Societal-level problems often result from many individuals acting in their own self-interest rather than in the interest of the group. This paper describes an experimental game based on continued degradation of the central resource which determines each player's winnings; players elect to allow, to not allow, or to reverse the degradation by spending from their respective scores. The game was begun with either a "pure" or half-degraded central resource and was played with subjects winning amounts based on their personal scores or on the group's combined score. Results under all conditions are examined
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Dana, J.M. and Rubenstein, F.D.The psychology of pollution and other externalities . Unpublished paper. Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Graduate School of Business, 1970.
2.
Hardin, G.The tragedy of the commons. Science, 1968, 162, 1243-1248.
3.
Kelley, H. and Crzelak, J.The conflict of individual and common interest in an n-person game . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 21 (2), 190-197.
4.
Rubenstein, F.D.A behavioral study of pollution: the role of perceived instrumentality in an externality situation. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Graduate School of Business. 1971.
