Social science studies of the commons are characterized by two relatively clear-cut theoretical traditions, here labelled 'the tragedy of the commons' and 'co-operative action theory'. These differ substantially both in their basic assumptions and epistemological prescriptions; or 'hard cores' and 'protective belts', to use Lakatos's (1974) tools for evaluating scientific research programmes. It is suggested that 'the tragedy of the commons' tradition scores higher on Lakatos's criterion of coherence, whereas 'co-operative action theory' has been more successful in the production of novel empirical findings. Furthermore, the contrasting effect between the two traditions is believed to have contributed to an overall growth of knowledge within the field of study.
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