Introduction
When someone asks what she does for a living, a university professor may answer that ‘I work at the university’. By so doing, she withholds information about her high-status profession and title, and puts herself in an ordinary job. She does this out of several concerns. For herself, it is to not appear elitist. For the other person, it is to avoid feelings of insecurity or inferiority. For the ongoing interaction, she does it to circumvent social imbalance (Vassenden and Rusnes, 2022). For much the same reasons – avoid negative judgment and wanting others to not ‘feel bad’ – a rich person may conceal her wealth when interacting with other parents with less money (Sherman, 2017).
These are examples of a phenomenon documented in many recent studies of social class and status: Elites and higher-class people often downplay – even conceal – their status when interacting with people of lower class/status than themselves. They present themselves as ‘ordinary’. This finding emerges in disparate academic literatures: Beyond the sociology of class (Sherman, 2017), we find it in psychology (Swencionis and Fiske, 2018), cognitive decision-making (Arnett and Sidanius, 2018), classical microsociology (Simmel [1910]1949) and recent contributions inspired by interactionism (Thornton, 2023). Researchers provide different explanations. To mention only the sociology of class, interactional status suppression is conceived of as reflecting predispositions and/or broader moral repertoires. In the Nordic countries, for instance, it is commonly conceived of through repertoires stemming from historical egalitarianism (e.g., Ljunggren, 2017). Other sociological explanations pointing to broader sensibilities include elites’ anxieties about their moral legitimacy vis-à-vis economic inequalities (Sherman, 2017). The sociology of class typically sees interactional status suppression as the same phenomenon as ‘elite ordinariness’ broadly (cf. Reeves and Friedman, 2024).
Building on literature reviews, this paper synthesises the existing research on cross-status interaction. This makes several contributions, to the sociology of class, to the understanding of national cultures, and to the other above-mentioned fields and disciplines: First, I show how downplaying of status in cross-class encounters is a more widespread interactional trait than especially Nordic (but also American) sociology has suggested (Gullestad, 1991; Sherman, 2017). My literature reviews strongly suggest that cross-status interaction unfolds very similarly where it is reported – the UK, Norway, the Netherlands, and the U.S. From this observation, I suggest that a better way to conceive of national differences, is that some societal formations facilitate for more frequent cross-status interaction than others, but that the interaction as such is quite similar. This centres the welfare-state (Alecu et al., 2022). A second contribution, underpinning the first, comes from tracing the theoretical interpretations in previous research. I notice an individual-structure dualism in some studies, and overly individualist approaches in others. Especially the sociology of class, which sees interactional status suppression as part of a broader elite ordinariness, hence risks conflating social domains (e.g., face-to-face interaction and media portrayals). What is missing in most current accounts of cross-status interaction, is an adequate theoretical grasp of the social situation (Tavory, 2024). Face-to-face interaction represents something of a ‘black box’ in current thinking on cross-status encounters, whether it begins from elite ordinariness broadly, or zooms in on interaction directly. I discuss how the study of cross-status interaction can be fertilised by the classical microsociological idea of situations’ existence in themselves, a social domain unreducible to dispositions or broader culture. This engages Erving Goffman's ritual interaction order ([1967]1982; 1983; Rawls, 1987; Smith, 2023). From this vantage point, I also highlight situational variation, which recent research has not attended to. This part of the paper also engages Randall Collins’ work (2004). In conclusion, I highlight the consequences of interactional status suppression, which shows the political implications of mundane interactions.
Theoretical clarifications: Dispositions, repertoires, impression management, the ritual interaction order
In the sociology of class, standard interpretations of elites in cross-class interaction centre moral repertoires (Lamont and Thévenot, 2000). The latter connects to a broader ‘moral turn’ in the field (Jarness and Flemmen, 2019:182), which is typically disconnected from interactional analysis. A well-known expression, which also relates to national comparisons, is Lamont's Money, Morals and Manners (1992). Lamont highlighted how cross-national variations in cultural/moral repertoires yield different boundary-work from higher-class people towards other social categories. For instance, a tradition of (cultural) egalitarianism contributes to American higher-class people drawing weaker cultural boundaries than the French (1992:127). Another expression of the moral turn is the earlier-mentioned insecurity about moral justification vis-à-vis economic disparities (Khan, 2011; Kuusela, 2022; Sherman, 2017), because of which contemporary elites embrace values of inclusion and meritocracy (Khan, 2011). This is a key point in Reeves and Friedman's impressive study of the British elite and its changes since the late 19th century (2024; Friedman and Reeves, 2020). In Who's Who, today's British elites self-present very differently from their predecessors’ aristocratic lifestyles. Current portrayals of ordinariness are shaped by elites having become ‘increasingly insecure about their moral legitimacy in the eyes of the public’ (2024:225).
Accordingly, repertoires of moral evaluation (Lamont and Thévenot, 2000) are frequently deployed frameworks in the sociology of class. They are applied to analysis of face-to-face interaction in much the same way as to elite ordinariness more generally, like in lifestyle expressions, public appearance, writing in outlets like Who's Who, in social media, or self-identifications as ‘ordinary’ in interviews. (The latter is an established finding in many countries.
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) Nordic sociologists refer to an ‘egalitarian repertoire’ (or just egalitarianism) when explaining either higher-class people's general modesty (Sakslind and Skarpenes, 2014), public appearance (Daloz, 2006; Krogstad and Stark, 2021; Krogstad and Storvik, 2010), or their behaviour in face-to-face interaction (literature reviews).
Moral repertoires are sometimes combined with dispositional theory, most notably Bourdieu's idea of the habitus ([1972]1977). An example is Khan's study of St Paul's School (2011), where U.S. elite adolescents are taught ‘ease’ in engaging with all sorts of cultural styles, and in navigating social hierarchies. ‘[H]ow to negotiate relationships,’ Khan argues, ‘is an embodied interactional knowledge,’ a ‘corporeal skill’ (2011:71) that aids elites in encounters with both superiors and subordinates. ‘Embodied ease’ makes hierarchies ‘disappear’ and helps one inter/act as if class-based distinctions are non-existent.
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Among the few recent microsociological interpretations of cross-status interaction (see later), Goffman's theories have been dominant, with researchers (McLuhan et al., 2014) relying on dramaturgy and impression management (Goffman, [1959]1987). The latter, which is also present in psychological research (Swencionis et al., 2017), touches on the theoretical interpretations that I propose, albeit I extend them to Goffman's ritual interaction order.
For microsociological theory to aid the study of cross-status interaction, there are possibilities beyond Goffman, like symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and more recent interaction order approaches that highlight disruptions (Tavory and Fine, 2020). (Alignment is the standard conceptualisation.) Other conceptualisations of the interaction order highlight small-group culture or idiocultures (Fine, 2012). The latter is a productive approach but arguably less applicable to cross-status interaction, which (judging from studies reviewed) can be rather ephemeral. In Collins’ interaction ritual theory (2004), groups form by people connecting emotionally around shared interests. This is unlike the cautious, nervous behaviours seemingly characterising interaction with marked status/class differences (Simmel [1910]1949) – which can indeed also be group differences. I consider Goffman's classic ritual approach ([1967]1982; Rawls, 1987) the most useful. The fact that the few later interactionist accounts rely on Goffman (McLuhan et al., 2014; Vassenden and Rusnes, 2022), also favours this approach. Goffman's idea that ritual bolster fragile personhood, to sustain the interaction order, is not a novel insight to microsociologists. Developing microsociological ideas as such is however not the contribution here. The intervention is to apply a classic microsociological idea to an area of research where it has had little (or no) bearing. This carves out an analytical space between individuals and structures/cultures and examines how ritual theory can fertilise our understanding of the phenomenon. I also note that Goffman's ritual interaction order does not in itself explain status suppression. (These are generic theories, not substantive ones about social class.) Its role is more modest: improve our understanding of interactional status suppression.
The two main ideas from Goffman that I build upon, are ritual and sui generis. Transplanting Durkheim's idea of society sui generis to face-to-face interaction, Goffman called upon us to analyse interaction as ‘a substantive domain in its own right’ (1983:2), as having semi-autonomous existence vis-à-vis both social/cultural structures and personalities/predispositions (1964; 1983).
The interaction order sui generis (Rawls, 1987) is produced through interaction ritual ([1967]1982), which helps individuals protect themselves and others. Goffman theorised selfhood as totemic, as collective gods were replaced by the individual ([1967]1982). The individual is however a very fragile deity, longing for ‘worship’ (respect/recognition), which she must obtain herself, from equally fragile others. Interaction ritual answers to this predicament. We rely upon our projected self-definitions (face), and facework comprises collaborative ritual communication to uphold them. Interaction is fragile too, hinging on participants successfully monitoring themselves and others, according to ‘the rule of self-respect’ and ‘the rule of considerateness’ ([1967]1982:11).
The interaction rituals most directly relevant when high-status people downplay differences in face-to-face encounters are avoidance rituals. ‘An important focus of deferential avoidance consists in the verbal care that actors are obliged to exercise so as not to bring into discussions matters that might be painful, embarrassing, or humiliating to the recipient’ (Goffman [1967]1982:65). This, I propose, happens in the reviewed studies. It requires little imagination to see that class-based lifestyles (Jarness and Friedman, 2017), high and low status (Swencionis et al., 2017), wage disparities, wealth (Sherman, 2017), prestige titles (Ljunggren, 2017; Vassenden and Rusnes, 2022), class privilege (Thornton, 2023), not to mention ‘distaste’ (Van den Haak and Wilterdink, 2019), make for threatening topics.
Literature reviews
Reflecting my own research interests, reviews began from the sociology of class, which approaches cross-status interaction from elite ordinariness more generally. The criterion of inclusion was that studies feature cross-status interaction as main or important sub-theme. In the next rounds, as I became aware of studies from other disciplines (psychology/decision-making), searches were broadened. Searches combined numerous word combinations: ‘elites+downplaying status+face-to-face’, ‘upper-class+ordinariness+cross-status/class encounters’, ‘egalitarian*+cross-status/class’, ‘status suppression’, to mention only a few. These searches, which included scoping references in identified publications, plus their citations, were reiterated several times. Table 1 lists the identified studies, in this order: 1–5 are reports of cross-status interaction in studies of class more broadly. 6-7 are psychological experiments. 8–10 are recent contributions leaning towards interactionism, and 11–13 are classical microsociology.
The sociology of class: Seeing general elite ordinariness in cross-class encounters
Van den Haak and Wilterdink (2019) rely on 90 interviews from the Netherlands. The authors show how people employ both egalitarian and hierarchical repertoires when they discuss cultural tastes. The authors convincingly show how these contrasting repertoires combine, and how morality frames cultural distinction: Well-educated people are often uncomfortable about making distinctions; hence the word ‘struggling’. Interpretations highlight (i) macro tensions between rising inequality and increased emphasis on meritocracy, and (ii) intra-individual tensions over self-presentation and internalised habitus (2019:418). The relevant levels, then, are a macro-world of inequality, ideology, and morality, and a ‘self-world’ of internal dialogue over right and wrong. Interaction is presented as a reflection of the macro-world and the intra-individual struggles. This is despite that, the most frequent
[…] reason for downplaying occurs when people personally know other people whose taste they are inclined to look down on. Respondents speak about uncomfortable situations in which they keep their opinions to themselves, either because they do not want to hurt others’ feelings or because they are afraid that others will find them elitist or arrogant (2019:424).
The title of Jarness and Friedman's article, ‘I am not a snob, but…’ (2017) is informative of the findings. From interviews with 38 upper middle-class Britons and Norwegians, they report widespread tension between, on the one hand, explicit boundary-drawing towards people with tastes/lifestyles contrasting with theirs; and on the other hand, values of acceptance, respectfulness, and openness. Upper middle-class people do indeed draw class-based boundaries, but carefully and against the backdrop of broader moral ideals. They repeatedly downplay superiority or class differences, and when that happens, the authors refer to the ‘dominant moral radar of tolerance and egalitarianism’ (2017:15), which is coupled with people's instinctive sense – their ‘practical mastery’ – of when these distinctions are or are not appropriate. Combined, these constitute a Bourdieuian ‘strategy of condescension’ because distinctions ‘fly under’ the moral radar. The findings and interpretations of consequences are compelling – in my reading, class boundaries become consequential by virtue of being unrecognised. A key theme is ‘cross-class encounters and the (strategic) monitoring of self-presentation’ (2017:21–23). Such face-to-face interaction is a main arena of downplaying, and interviewees ‘[…] go to lengths to downplay difference in social encounters’ (2017:14). Data excerpts included statements from ‘Jonas’, who is head of a cultural enterprise and admits to cultural snobbery. ‘However, while Jonas has no moral issues conveying his “snobbish” self to us, the interviewer, he very consciously downplays such attitudes when encountering people whom he suspects do not share his cultural interests’ (2017:22). Jarness and Friedman's interpretations resemble Van den Haak and Wilterdink's suggested macro-tensions and intra-individual tensions: (i) There are external values and norms – egalitarianism, tolerance, openness – and (ii) there are people's dispositions (habitus). Monitored self-presentation in face-to-face interaction appears to be a combined expression of the broader moral formations and a ‘[…] capacity embodied in the habitus of the upper-middle class’ (2017:23).
Ljunggren's article (2017) about the Norwegian cultural elite is based on 25 interviews with actors, cultural directors, editors, and humanities professors. It presents convincing findings. Resembling the papers above, interaction is seen as an expression of repertoire – an ‘egalitarian cultural repertoire’. Several examples pertain to social encounters with non-elites. Participants often ‘hide hierarchies’ ‘[…] in social interactions with “outsiders” because they believe that social differences make both parties feel uncomfortable […]’. Further, ‘“feelings of superiority” cannot be brought out in wider social interactions without problems’ (2017:570). Particularly candid are the university professors, who often ‘[…] tried to “hide” or hierarchically euphemize their occupational position in non-academic settings, by stating that they were “teachers” or answering that they “just worked at the university”, when asked’ (2017:569). Ljunggren's interpretation of such downplaying – even hiding elite positions – lies with Norwegian egalitarianism as a ‘key cultural repertoire’. In other words, the relevant levels are morality ‘out there’ and/or ‘in here’.
Vassenden and Jonvik (2019) is a study of class and culture in Stavanger, Norway. It relied on qualitative interviews (39), with people with different educational histories and socioeconomic backgrounds. The interviews centred lifestyles and cultural capital. This study found the same downplaying of status as in the studies above, with cultural capital typically held in abeyance in cross-class encounters. Theoretically, the authors rely on moral repertoires (Nordic egalitarianism), but also engaged Goffman's facework (1967]1982).
Sherman's book Uneasy Street—The Anxieties of Affluence (2017) explores the social worlds and identities of New York's economic elite. The main data are 50 interviews with affluent parents, several in the top 1 percent earners. Highlighting moral considerations, Sherman paints a vivid picture of their efforts to justify their wealth, against the backdrop of glaring inequality (thereof ‘anxieties’). Interviewees emphasised ‘the importance of being morally worthy of their wealth’ (2017:55). Striving to be considered good persons, many emphasise their ordinariness. In interpretations, Sherman mentions extra-local cultural-moral formations: values and norms like cultural egalitarianism (2017:231), and ideologies like the American Dream (2017:232).
In respondents’ comments about being ordinary, there are numerous examples of interactions with people of lower class than themselves; domestic workers (nannies/housekeepers), friends, relatives, and other less affluent parents. In these situations, respondents typically downplay status differences. (Examples pp. 41; 49; 50; 54-55; 124; 129–131.) Partly, they wish to avoid negative judgment of themselves, but it also happens out of concern for the other person. Many hence hide their wealth. Below are some excerpts from Sherman's book, which show both situational downplaying and Sherman's interpretations. Interviewees
[…] sometimes wanted to avoid showing their wealth to those with less. [21] […] In interaction with others, being ‘aware’ means not making other people feel bad about having less or treating them differently. This imperative is a variation on the Golden Rule, to treat others as you want to be treated, which is a prominent cultural norm in the United States (and elsewhere). [124] […] The people I talked with translated this broad imperative of ‘awareness’ into their interactions with others. [130]
Mirroring the previous studies, Sherman thus presents status suppression in interaction as a combined outcome of inner inclinations (‘awareness’ of privilege) and outer norms/ideologies: It is an extension of ‘awareness’ and reflective of ‘norms of civility,’ ‘norm of silence’ about class differences (2017:131), norms of reciprocity, a ‘culturally prominent [American] idea of classlessness’ (2017:22), ‘the American cultural taboo against discussing money and class’ (2017:18). Explanations are thus also found in ‘national culture’.
Psychological experiments
Fiske and colleagues examine impression management (Goffman, [1959]1987) in cross-status interaction. A series of psychological experiments in U.S. workplaces and among university students (Swencionis and Fiske, 2016; 2018; Swencionis et al., 2017) investigate how higher- and lower-status Americans self-present in cross-status situations – status pertaining to class and race. High-status Americans (‘downward comparers’) seem quite consistently to downplay their competence and promote warmth, as an ingratiation strategy vis-à-vis lower-status interactants, partly to counter stereotypes about higher-status people being ‘cold’. Conversely, lower-status Americans downplay warmth, and promote competence vis-à-vis higher-status colleagues. People in both categories ‘[…] try to hide the status difference’ (2018:80), through ‘warmth-competence tradeoffs’ (Swencionis et al., 2017). One experiment was with students at a prestigious university in a U.S. state ‘associated with lower-status stereotypes’ (2016:82). In encounters with students from less prestigious state universities, participants reported discomfort in revealing that they attended the elite university. Some concealed it, which intriguingly mirrors Norwegian professors (Ljunggren, 2017; Vassenden and Rusnes, 2022).
These psychological studies are informative in showing similar findings to sociological research, using very different methods (experiments). Perhaps to be expected given their discipline, Fiske et al. do not engage theories of moral repertoires or dispositions as such. They nevertheless discuss broader culture, and the possibility of cross-national variation (2018:95). What they do share with sociological interpretations, is the emphasis on individuals who highlight and downplay certain parts of themselves in interaction. Like most sociologists cited here, Fiske et al. show less interest in theorising interaction as such.
Arnett and Sidanius’ ‘Sacrificing status for social harmony’ (2018) is based on five experimental studies with altogether 1246 participants affiliated with prestigious U.S. universities, as graduate students or employees. The authors report ‘a surprising tendency’ (2018:108) that participants with high status conceal their identities in cross-status interaction, and more so than lower-status participants. This is surprising, they argue, because research attends more to concealment of inferior status, citing Goffman's Stigma ([1963]1990). High-status participants conceal information like titles, length and place of education. Concealment is consistent across the studies, like in ‘getting to know you’ sessions (2018:118). The authors conclude about ‘[…] a surprisingly widespread tendency: individuals consistently conceal relatively high-status identities from their peers in an effort to preserve social harmony’ (2018:122). This last point about social harmony is the same as Vassenden and Rusnes (2022) professors’ concerns behind ‘passing as ordinary’ (below). This also shows that Arnett and Sidanius diverge from the studies above in their focus: Rather than ‘morality out there’, their high-status participants conceal their status because of threats to the immediate social harmony, i.e., interactional threats to self (not appear self-promoting or invite envy), the other (who may feel stigmatised), and belonging, that is, people getting along (2018:109). These findings appear extremely robust, and I find much value in the interpretations (which are strikingly like ours about Norwegian professors) when moving to microsociology. (This study could have been under the next heading; I have placed it here because of experiments.) Unlike the authors above, then, there is not much emphasis on broader culture here, but notwithstanding the interactional/situational factors, much emphasis is on ‘social-cognitive processes and behaviors of high status individuals’ (2018:129, emphasis added). In other words, and like the other studies, the analyses centre the individual who conceals information about herself. Interaction is foregrounded more than in the preceding studies, but not theorised as such.
Recent interactionist contributions
Thornton's study (2023) of upper-middle class students in an elite private university in the U.S. relies on 41 interviews about class and status on campus. Interviewees compare themselves downwards to ‘first-generation, low-income’ students and upwards to rich students. Interviewees expect the rich to show deference towards themselves, and (as I understand it:) to downplay status differences. Downwards, interviewees expect themselves to show deference to students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. With similar terminology to Sherman's (2017), awareness of their own privilege leads them to hide ‘[…] visible cues of their higher class when interacting with [first-generation, low-income] students’ (2023:4). Thornton does not explicitly engage theories of broader moral repertoires or class dispositions. Bridging to microsociology, he relates to symbolic interactionism (Mead; Cooley). Students’ awareness, moreover, appears to be partly generated on campus, as learnt through preceding cross-status interactions. In that sense, too, Thornton departs slightly from the preceding studies, in that interactions are also causes of identity- and boundary-work in future interactions. Nevertheless, there is more focus on the individuals’ ‘awareness’ of their privilege than on the situations in their own right.
Vassenden and Rusnes (2022) investigated Norwegian professors’ self-presentation in everyday life and combined Goffman's ‘passing’ concept from Stigma ([1963]1990) with Interaction Ritual ([1967]1982). Through interviews (N = 14), the study zoomed in on social encounters like with other parents and small talk between neighbours – especially situations where people do not know each other's occupations in advance. (This was compared to interviews with nine kindergarten teachers and eight industrial workers, who reported much less presentational ambivalence; cf. Arnett and Sidanius, 2018). When someone asks what they do for a living, these professors avoid mentioning their titles upfront, before gradually negotiating possible disclosure. Like Ljunggren's respondents, their typical first reply is ‘I work at the university’. This maintains three concerns. First, the occupational title may clash with the self-image they want to project, as being ‘down to earth’. Second, they are mindful not to make interlocutors feel inferior or insecure. Third, they aim to ‘save situations’ from conversational ‘fuss’ and social imbalances. This was theorised as a Goffmanian ‘deferential avoidance ritual’ of protecting face for all interactants. Like Vassenden and Jonvik, Arnett and Sidanius, and Thornton, this study can be seen as a stepping-stone to theorising the interaction order.
McLuhan et al. (2014) modify ‘the cloak of competence’ (Edgerton [1967], in McLuhan et al., 2014) used by ‘inferiors’, and introduce the reverse version, i.e., ‘the cloak of incompetence’. This describes the phenomenon that people downplay their competence in interaction, which according to the authors is as pervasive a feature of social life as that of hiding incompetence. The authors rely on a ‘meta-analysis’ of existing research, and connect their findings to Goffman's theories, especially his dramaturgical analysis of impression management ([1959]1987). From this, the authors identify different ‘goals’ that individuals can have for presenting diminished competence, like managing relationships and saving face (2018:365-366). Examples of cloaking include women who ‘play dumb’ on dates (to not intimidate prospective romantic partners), students who get good grades interacting with those who do not, and high-achieving black students who anticipate or try to debunk allegations of ‘acting white’. While McLuhan and co-authors do not attend to cross-class interaction per se (this is a sub-theme), their work is relevant to my argument in showing that status suppression – ‘cloaking behavior’ (2018:380) – is a widespread interactional feature. It is also relevant that they emphasise ‘[…] the local and interpersonal dimensions of cloaking behavior, focusing on specific settings in which incompetence is displayed and particular individuals’ attempts to present a less than able self’ (2018:381-382). However, while this directs our attention to situations rather than mind-sets or culture (see 2018:365-366), the analysis of individuals’ goals/strategies is not so much supplemented with analysis of specific situational properties.
To summarise the preceding review of the existing empirical research: With some exceptions, downplaying status in interaction is seen as an expression of broader morality ‘out there’ being engaged with ‘in here’; intra-personally, often as expression of upper-class habitus or performance. Social interaction is then often conceived of as the combined outcome of predispositions/habitus and broader morality (repertoire). Broader morality, moreover, is often tied to nations. More interactionist interpretations also tend to prioritise the individual over situations.
I observe also that an important method in the current empirical research is interviewing. This matters for two reasons: First, it poses challenges for interactionist analyses. As Vassenden and Mangset show about studies of class and identity-work, interviews are interaction order phenomena in their own right, with rituals of self-presentation and facework (2024). That means that we cannot be conclusive whether reports in interviews of interactional status suppression reflects actual behaviour or is self-presentation following social desirability bias (cf. Khan and Jerolmack, 2013). Still, having done interviews on the topic myself, and seeing how experiments yield the same findings, plus status suppression having been theorised for more than a century (Simmel; below), I believe we can conclude that this is a very real, widespread, and consequential interactional phenomenon. Second, the dominance of interviewing helps explain the relative absence of situationalist interpretations. As argued by Rawlings and Childress, there are clear affinities between interview studies and dispositional thinking. Situationalist theories are more common among ethnographers (2019:1764).
Classical microsociological accounts
To my knowledge, the earliest microsociological mention of status suppression in cross-class interaction was Simmel's descriptions of sociability. Simmel writes that, in occasions of ‘pure sociability’ – interaction existing for its own sake – participants will suppress their ‘objective attributes’: fame, wealth, social position ([1910]1949:256). This is even a condition for sociability (254). Consequently, in sociable situations, ‘[…] the strong, outstanding person not only places himself on a level with the weaker but goes so far as to assume the attitude that the weaker is the more worthy and superior’ (257). Because sociability is democratic in structure, with impulses to act as if all were equal, Simmel notes that cross-class sociability can be painful and strenuous. Nevertheless – or for exactly that reason – the courtesy of downplaying one's superiority is a ‘specific attitude in society’ (257).
Moving to postwar American sociology, Goffman wrote in detail about these issues (his contemporaries also noted it; Davis, 1962
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). Overall, Goffman described ‘[…] most rituals in the mid-twentieth century as mutual or symmetrical: showing polite recognition of others […]. Individuals reciprocated, thereby showing their status equality’ (Collins, 2004:278, emphasis added). Substantively, we must note, there are many examples in Goffman's works, like The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959[1987]) and Interaction Ritual (1967[1982]), of both accentuation and suppression of class symbols and social status in interaction (1959[1987]:47-51; 1967[1982]:64-65). Nevertheless, and while he never highlighted elite ordinariness to the same degree that, e.g., Reeves and Friedman do in 2024, the tenor of Goffman's writing on interaction ritual suggests status suppression. (Cf. Arnett and Sidanius above; Goffman's works beyond Stigma make it much less of a surprise that high-status individuals too, not just those with low status, conceal information about themselves.) Goffman observes, for instance, the ‘[…] noblesse oblige through which those of high status are expected to curb their power of embarrassing their lesser’ (1967[1982]:28). Importantly, and which I stress in the next section, Goffman highlighted particular social contexts where suppression of status is pronounced, almost by rule. One is public places, like streets and squares, where we are all situational equals (1963). Another is ‘the social life of large social establishments – office buildings, schools, hospitals, etc. Here, in elevators, halls, and cafeterias […] and entrances, all members are often formally on an equal if distant footing’. In these settings, distinctions like between ‘[…] occupational categories, must be suppressed. The effect is to stress situs and equality’ ([1967]1982:109, emphasis added). Shifts of interaction contexts, and how they matter for which parts of ourselves we play up or down, were crucial in several of Goffman's works, regarding both low (1963[1990]) and high status: On social arenas where one's expertise is not centre stage, like public transportation or a grocery, Goffman noted that professionals ‘may take a very modest role’ (1959[1987]:43). He also refers to this as ‘negative idealisation’ (1959[1987]:48).
Writing about the U.S. in the 1970s, Posner (1976) applied Goffman's Stigma ([1963]1990) – and tacitly interaction ritual – to excellence and superiority: She argued that someone being extraordinary (beautiful/rich/knowledgeable) can put the same strain on ‘smooth social interaction’ as someone being inferior or stigmatised. This, Posner notes, is paradoxical given the American emphasis on success. In social interaction, ‘[…] the introduction of extraordinary persons […] can pose as great a problem as the treatment of stigmatized inferiors. In a very real sense, both groups are trouble makers because their differentness threatens the smooth, uneventful running of a social episode’ (1976:142). As interaction is typically upheld for its own sake, excellence can threaten the social order just as much as incompetence (1976:144). Importantly, social interaction often has ‘smooth running’ as its goal. Posner did not refer to Goffman's rituals, but it is in many ways closer to that than to stigma theory, when she states that ‘[…] smoothness is achieved through the mutual tactful avoidance of elements of ourselves which could be regarded as unusual, bizarre or stigmatizing’ (1976:142, emphasis added). While we may disagree about calling excellence ‘stigma’ (I would reserve that for ‘inferiors’), Posner's argument that both ‘inferiority’ and ‘superiority’ are kept in abeyance in social interaction, for the sake of the interaction itself, is forceful.
These classical/theoretical microsociological works observe the same phenomenon of status suppression as do current sociological studies that approach cross-class interaction from observations of broader elite ordinariness, and as do psychological studies that zoom in on cross-status interaction directly. The main point I extract from these older microsociological accounts is that they ground status suppression in interactions/situations, rather than in mind-sets/dispositions or broader culture. Both this point, and the one about situational variations, are largely neglected in recent research.
The added value of Goffman's ritual interaction order
Goffman's interaction order attunes us to seeing cross-status encounters as belonging to a separate domain of social reality. Attending to this classical microsociological idea that social situations have independent force, allows us to identify the different mechanisms of different types of elite ordinariness, where some come from interaction order pressure and others do not (or less). This helps us avoid conflating contrasting social domains.
In Rawls’ persuasive reading of Goffman, the interaction order is a moral order of mutual protection of selves (1987:139), centred on self-respect and considerateness. This frames morality differently from the ‘moral turn’ in the sociology of class (Jarness and Flemmen, 2019), where morality appears tacitly as conceived of through a structure – individual dichotomy: Moral repertoires are historically constructed macro-phenomena, informing intra-individual meaning-making. Seeing morality instead as an emergent property of social interaction loosens such dualism and modifies individualist interpretations in psychological research.
This does not render repertoires or dispositions irrelevant. Far from it. ‘The situation’ is a tricky theoretical concept, where one problem is how delimited (or expanded) we think of it (Tavory, 2024). Beyond repertoires and predispositions, people's ‘horizontal’ trans-situational experiences and expectations always factor in. After all, ‘[…] actors bring both their pasts and their anticipated futures with them wherever they go’ (2024:3). A sui generis existence of the interaction order does not cut it off from the world beyond. Yet, my suggestion is that, in face-to-face situations, we conceive of broader morality, predispositions, ‘horizontal’ experiences and anticipations as ‘sifted through’ the here-and-row ritual pressures of the interaction order.
This means that in a cross-status encounter, ‘egalitarian repertoires’ work very differently from e.g., the following cases: A Dutch minister of culture writes an op-ed about inclusive cultural policy; a director of an institution for elite culture like the Norwegian Opera and Ballet emphasises inclusivity when writing organisational documents (Larsen, 2016:48-49); British elites mention pets, drinking beer and watching football as their leisure activities in their Who's Who entries (Reeves and Friedman, 2024:74; 85). In these cases, there is presumably little of the interaction order pressures experienced by affluent New Yorkers (Sherman, 2017), Norwegian professors (Vassenden and Rusnes, 2022), or people from elite U.S. universities (Arnett and Sidanius, 2018).
Hence, to advance on the ‘moral turn’ in the study of class (Jarness and Flemmen, 2019), we must attend carefully to whether moral concerns arise from ritual pressures of the interaction order, or from other pressures, like in public appearance (Krogstad and Stark, 2021) or broader insecurities about moral legitimacy (Reeves and Friedman, 2024; 2020). Imagine a Danish member of parliament carefully monitoring her ‘ordinariness’ in TV debates, and on her Facebook profile – in some contrast to her French counterpart (Krogstad and Storvik, 2010). Whereas this MP's ordinariness on TV may be necessary to win re-election (Daloz, 2006), her ordinariness in a kindergarten drop-off situation would be about ‘smoothness in interaction’ (Posner, 1976), and mutual protection of selves (Goffman [1967]1982). In cross-status encounters, interaction ritual concerns are immediate. General moral legitimacy is, while never irrelevant, more distant. When elites portray themselves as ‘ordinary’ in public, it is the other way around. In theorising how the ‘situation’ connects to resources and limitations beyond it, Tavory (2024) distinguishes between proximate and remote relevances/potentialities. In the situation of writing a Who's Who entry (Reeves and Friedman, 2024), cross-status interaction is a remote relevance while general moral legitimacy is proximate. When chatting with other parents during a Christmas breakfast in kindergarten, general moral legitimacy is a more remote potentiality. A highly proximate relevance, is the risk of damaging immediate social harmony, should one play up one's social status.
On the interplay of the interaction ritual/order, repertoires, and dispositions, let me consider one case among our professors. While these professors typically answer that they ‘work at the university’ vis-à-vis new people in non-academic contexts, there are numerous academic interactions where they are expected to use their titles, or they feel the need to. A scientific conference is an obvious example. Shifts of interaction contexts are candid. ‘Kalle’ spent his sabbatical in the U.S. He brought his family along and stayed for a year in a town that is dominated by its university. When Kalle met the local Americans, like when taking his children to leisure activities, his experience was that ‘every other person you met was either a student or a professor’. This is very different from where he lives in Norway, which is a city with fewer academics relative to population. There, he routinely suppresses his occupational status and title, like when coaching his son's football team (vis-à-vis other parents). During his research leave in the U.S., he did not, because everywhere he went, he ‘experienced much more mutual understanding about what it means to work in a university’. In a sense, his everyday interactions while in the U.S. implied using his title and work in everyday sociable encounters to achieve symmetry (vis-à-vis the other locals, who were also academics). In his Norwegian life, he suppresses it for the exact same ritual purpose. In a theoretical translation of Kalle's comparative experiences, his contrasting interactional behaviours are products of how interactions are constituted (who the interactants are), more than a particular habitus or moral repertoire. Or we can imagine the latter two as relative constants, preparing Kalle for both kinds of interaction, but he defers to contrasting situational requirements. While these requirements change with the interactants, the basic of the ritual interaction order is the same: Mutual confirmation of what we share, tactful avoidance of that which sets us apart or threatens the face of one or more interactants.
Situational variations
The latter does not apply similarly to all cross-status encounters, which is something that most previous research has neglected. As mentioned, Goffman wrote extensively about shifts between interaction contexts where status are suppressed or accentuated. However, he never formalised this into typologies. Collins makes more headway in that respect. Interaction Ritual Chains (2004) devotes a chapter to categorical identities (especially class and occupation) in the 21st century. Here, he theorises how the interactional relevance of categorical identities vary according to types of situations/rituals.
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In distinguishing between different rituals, and how they play up or down categorical identities, Collins (2004:272) develops a threefold typology, which can work as our starting point. On a continuum from formal to informal rituals, we find (i) official ceremonies, that is ‘enactment of formal organization’, (ii) sociable situations (cf. Simmel), and (iii) open public situations.
The most formal ritual, official ceremonies (i), have highly focused attention, and are ‘scheduled, publicized, scripted’. They typically accentuate categorical identities. For cross-status interaction, we can imagine a CEO addressing the company's employees in a formal speech. Her status and position are now front and centre of interactions. At the informal end are (iii) open public situations. In streets or squares, attention is weakly focused, and interactions unscheduled. This blurs categorical identities. If the CEO later in the evening meets an employee at the cinema or on a street-corner, their status difference is muted. This is the same point that Goffman made, that in ‘[…] elevators, halls, and cafeterias’ of large establishments, class distinctions ‘must be suppressed’ ([1967]1982:109). In public spaces, categories like class and occupation are veiled under civil inattention (1963). At the midpoint of the continuum, we find (ii) sociable situations, under which sort gatherings like dinners and festivals (2004:273), or conversations between parents at Christmas breakfasts in kindergartens. Sociable situations vary in focus and scripting, and Collins argues that ‘[…] the less scripted, advance-scheduled, and widely announced the sociable gathering, the more invisible the social boundaries’. Hence, ‘[s]tatus group boundaries […] blur to the extent that they are grounded in weakly focused sociable rituals’ (2004:274). The last point can however be nuanced through the above-mentioned case of Kalle, whose conversations with other parents when following his children to activities is an apt example of a ‘weakly focused sociable ritual’ (2004:274). While Collins’ point is agreeable, categorical identities are clearly much more blurred if the sociable ritual occurs cross-status. Then, categorical identities threaten sociability (Simmel, [1910]1949). In intra-status sociable rituals – like with Kalle and the American academics – these categories can well be what facilitate sociability or the ‘smooth running’ of interaction (Posner, 1976:142).
In an earlier version (Collins, 2000), a fourth category was work situations, which does not figure in Collins’ 2004 typology. While work situations can be of all the three categories, I find it useful to distinguish private sociable gatherings from work, seeing how work relations can have hierarchy inscribed. Goffman distinguished situations of symmetrical rule from those of asymmetrical rule ([1967]1982:52-53). Whereas the latter characterizes certain work-hierarchies that demand deference upwards in the chain of command (the military is archetypal), the symmetrical rule characterises informal interaction contexts. The latter would be Collins’ (iii) unfocused publics and (ii) weakly focused sociable situations. Barring Swencionis and Fiske's experiments (2016; 2018), and domestic workers to the affluent (Sherman, 2017), the most prevalent interactions in the reviewed studies appear to be of the symmetrical sociable type. We imagine the above-mentioned CEO to be acutely aware of the difference between the following two situations: First, she may interact in private with the mother of one of her children's friends, a mother whose occupation she either does not know or knows is of lower status than hers, or whose lifestyle and cultural preferences she either does not know or knows to be very different from hers (or even to her dismay), or whom she knows or suspects has much less money (cf. Sherman 2017). This loosely scripted sociable situation demands significant ritual tact in self-presentation. Second, she may interact at work with another mother of her children's friends, whom she knows first because she works in the company, in an administrative supporting role to her as the CEO. Although downplaying of high status happens at work too (Swencionis and Fiske, 2016; 2018), and although their relationship as parents to children is a ‘proximate relevance’ (Tavory, 2024), in this less-sociable situation of ‘asymmetrical rule,’ the two mothers would not expect to interact as equals in the same way as when they meet courtside at their daughters’ basketball practice.
Further points about situational variation include social dependencies, like in the difference between fleeting encounters with people one will not meet again, and those upon whom one is reliant for future interactions (Goffman, [1967]1982:7-8). The latter includes neighbours, relatives, colleagues, other parents, etc. (What goes around comes around.) Another factor is people's previous knowledge of each other. Downplaying status is a different game if interlocutors already know one's status (e.g., as wealthy) and if they do not. If they do not, one enters interaction managing information. If they already know, one may rather manage tension. (This would be the high-status version of Goffman's ‘the discreditable – the discredited’; from Stigma [1963]1990.) We must also attend to audiences: It can make a profound difference if a face-to-face cross-status encounter is one-on-one, or there are bystanders present, and then, who these bystanders are. Developing heuristic tools and typologies of cross-status encounters in different interactional contexts should be a crucial task going forward. The preceding is merely a beginning.
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Across time and place
Several researchers have connected interactional status suppression to national cultures. Sherman, for instance, interprets her respondents’ downplaying of status with reference to American norms, like ‘the American cultural taboo against discussing money and class’ (2007:18). Tendencies to foreground the nation as explanatory framework has been pronounced among Nordic sociologists and anthropologists, who have described interactional ‘downplaying of differences’ as owing to the region's historical legacy of egalitarianism. A frequently used literary reference is ‘The Law of Jante’ (Sandemose, [1933]1998): do not stick out, do not think of yourself as better than others. (Similar phrases about national cultures and status suppression include the Australian ‘tall poppy syndrome’; Peeters, 2004.) An instigator of this view was anthropologist Marianne Gullestad (1991), who wrote about a Norwegian/Nordic ‘interactional style that deemphasizes differences’ (1991:483). References to Gullestad and this point regularly accompany studies that mention Nordic egalitarianism (Alecu et al., 2022; Bendixen et al., 2018; Jarness and Friedman, 2017; Krogstad and Stark, 2021; Ljunggren, 2017).
Findings in contemporary studies from the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, and the U.S. not the least, and observations by American and German microsociologists in the 1950s (Goffman), the 1970s (Posner), and 1910 (Simmel), suggest that elites displaying ordinariness/egalitarianism in cross-class encounters is more widespread transnationally than especially Nordic research has suggested. Egalitarianism in social encounters appear to vary less across countries than, say, the public appearance of political elites (Daloz, 2006). Note, however, that thus far, relevant research stems only from the Global North.
Changes over time likewise suggest less national particularity. Here, Wouters’ work (2007) on the historical informalisation of manners is noteworthy. Wouters studied changes in German, British, Dutch, and American etiquette books since the late 19th century. Etiquette books are informative in that they describe norms for face-to-face behaviour. Across these countries, Wouters finds that, ‘[…] as sensitivities about social inequality increased, […] [r]eferences to hierarchical group differences, particularly to ‘better’ and ‘inferior’ kinds of people, were increasingly tabooed’. In the 1960s, ‘[…] the once automatic equation of superiority in power and superiority as a human being declined to the point of embarrassment’ (2007:201).
Status suppression can be traced further back in time: With Elias’ The Civilizing Process ([1973]2000), an early ‘seed’ of contemporary situational equality, and downplaying of hierarchies, was social life in the early modern (16th century) European courts. Whereas medieval nobles had sat on their isolated estates, dominating their local subordinates, Renaissance nobles gathered in courts. Here, they had to engage each other in social situations where ‘[…] the hierarchical relations were more complex, frequently ambiguous, sometimes as yet indeterminate’ (Taylor, 2007:215). This required cultivation of new social skills, like pleasing, accommodating and befriending others. Court society was ‘[…] a context in which hierarchy ha[d] to be partly bracketed’ (Taylor, 2007:215, emphasis added). Interactional ‘quasi-equality’ later diffused to larger segments of European societies, starting with the upper classes, and continuing down the class structure. (Wouters continues this analysis.) Another historical shift is described in Habermas’ analysis of the 18th century coffee houses. Here, class and hierarchies were set aside, at least in principle. The salons ‘[…] preserved a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether. The tendency replaced the celebration of rank with a tact befitting equals’ ([1962/1989]1991:36).
Combined, current research, microsociological theorising, and historical developments, make me conclude that in cross-status interaction, cross-national differences are much smaller than we have tended to believe. In place of ideas like a Nordic ‘interactional exceptionalism’, I pose an alternative hypothesis: More than interactional behaviour being uniquely shaped by cultural tradition and ‘egalitarian legacy’, the Nordic case may be better conceived of as one with comparatively more cross-class interaction than many other countries. In Norway, cross-class interaction is facilitated by the institutions of a comprehensive welfare-state (Alecu et al., 2022:507-508; 528-529). E.g., universally accessed kindergartens and public schools (which enrol 96% of schoolchildren) provide numerous occasions for cross-class interaction, for children and parents, even among financial elites (Aarseth, 2015). Up to now – with the increasing inequality from which the Nordic countries are decidedly not exceptions (Hansen and Toft, 2021) – and with the partial exception of Oslo, moderate socioeconomic geographic differentiation has worked similarly. Put differently, avoidance rituals in cross-status encounters appear to be performed quite similarly across many nation-states, in reflection of the mutual protection of selves that Goffman called a ‘basic structural feature of interaction’ ([1967]1982:11), but there are more such encounters in some countries than in others. This hypothesis can be further refined through situational variation: It is arguably not only cross-status encounters in general that are facilitated for by some societal formations – like universalist welfare-states – but importantly sociable cross-status situations.
Conclusions and implications
In conclusion, I address two issues for future research: methodological lessons, and social consequences.
Interviewing is the dominant method in current research. Interviews come with situational/presentational pressures of their own (Khan and Jerolmack, 2013), of upholding a front, often a tolerant one, vis-à-vis the interviewer (Vassenden and Mangset, 2024). Social desirability bias easily exaggerates egalitarian attitudes. We should hence do more experiments to extend on Fiske et al. (e.g., Swencionis and Fiske, 2016) and Arnett and Sidanius (2018), and we should do them cross-nationally. I have not seen ethnographic studies on cross-status interaction, of which we should decidedly do more. Yet, as Vassenden and Mangset demonstrate (2024), interviewing remains for various reasons – like feasibility – an important methodological tool in the field and hence must be elaborated on and improved. Addressing now mainly the sociology of class: Following my argument about separate orders of ordinariness/egalitarianism – face-to-face, public/media appearance, social media, policies – we need interviewing that grasps the differences between them. If a CEO or a university professor claims ‘ordinariness’ in an interview, we must reflect carefully on which type(s) of ordinariness/egalitarianism/modesty that is topical. They may not converge: Our university professors said they hide academic credentials in everyday (sociable) face-to-face situations but reported little hesitancy in posting on Facebook and Twitter about their latest publication or academic seminar. If interactional context is not asked about specifically, interview statements (or responses in questionnaires) about ‘being in the middle’ (Savage, 2015) are potentially about very different orders: They can be about the interaction order, about public appearance, or about broader cultural/moral order. This connects back to comparative contrasts: If Nordic elites make stronger claims to ordinariness in interviews (or questionnaires) than their counterparts elsewhere, it likely factors in, that cross-status sociable situations are closer to mind (if they engage in more such interaction). Their actual behaviours in cross-status encounters probably differ less. This also implies that we cannot automatically conclude that contrasting ‘national cultural repertoires,’ which Lamont (1992) so convincingly demonstrates for the U.S. and French upper-middle classes, translate into contrasting interactions. In Lamont's interviews, French respondents emphasized cultural boundaries, and their American counterparts conversely socioeconomic boundaries. Whether they behave differently in actual cross-status interaction is another question. With this paper's theorising: In real-life cross-status encounters, French and American elites might suppress both boundaries, in alignment with the pressures of the interaction order. American elites may be more attentive to downplaying socioeconomic boundaries, as these are the most salient in their imaginations, and French elites vice versa cultural boundaries. The interaction rituals may however be less dissimilar than the national repertoires.
A crucial issue going forward is to investigate the social consequences of cross-status interaction (or lack thereof): Conceivably, interactional status suppression can both produce social cohesion and hide and thereby reproduce inequalities. Social cohesion is the optimistic conceptualisation, which also speaks to the consensus dimension of Goffman's theories – early in his career, he had ‘[…] a sneaking admiration for Talcott Parsons’ work’ (Smith, 2006:13). Goffman writes that ‘[…] societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters’ ([1967]1982:44). If we conceive of egalitarian interaction rituals as producing social cohesion, a paraphrase reads: Societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must provide social encounters that mobilize their members as self-regulating participants. More pessimistically, one outcome of exactly such self-regulation is concealment of inequalities. Several authors have noted that egalitarian values can hide social hierarchies, and thereby perpetuate them (Hjellbrekke et al., 2015:88). Concealment can happen through elite ordinariness being welcomed on the lower classes’ ‘symbolic market for […] performances of down-to-earthness’ (Jarness and Flemmen, 2019:183; Reeves and Friedman, 2024). Distinguishing the interaction order from other orders allows us to examine more precisely how inequality is concealed, and how this occurs differently in different societal spheres.
