficit” (Run 2011). This new chamber would unite members of every tribe regardless of geographical location and offer a forum for minorities to voice grievances and make their concerns heard. As such, the House of Nations would pre-empt disaffected groups from resorting to violent action, as they frequently do in contemporary South Sudan. In a related proposal, Beny Gideon Mabor, a law student at the University of Juba, argues in favour of tribal representation along the model of Botswana's House of Chiefs. He believes that

There is actually a website dedicated to the idea (<www.houseofnationalities.org>), which is part of the Gurtong Trust – Peace and Media Project, which also runs the Gurtong news website.

unity in diversity is the best tool for resolving inter-tribal conflicts in South Sudan by mandating the indigenous communities to settle their disputes in accordance with their own personal laws and obligations (Mabor 2011).

In other words, the goal is not to overcome tribal identities but to channel tribal conflicts in a national body for conflict resolution while otherwise leaving each tribe to settle its conflicts according to its own rules, customs and traditions.

Taking these ideas one step further, PaanLuel Wël, a South Sudanese blogger, puts forward a seemingly counterintuitive solution to tribalism: Instead of trying to fight it, he thinks South Sudan should embrace it by installing a system of government based on “tribocracy”, which he defines as

a political system of governance in which equality in political representation in the national government and/or at the state level is achieved through the principle of tribal representation. As each and every tribe [gets] a small proportion of the national seats, the benefits accruable from those high portfolios would trickle down to every tribe (Wël 2011).

As a consequence, any wrongdoing on the part of an official would no longer be ascribed to his or her ethnicity but rather to his individual failings and would in turn be punished primarily by his or her own kin (whom he or she represents) rather than triggering inter-ethnic quarrels.

With the experience of cultural alienation and subordination still fresh in most people's minds, there is widespread support for valuing (rather than repressing) the South's diversity. However, there is much less agreement about how to practically and institutionally accommodate this diversity.

Liberation Struggle against the North

One of the few almost universally held views is that the new nation should be built on the memory of the decades of struggle against the North and – less universally – on the role played by the SPLM/A and its late leader John Garang.¹² Thus, accompanying a call against political tribalism and the culture of war, Stephen Par Kuol (2011), the education minister of Jonglei State, states that “historically, we have come a long way as a family united and divided by the common struggle against the common oppression”. An editorial on the day before the declaration of independence reminds its readers that all gratitude is owed to the SPLA fighters. To properly commemorate those who died during 22 years of war, the author proposes “Project 22, A Campaign for South Sudan's Future”, a 22-year effort to shape the new South Sudan into a place worth living in. If that project is realized, “we will have delivered on the sacred promise of our nation to all those who gave selflessly of themselves” (New Sudan Vision 2011) – building a new nation is therefore a duty owed to the SPLA's martyrs. Salva Kiir Mayardit, South Sudan's president and head of the SPLM, also “paid tribute to the fallen heroes of the new nation” (Sudan Tribune 2011b) in his independence speech, adding that their efforts had not been in vain.

81% of respondents think favourably of the SPLA; 49% of those very favourably (The International Republican Institute 2011: 20).

One very obvious way in which the SPLA's resistance fight will be commemorated by the state is the new currency. Some of the newly printed South Sudanese pounds will show John Garang, so that “the face of the late leader will remind Southerners o[f] the long road to independence” (Samuel 2011). Independence celebrations saw a giant new statue of John Garang unveiled in Juba next to his mausoleum, which “is already becoming a shrine to his legacy” (Girungi 2011). Along the same lines, the third stanza of the newly composed national anthem, in the words of South Sudanese Minister of Information and Broadcasting Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin, “commemorates the martyrs and heroes who lost their lives for the sake of the people of this nation” (Wudu 2011).

Canada-based Laku Modi Tombe (2011), in contrast, harshly criticizes the exclusive focus on the SPLM and reminds his readers that the

SPLM had been preaching unity with North Sudan for 26 years, until one week before [the] referendum, when it declared its support for independent South Sudan.

Even Salva Kiir is curiously ambiguous on how to treat the liberation struggle in the national narrative. Asked whether the South's decision to become independent constituted a betrayal of John Garang's and the SPLM movement's ideas, Kiir said, “Evidently I cannot dance to the secession of the South” (Ochi 2011). He adds that the way forward should be to forgo anger, and Southerners should forgive Northerners for what happened during the war. Therefore, Kiir's answer to the question of how to commemorate the war is “we have to forget the past” (Ochi 2011). As such, Kiir's movement stands in marked contrast to other liberation movements, which have come to power and laid claim not only to the state but also to the nation (Dorman 2006). It remains to be seen whether the SPLM and its leadership will in the long run refuse to follow in the footsteps of Zimbabwe's ZANU-PF policy of actively propagating “patriotic” history in an attempt to monopolize its own view of national history (Ranger 2004). This tension between forgetting and using the past is apparent in the president's speech on Martyrs' Day (30 July). On the one hand, Kiir explicitly links the commemoration of the dead to nation-building: “Unless we cultivate the spirit of nationalism, cemented by the blood of our martyrs, we cannot prosper” (Kiir 2011). Yet, in the same speech, he described the Republic of South Sudan as a tabula rasa, while urging South Sudanese that “it is not time to blame the past but rather it is time to focus on what to do today, tomorrow and the future” (Kiir 2011).

Using the liberation struggle as the keystone of national unity can also have exclusionary effects, for instance with regard to the large diaspora community. While on the surface the issue is the lack of opportunities for highly qualified South Sudanese returning from the diaspora (Ayiei 2011), others argue that “many southern Sudanese expatriates who seek to participate in their country are reluctant due to the overriding concept that ‘those who did not hold the gun should not now come and claim positions’” (Juba Post 2011).

Language Politics: Arabic No More

Sudan is home to a great number and diversity of languages,¹³ something Laitin (2007: 88) argues is inimical to the creation of “unique national cultures”. A more visible step toward shaping the new nation's look therefore comes in the form of replacing place names dating from the time of Northern domination or even the colonial period. Thus, in Yei County, village elders opted for the renaming of streets and of a payam (small administrative unit) to remove what they saw as colonial names. Replacing them with local names was to help “conserve [the communities'] cultural and traditional values” (Amos 2011) as each instance of renaming was to be accompanied by cultural ceremonies. Apart from natural designations derived from rivers, mountains and the like, names of martyrs and local “great men” were to be used, thereby also reminding people of the liberation struggle and “providing historical background to South Sudanese cultural values” (Amos 2011). Michael Modi Apollo, chairman of the local renaming committee, even advised parents not to give foreign names to their children.

The website <www.ethnologue.com> (28 February 2012) records 133 living languages in Sudan.

In a sense complementing both the draft constitution's refusal to grant official-language status to Arabic or even Juba Arabic (the vernacular spoken by many in South Sudan [Leonardi 2011b; James 2008:73]) and the Ministry of Education's decision to discontinue teaching in Arabic in secondary schools (Upper Nile Times 2011) – problematic not least when considering the large number of returnees from the North – Rengo Gyyw Rengo Jr., a master's student in International Relations, calls for all Arabic names to be removed from Juba as they are a reminder of the oppressors from the North. The precedent given is the Africanization of Belgian names conducted by the former president of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko. “A name tells of who we are. We must have names with our identity and meanings” (Rengo Jr. 2011). But even when signs are in English, they can arouse strong reactions. James Alic Garang, Ph.D. candidate in Economics, makes the case that all references to “Southern Sudan” ought to be replaced by “South Sudan” as fast as possible. This is not mere linguistic pedantry since

Southern Sudan was a region within old Sudan while South Sudan is a new republic, independent and fulfilled, period. We are the lat[t]er; not the former! (Garang 2011).

The use of language in education and official matters – primarily concerning the use of Arabic and English but also including vernacular languages – has long been at the centre of politically charged debates in colonial and independent Sudan (James 2008: 70). Judging by the online debates, this state of affairs appears poised to remain unchanged.

Land of Cush and Christianity

Another theme that has emerged is the attempt to trace the origins of the modern state of South Sudan to the ancient and somewhat mystical land of Kush. A Nubian state that formed part of the Egyptian empire for much of its existence, it is typically said to have been along the Nile in the present-day Republic of Sudan, the North (Török 1997). One of the reasons for its popularity among some Christian South Sudanese lies in the fact that Kush is sometimes equated with the biblical persona Cush, son of Ham and brother of Canaan, who appears in Genesis and the Books of Chronicles. Thus, Abuoi Jook Alith (2011) starts his patriotic poem “Diverse south Sudan we yearned” with the following lines:

Southern Sudan diversities let us all unite,

And advance our blessed golden land of Kush.

The popularity of Cush or Kush is further evidenced by the new national anthem's former working title “Land of Cush”, though this was later dropped. Other lines such as “Oh Cush!” and “For your Grace upon Cush” became “Oh motherland!” and “For your grace upon South Sudan”, respectively (Martell 2011), but the fact that such wording was seriously considered is remarkable enough.

Chol de Kwot, logistics expert, goes much further by advertising the “Republic of Kush” as the name of the new state of South Sudan. Based on quotations in the Bible and the fact that the word Kush is used in the Jieng language (meaning, curiously, “unknown”), he argues that the Kingdom of Kush consisted of Nilotic tribes that were later forced to move South from present-day Egypt and the Republic of Sudan. More importantly, Kwot believes that the name Kush would tap into the belief among many South Sudanese Christians that the story of the Israelites leaving Egypt in a 40-year search for their homeland finds its modern-day expression in their own liberation struggle, with John Garang in the role of Moses and Salva Kiir as his deputy Joshua.¹⁴

You can even find a master's thesis on the subject: The Sudanese in war compared to the Hebrews of the Exodus (Garang Awan 2009).

Such strong [belief] in [the] fulfilment of God's prophecy can easily be tapped into to enhance growth of patriotism and nationalism in our people[] which will in turn be a platform to rise beyond tribalism and other vices within [a] short time. Therefore, [the] Republic of Kush is a name with [the] ability to unite us as people of the same land and destiny (Kwot 2011).

In addition, patriotism that is centred on the idea of Cush could also “easily be marketed in the Christian world” (Kwot 2011). Alier Ngong Oka (2011) from the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, in contrast, opposes the name Cush/Kush because it is an “ambiguous geographical piece of land we can only claim to be part of, because our land is not the same as the old ‘Cush’”, which also covers parts of the territory of the neighbouring states of Chad, Ethiopia and Central African Republic.

The entire debate about Cush can be seen as exemplary of the wider phenomenon of rooting South Sudan's independence and national identity in the biblical tradition and employing biblical language and imagery to elucidate the nation's trajectory toward a Christian future.¹⁵ The national anthem's first stanza “portrays South Sudanese' trust in God and [thanks] God for the peace, freedom and resources he has given to the long-time marginalized persons in the new African state” (Wudu 2011). Kenneth Oluka (2011), editor at the Ugandan daily The New Vision, likens the independence celebrations of the multi-ethnic nation in Juba to “the day of Pentecost when the disciples were filled with the Holy Spirit and they started speaking in tongues”, whereas others see the South Sudanese victory over the North as being “akin to the biblical story of David vs. Goliath” (New Sudan Vision 2011).

93% of respondents gave their religious denomination as Christian (The International Republican Institute 2011: 67).

Finally, South Sudanese seek to instil a sense of national belonging by having the newly composed national anthem taught and memorized all over the country while not forgetting to emphasize its high symbolic value, which merits taking a sombre and earnest approach to the song and its text. Thus, Joseph Kolombos, spokesperson for the Eastern Equatoria State Legislative Assembly, “warned the public [against] using [the] South Sudan National Anthem in mobile phones as ringtones” as “the National Anthem is an important symbol for the country and it must be used with great respect and dignity” (Jackson 2011).

Conclusion

The analysis of South Sudanese online media output from January to September 2011 has furnished an initial overview of the issues that feature in the domestic debate about the shape and form of the South Sudanese nation.

The key issue that emerged from the analysis is the question of how to balance strong tribal identities with allegiance to the national supra-identity. In this context, fears of domination by the Dinka and larger ethnicities in general are countered by appeals to welcome ethnic diversity as the basis for a multi-ethnic nation. Writers differ, though, in their assessment of whether tribalism is destined to be a persistent feature of South Sudan that should be represented in a separate chamber or whether it may weather over time and be replaced by a nationalism that transcends tribal allegiance.

In terms of ideas for what constitutes the South Sudanese nation in a positive sense, a common thread is commemoration of the rebels' (in particular, the SPLA's) liberation struggle against the North as a point of reference for all South Sudanese. Also, just as people are eager to rid themselves of reminiscences of the “old Sudan” – for example, Arabic place names – there is also a longing for something to take their place as a positive common denominator. One option on offer is Christianity, as evidenced by the idea of standing in the tradition of Kush or by equating John Garang with Moses.

Finally, an option brought into play both by the draft constitution and a couple of writers is that the country should do without a common identity altogether and instead allow for “unity in diversity” (El-Battahani 2007): Ethnic, tribal, regional and religious diversity should constitute South Sudan's national identity. For now, however, “this is a vision of nationhood that has yet to find consistent expression, either in the North or the South” (Ryle 2011: 41). And if the experience of fellow African countries, many of whom recently celebrated half a century of independence, is anything to go by, debates about national identity are not likely to conclude and disappear anytime soon.

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93.

Post

Juba

(2011), How to Best Serve the South, in: jubapost.org, online: <http://jubapost.org/article-11.html> (8 July 2011).

94.

Kiir Mayardit

Salva

(2011), President Kiir's Message on Martyrs' Day, in: gossmission.org, 1 August, online: <www.gossmission.org/goss/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1230&Itemid=193> (27 April 2012).

95.

Kuol

Stephen Par

(2011), The Republic as a Responsibility, in: gurtong.net, 3 May, online: <www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/5168/categoryId/24/The-Republic-as-a-Responsibility.aspx> (15 September 2011).

96.

de Kwot

Chol

(2011), Why Republic of Kush Should be Adopted for the County in Waiting?, in: newsudanvision.com, 25 January, online: <www.newsudanvision.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2312:why-republic-of-kush-should-be-adopted-for-country-in-waiting&Itemid=44> (4 October 2011).

97.

Leopold

Evelyn

(2011), South Sudan: Birth of a Nation Amid Joy and Deadly Unfinished Business, in: The Huffington Post, 17 July, <www.huffingtonpost.com/evelyn-leopold/south-sudan-birth-of-a-na_b_900831.html> (22 February 2012).

98.

Lupai

Jacob K.

(2011a), The New Nation, in: gurtong.net, 1 May, online: <www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/5161/categoryId/24/The-New-Nation.aspx> (16 September 2011).

99.

Lupai

Jacob K.

(2011b), Independence of South Sudan above Anything Else, in: southsudannation.com, 14 June, online: <www.southsudannation.com/independofssabove%20jlupai78.htm> (9 July 2011).

100.

Mabor

Beny Gideon

(2011), The Importance of South Sudanese Cultural Diversity and Identity in Nation Building, in: southsudannation.com, 23 September, online: <www.southsudannation.com/theimportanceofss%20benygideon%2078.htm> (30 September 2011).

101.

Majokdit

Riak G.

(2011), We Have Finally Done It!, in: thecitizen.info, 20 July, online: <www.thecitizen.info/opinion/we-have-finally-done-it/> (1 October 2011).

102.

Martell

Peter

(2011), A Song for South Sudan: Writing a New National Anthem, in: BBC News, 12 January, online: <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12164171> (14 September 2011).

103.

Mayar

Manyang David

(2011), New Police Force ahead of Independence, in: jubapost.org, June, online: <http://jubapost.org/article-155.html> (8 July 2011).

104.

Mon

Benjamin Majok

(2011), Commissioner: Tribalism Undermines South's Independence, in: sudanvotes.com, 15 July, online: <www.sudanvotes.com/articles/?id=930> (6 October 2011).

105.

New Sudan Vision (2011), The Meaning Behind South Sudan Declaration of Independence, in: newsudanvision.com, 8 July, online: <www.newsudanvision.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2396:editorial-the-meaning-behind-declaration-of-south-sudan-independence&catid=1:sudan-news-stories&Itemid=6> (9 July 2011).

106.

Nyaba

Adwok

(2011), The Erosion of Traditon [sic] in South Sudan, in: newsudanvision.com, 5 June, online: <http://newsudanvision.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2369:the-erosion-of-tradiiton-in-south-sudan&Itemid=144> (9 July 2011).

107.

Ochi

Richan

(2011), Kiir: A Road Map for the Coming Period, in: sudanvotes.com, 25 February, online: <www.sudanvotes.com/articles/?id=593> (6 October 2011).

108.

Oka

Alier Ngong

(2011), New Name for South Sudan Debate Broadened, in: gurtong.net, 10 January, online: <www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/4649/New-Name-For-South-Sudan-Debate-Broadened.aspx> (16 September 2011).

109.

Okuk

James

(2011), Regional Representation Breeds Tribalism in South Sudan, in: sudantribune.com, 16 April, online: <www.sudantribune.com/Regional-representation-breeds,38599> (9 July 2011).

110.

Oluka

Kenneth

(2011), Jubilant Crowds Welcome South Sudan, in: thenewnation.net, 10 July, online: <www.thenewnation.net/features.html?start=9> (1 October 2011).

111.

Paul

Elhag

(2011), SPLM's Political Tricks: Appointing Crooks in Cabinet, in: sudantribune.com, 31 August, online: <www.sudantribune.com/SPLM-s-political-tricks-Appointing,40005> (16 September 2011).

112.

Ramba

Justin Ambago

(2011a), Don't Blame Federalism for Tribalism, in: gurtong.net, 23 April, online: <www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/5138/categoryId/24/Dont-Blame-Federalism-for-Tribalism.aspx> (16 September 2011).

113.

Ramba

Justin Ambago

(2011b), Two Sudans, But the Task of Nation-Building Remains the Same, in: gurtong.net, 7 August, online: <www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ID/5552/Default.aspx> (15 September 2011).

114.

Rengo

Rengo Gyyw

Jr. (2011), Remove Offensive Vestiges of Arabism in Juba, in: gurtong.net, 14 May, online: <www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/5212/Remove-Offensive-Vestiges-Of-Arabism-In-Juba.aspx> (9 July 2011).

115.

Rhodes

Tom

(2011), Mission Journal: South Sudan's Struggle for a Free Press, in: CPJ Blog, 8 September, online: <http://cpj.org/blog/2011/09/south-sudans-struggle-for-a-free-press.php> (12 September 2011).

116.

Run

R. Mou

(2011), Why House of Nationalities is Necessary in Souyth [sic] Sudan, in: gurtong.net, 14 February, online: <www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/4871/categoryId/24/Why-House-Of-Nationalities-Is-Necessary-in-South-Sudan.aspx> (16 September 2011).

117.

Samuel

Adaku

(2011), South Sudan to Issue New Currency on July 9, in: juba post.org, March, online: <http://jubapost.org/article-50.html> (8 July 2011).

118.

South Sudan News Agency (2011), The Root Causes of Conflicts in South Sudan, in: southsudannewsagency.com, 14 May, online: <www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/top-stories/the-root-causes-of-conflicts-in-south-sudan> (28 September 2011).

119.

Stephen

Juma John

(2011), Equatoria Conference Calls for Federal System of Governance, in: gurtong.net, 19 April, online: <www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/5121/Equatoria-Conference-Calls-For-Federal-System-Of-Governance.aspx> (29 September 2011).

120.

Tribune

Sudan

(2011a), South Sudan Denies Banning Circulation of Newspapers from the North, in: sudantribune.com, 29 June, online: <www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-denies-banning,39374> (6 October 2011).

121.

Tribune

Sudan

(2011b), Salva Kiir Takes Oath, Grants Amnesty to Rebels, in: sudantribune.com, 10 July, online: <www.sudantribune.com/Salva-Kiir-takes-oath-grants,39479> (20 April 2011).

122.

The International Republican Institute (IRI) (2011), Survey of South Sudan Public Opinion, 6–27 September, online: <www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/news/press/mainColumnParagraphs/0111114/content_files/file/IRI%20South%20Sudan%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20(September%202011).pdf> (25 April 2012).

123.

Tombe

Laku Modi

(2011), Dictators Aren't Nations' Builders, in: gurtong.net, 31 January, online: <www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/4774/categoryId/24/Dictators-Arent-Nations-Builders.aspx> (16 September 2011).

124.

Upper Nile Times (2011), The Government of Southern Sudan has Outlined a Strategic plan to Eliminate Arabic in Secondary Schools by 2014, in: untimes.org, 23 August, online: <http://untimes.org/index.php/south-sudan/item/67-the-government-of-southern-sudan-has-outlined-a-strategic-plan-to-eliminate-arabic-in-secondary-schools-by-2014> (18 February 2012).

125.

Wël

PaanLuel

(2011), “Tribocracy”: Best System for South Sudan and Africa, in: gurtong.net, 18 August, online: <www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/5598/Tribocracy-Best-System-For-South-Sudan-and-Africa.aspx> (15 September 2011).

126.

Wudu

Boboya Simon

(2011), South Sudan National Anthem Launched, in: juba post.org, June, online: <http://jubapost.org/article-127.html> (8 July 2011).