Abstract
Sociology of philosophy is the name of a theory-based, empirical sociological subdivision, whose basic approach is praxeological: doing philosophy involves a variety of socially situated practices that in some cases result in philosophical arguments and doctrines fixed in text. Constellation research is an approach developed by the German philosopher Dieter Henrich (1927–2022) for investigations into the history of philosophy. It combines a historical and a systematic intent and interest. Constellation research has primarily been tried out on the rapid development of post-Kantian idealism in Germany in the 1790s. The approach has some obvious similarities with different approaches within the sociology of philosophy. The article first gives a condensed presentation of constellation research as a research program. In a second step, it tries to sort out similarities and dissimilarities with key concepts, topics and approaches within the sociology of philosophy. The argument put forward is that constellation research can provide the sociology of philosophy with some novel ideas and that the sociology of philosophy may prove to be a useful resource to constellation research. In short, there is a potential for cross-fertilization between the two approaches.
Keywords
Introduction
Sociology of philosophy is the name of a theory-based, empirical sociological subdivision. It is related to fields such as sociology of knowledge, sociology of science, science studies and ‘the new sociology of ideas’ (Camic and Gross, 2004), which study the social dimensions of both human knowledge and belief in general and scientific knowledge and ideas in particular. The sociology of philosophy has a narrower focus: it studies philosophical activity and knowledge production. The point of departure for the sociology of philosophy is not a bloodless knowing subject, but rather the whole human being endowed with ‘the manifold powers of a being that wills, feels and thinks’ (Dilthey, 1989: 50). An initial definition can be formulated as follows: the sociology of philosophy is the study of philosophical practice as a socially organized activity rooted in various historical and social contexts, an activity that involves the production of philosophical knowledge, that is, propositions and arguments that make claims to validity. The degree of social organization can vary from modern university departments and joint research projects to informal face-to-face groups of like-minded people and geographically dispersed networks that communicate mainly through correspondence. Sociology of philosophy is about philosophy in the making just as much as about philosophy as a finished product of thought. The basic approach is praxeological: doing philosophy involves a variety of socially situated practices that in some cases result in philosophical arguments and doctrines fixed in text. Important work in the field of sociology of philosophy has been done, for example, by Pierre Bourdieu, Randall Collins, Martin Kusch, Neil Gross and Patrick Baert. Especially the work of Bourdieu has inspired several studies, for example, by Jean-Louis Fabiani, Anna Boschetti and Toril Moi. 1
Constellation research is an approach developed by the German philosopher Dieter Henrich (1927–2022) for investigations into the history of philosophy. It combines a historical and a systematic intent and interest. Constellation research has primarily been tried out on the rapid development of post-Kantian idealism in Germany in the 1790s. This was a decade of astonishing philosophical creativity. In many cases very young people came up with new bids about how to take philosophy a step further to give it a solid foundation. This rapid development has been the object of study for a research group mainly situated in Munich under the leadership of Henrich. 2
The approach called constellation research has some obvious similarities with different approaches within the sociology of philosophy. In the following, I will first give a condensed presentation of constellation research as a research program. In a second step, I will try to sort out important similarities and dissimilarities with some key concepts, topics and approaches within the sociology of philosophy. This far constellation research has to my knowledge not been much received and discussed within the sociology of philosophy; in fact it is probably unknown to most sociologists, whereas the sociology of philosophy has gained some attention from the side of constellation research (Mulsow, 2005a). I will also make a plea for a kind of cooperative research projects in which both philosophers and sociologists participate.
The sociology of philosophy is a relatively young subdivision in sociology, and all inputs that can improve its theory and practice are welcome. It is my intention to stage a first encounter between constellation research and sociology of philosophy. Thus, a first aim of this article is to familiarize sociologists with constellation research. My main aim, however, is to contribute to the research question: what can constellation research and sociology of philosophy learn from each other? How can they enrich one another? The argument I will put forward is that constellation research can provide the sociology of philosophy with some novel ideas and that the sociology of philosophy may prove to be a useful resource to constellation research. In short, I see here a potential for cross-fertilization. Such a cross-fertilization will contribute to a better sociology of philosophy as well as a better constellation research.
Constellation research
The basic move of constellation research is to shift focus from individual authors and texts to various forms of constellations. The story of German idealism is not a story about four major philosophers – Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel – and their major works. More than that, the story cannot be told in this way. Instead focus must be on to begin with constellations of persons/authors, both first and second ranks. Today more or less forgotten persons/authors may very well have played an important role in a certain intellectual context, for example, as a originator or transmitter of ideas or personal contacts. Furthermore, focus must be on constellations of texts: published as well as unpublished, for example, in the form of correspondences and unfinished manuscripts. In a particular constellation, the various texts tend to relate to one another as in an oral dialogue – question and answer, challenge and response, thesis and antithesis – and cannot be understood in isolation. Finally, focus should be directed at constellations of problems, ideas, theories and concepts. In this case too, it is often difficult to understand what problem is under discussion or what a certain theory really says without the broader context of problems and theories. In short, a constellation can be described as a constellation of constellations.
A prerequisite for being able to undertake constellation research is a certain density of the available material, primarily in the form of texts but also in terms of biographical and historical knowledge (Mulsow, 2005a: 94). For this reason, the whole of Greek philosophy and major parts of medieval philosophy is out of reach for this approach in question. Furthermore, a constellation often has one or more geographical centre, thereby indicating the importance of co-presence and face-to-face interaction. In the case of post-Kantian philosophy in the 1790s, three such centre stands out: Tübingen and Jena, two small university towns, and Homburg vor der Höhe, the latter a small town just north of Frankfurt am Main.
A second important concept, beside that of constellation, is space of thought (Henrich, 1991: 220f.; Stamm, 2005: 35ff.). Sometimes the expression space of resonance is used (Stamm, 2005: 57). 3 A space of thought is characterized by certain available resources in terms of potential positions, theoretical options and argumentative moves. Beside the theoretical positions taken, there are other possible positions inherent in a certain space of thought, and besides the argumentative moves made, there are other possible arguments that might have been brought forward. A central task of constellation research is to reconstruct a particular space of thought. This task includes its coming into being, i.e. the reconstruction of initial motivations, knowledge interests and problems. At the temporal beginning of a space of thought is often found a proto-theory that in the following is developed, refined, revised or abandoned.
Constellation research is very much about philosophy in the making. A space of thought is a constellation in motion. Thus, a constellation is not something static, like a constellation of stars, but rather something highly dynamic. This means that a constellation in its dynamic development has something corresponding to a plot structure: it is a success story, a story with a tragic outcome, a story about finding and losing one another and so on (Mulsow, 2005a: 76ff.). Thus, the story told about a constellation in many ways has the form of a dramatic narrative. Furthermore, there are at least two basic developmental patterns (Stamm, 2005: 44ff.). On the one hand, we have the internal differentiation of a space of thought, for example, in the form of introducing new distinctions or as internal critique, i.e. using the resources immanent in the space of thought for self-critical purposes. This is called an analytical constellation. This developmental path involves conceptual refinement and adds internal complexity. On the other hand, we have the going beyond a given space of thought by way of extension and incorporation. This is called a synthetic constellation. This kind of developmental path is often found at the margins of a given constellation and initiated by contacts between different constellations. In the latter case, it can be said that a kind of cultural transfer takes place (Mulsow, 2005a: 78).
A specific type of constellation is called antagonistic (Stamm, 2005: 42f.). This is a constellation characterized by harbouring within itself tensions that emanates from conflicting influences. The post-Kantian philosophy of the 1790s in Germany was, on the one hand, convinced of the importance of the Kantian notion of human freedom (as opposed to the realm of nature) and, on the other, inspired by a type of theory that involved a monistic position (Spinozism) in which everything takes place according to necessity. These two inputs were equally strong and at the same time at first sight difficult to reconcile with one another. Furthermore, this double input was arguably a key to the rapid philosophical development that took place in this decade. Thus, there is a reason to believe that antagonistic constellations tend to release philosophical creativity.
Furthermore, a distinction is made between the surface process and the depth dynamics of a constellation. The existence or finding of erratic documents, i.e. texts that does not fit into the established picture (for example, from Kant to Hegel via Fichte and Schelling), indicates that there is something we do not know and which points to the existence of missing links, hidden motives or deep-seated convictions situated below the explicit motives and aims.
An important aspect of constellation research is the analysis of arguments. This is what makes it into a philosophical undertaking. The analysis of arguments involves an investigation into the possibilities inherent in a certain space of thought. And this may very well mean going beyond the arguments that was actually put forward by uncovering unrealized possibilities and options. In this way constellation research may indirectly contribute to on-going contemporary discussions. Thus, constellation research is motivated not only by a historical but also by a systematic interest. It combines a participant and an observer perspective: reconstructing a past philosophical development and participating in an on-going discussion. The systematic intent allows constellation research to gain a certain distance from the self-interpretations of the authors under study. 4
What are the limits of a particular constellation (Stamm, 2005: 50f.)? Who and what belongs to it? What is inside and what is outside it? One answer goes: part of a constellation is them who are making moves within one and the same space of thought (analytical constellation). Another answer is that the borders of a constellation are in general porous and fleeting (synthetic constellation). There tend to be a centre and a periphery, the latter, for example, in the form of persons only loosely attached to the constellation and who may also be partaking in other constellations. Nevertheless, some preliminary delimitations must be made to know what the object under study is and some preliminary decision of who and what does belong and does not belong to a particular constellation. This decision may of course be revised at a later stage in the research process. 5
Sociology of philosophy
Whereas the sociology of knowledge is at least a hundred years old, the sociology of philosophy is of more recent origin. In a sense one can say that the sociology of knowledge consists in continuous refinements of Marx proposition that it is not consciousness that determines social being but the other way around (Marx, 1974: 9). The two front figures in the more recent sociology of philosophy are Pierre Bourdieu, whose study L’ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger was first published in 1975 (expanded version in 1988, English translation in 1991), and Randall Collins, who published his monumental The Sociology of Philosophies in 1998. In the following I will confront constellation research with some key concepts and topics stemming from the tradition of sociology of philosophy, to find out similarities and dissimilarities and to deliver some arguments about why both approaches may profit from taking each other into consideration.
Constellation research and the sociology of philosophy share a focus on interaction, networks and communication, including cooperation, rivalry and conflict. The formula competition among friends describes quite well what goes on in many constellations; thereby competition may escalate into conflict and the parting of ways. 6 With Collins the former furthermore share an interest in creative milieus, highlighting the interactive and dialogical dimensions of creativity. Common is also the primacy of relations. Relationalism means that an entity of any kind has its position only in relation to other entities occupying a place in the same space or on the same field. Not authors, texts, problems and ideas in isolation but in a network of relations is the object of the study. Constellation research strongly underlines the relationalism of abstract entities such as problems, ideas and theories. In this sense constellation research is through and through relational. This goes beyond, for example, Norbert Elias’ notion of social configurations, which relates to individuals, groups or class fractions and their various forms of mutual interdependencies. A configuration – spanning from harmonious and friendly to unfriendly and hostile relations – is ultimately always made up of individuals (Elias, 2002: 51 and 244f.; cf. Mulsow, 2005a: 81ff.).
Another communality is a certain preference for spatial metaphors (Füssel, 2005: 197), be it space of thought, field of forces (Henrich, Stamm), attention space (Collins) or social space and philosophical field (Bourdieu). Thus, doing philosophy involves making moves in a certain space or on a certain field. For Bourdieu the question of the delimitation of a field must be answered empirically: ‘The limits of the field are situated at the point where the effects of the field cease’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 100). Furthermore, he stresses that a field has dynamic borders which often are ‘the stake of struggles within the field itself’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104). These are points of view that may be incorporated into constellation research. One may, for example, speak of constellation effects: when a certain argumentative move in a constellation does not provoke any positive or negative reaction, the limits of the constellation in question have been transcended – instead of resonance there is silence.
More difficult is finding an equivalent to Bourdieu's multi-faceted notion of capital in constellation research. When the latter talks about resources, it has primarily intellectual resources in mind (theories and arguments), but an extension could easily be made to include also social network contacts (social capital). The intellectual resources inherent in a constellation make up an opportunity structure in terms of structural possibilities and possible moves: what theoretical positions are within reach? What argumentative roads might be taken? Especially Collins stresses the importance of being at the right place at the right time to be able to take the next step in philosophy. Being part of a vibrant constellation is a good starting point if you want to become, with Collins’ expression, a ‘major’ philosopher. Furthermore, taking part in such a vibrant intellectual constellation is certainly a case of philosophical timing, being at the right place at the right time. Also in Patrick Baert's so-called positioning theory is the issue of timing of great importance (Baert, 2015). 7
A difference between Baert's approach and constellation research is that the former wants to blend out the motivations behind a certain intellectual intervention and instead focus on the more tangible effects and consequences of an intervention. Baert writes about a motivational bias, ‘the elusive search for what went on in people's mind’, and suggests ‘abandoning a vocabulary of intentions for a vocabulary of effects’, provided that ‘the empirical evidence for claims regarding intentionality is wanting’ (Baert, 2015: 181–182). The starting point for constellation research is on the contrary the initial motivations, knowledge interests and proto-theories that goes into a space of thought and which must be reconstructed. In this respect constellation research is closer to Neil Gross’ notion of ‘intellectual self-concept’, i.e. the kind of philosopher someone wants to be (for example, engaged in public affairs or a distanced scientist). A philosopher's self-concept is about the original motivations that brought him or her into philosophy (Gross, 2008).
In his later work, Erving Goffman introduced the notions of frame and framing. They relate to the organization of experience, and ‘frame analysis is to be understood to apply to experience of any kind, including the merely cerebral’ (Goffman, 1986: 316). The basic idea is that a given social situation is not simply wide open for various definitions, but is normally already framed in a certain way and thereby indicating answers to questions like ‘What kind of situation is this?’ and ‘What is it that's going on here?’. In a similar way an intellectual constellation can be said to be framed in a certain way (Mulsow, 2005a: 80). To enter it we must have at least preliminary answers to questions like ‘What is the problem under discussion?’, ‘Why is this an important issue?’ and ‘What meta-theoretical motivations are presupposed?’. These are questions that indicate what we must know to enter and take part in a particular space of thought. A space of thought is always framed in a certain way. A sufficient understanding of this frame is a precondition for understanding what it is that's going on in the given space of thought. The phenomenon of productive misunderstandings may, at least in some cases, have an origin in ‘misframings’. In the extreme case, a constellation may approach being a sub-culture whose philosophical slang is understandable only to insiders, but this is normally counteracted by the conviction of having something important to tell the intellectual world, i.e. a wish to communicate and transmit a message.
The notions of thought style and thought collective, as developed by Karl Mannheim and Ludwik Fleck in the 1920s and 1930s, may be activated within constellation research (Mannheim, 1986; Fleck, 1979). The output of a given intellectual constellation is not simply the achievement of individuals but has rather the character of a joint effort and may also be an example of a particular thought style. Fleck's stress on the role of proto-ideas and of collective moods, including emotional components, is very much in line with constellation research. However, I see a certain risk that talking in terms of thought style and thought collective may be a bit too homogenizing, with the effect of making a constellation less complex and dynamic than it is. A constellation of individuals is not a collective, and the output of a constellation is not the result of thinking in the same way. 8 But if the two notions are explicated in a way that allows for a plurality of different voices and strivings, they may very well be introduced into constellation research.
Another point of contact between constellation research and the sociology of philosophy is the concept of generation (Henrich, 2005: 24f.). Dieter Henrich has in a different context introduced the concept of ‘motivational history’ (Henrich, 1996) as referring to the meta-theoretical convictions and aims that characterize major representatives of a philosophical generation, in his own case the generation of young Germans that took up higher studies in the years after 1945. They give a generation a philosophical profile in common. In the sociology of knowledge/philosophy, the concepts of generation and generational units, the latter being constituted by a similar reaction to common significant events and formative experiences, have played an important role ever since Karl Mannheim's classical study from 1928 (Mannheim, 1972).
It seems rather obvious that Randall Collins’ key concepts, such as networks, interaction ritual chains, cultural capital, emotional energy, transmission of emotional energy and energy star, are close to the approach of constellation research (Mulsow, 2005a: 84ff.). 9 A constellation of persons/authors is a concentration of emotional energy generated mainly in direct contact with one another, often by way of face-to-face interaction. 10 In such situations it is also close at hand that one or more individuals develop temporarily into an energy star, becoming a centre which transmits creative energy to a whole milieu. For example, Fichte was the undisputed energy star in the Jena-constellation of the mid-1790s. Furthermore, each intellectual constellation probably tends to develop its own interaction rituals. Even Collins’ ambitious idea of developing a sociology of thinking, that to a certain extent allows us, this is the claim, to make predictions about what a particular intellectual will think in his or her next move, is not quite foreign to constellation research. ‘Social structure is everywhere, down to the micro level. In principle, who will say what to whom is determined by social processes. And this means there is not only a sociology of conversation but a sociology of thinking’ (Collins, 1998: 46). However, by Collins this is hardly more than a vague promise. Constellation research, being interested in the oral dimension of philosophy, has the ambition to reconstruct conversations and discussions that must have taken place although they are not documented in the available material. Given what we know about a certain space of thought, it is deemed possible to fill out missing argumentative moves that with a high probability must have taken place but also the moves that might have taken place. To network contacts, interaction rituals, and transmitted emotional energy must be added the argumentative moves that were/are possible given the structure of a particular space of thought. This also allows for continuing lines of argument, beyond the ones that can be historically reconstructed, into contemporary debates. Moving in this direction would contribute to making the sociology of philosophy more attractive to philosophers.
Next, I would like to point to some important dissimilarities. The sociology of philosophy tends to remain on a rather high level of abstraction, i.e. it often does not reach down to the micro-processes in which philosophical conceptions and theories take shape. This can be seen in Collins’ magistral book The Sociology of Philosophies. His key concepts, and the ambition to contribute to a sociology of thinking points in the direction of micro-sociological investigations. What we find is a program for a micro-sociology that, however, is poor in its execution. Looking at things from a high altitude, it displays no method of discovery; it can confirm but not revise the history of philosophy. We find, for example, no suggestions on how to improve or revise our understanding of the development of post-Kantian philosophy in the 1790s. Martin Mulsow has suggested that Collins’ method may be useful for ‘the comparative analysis of large-scale types of networks’ (Mulsow, 2005a: 89), but not for detailed studies of specific constellations. Collins himself seems to be fully aware of the fact that he does not reach down to ‘the flow of micro-situations’, because ‘as we examine the history of intellectual networks, we generally find that intimate materials on the micro-level of the sociology of thinking are not available … What we glimpse, at best, are the long-term contours of interactional chains and their products …’ (Collins, 1998: 53). Here, constellation research may lend the sociology of philosophy a helping hand.
Furthermore, the sociology of philosophy often has a disclosing intention (Gross, 2008: 237f.). It excels in the uncovering of unspoken strategies and hidden interests at work. Its primary target tends to be what Bourdieu calls the scholastic reason: pure philosophy as uncontaminated by the world, i.e. the illusion that finding out the truth is the sole interest of those involved in philosophy (Bourdieu 2000). This research orientation may be an invitation to not take the philosophical arguments brought forward seriously enough (cf. Kusch, 1995: 30). Constellation research, on the other hand, remains a philosophical undertaking through its focus on the analysis of arguments and its ambition to eventually contribute to on-going philosophical debates.
The most conspicuous absence in constellation research is in my eyes the lack of a concept of power, which on the other hand is never far away in the sociology of philosophy (Füssel, 2005: 197 and 205f.). When constellation research talks in terms of resources, it has in mind primarily argumentative resources, not different kinds of social resources – various forms of capital – that establish positions of power. This dimension may be added to constellation research with the help of the sociology of philosophy, thereby making the former more attractive to sociologists. Both reflections on power in interpersonal relations and situated on the meso- and macro-levels should be of relevance to constellation research. A dominant figure in a constellation (an energy star) has power in terms of decision-making, in terms of setting the agenda and to some extent also in terms of forming the wishes and strivings of those who participate in the constellation. 11 A space of thought is an open and dynamic but not unlimited space for various moves. Furthermore, there are positions of power tied to the institutional and organizational setting upon which a certain constellation relies. Fichte was, for example, dismissed from the University of Jena due to probably political reasons disguised under an accusation of atheism. Taking relations of power into account does not necessarily imply that the arguments of philosophers are not taken seriously and that they are treated as nothing but smokescreens for power struggles.
Finally, I want to touch on the possibility to transfer constellation research from philosophy to the social sciences. A salient difference between philosophy and the social sciences is that the latter often involves an input by way of systematic empirical investigations. This means that constellations in the social sciences tend to have the character of synthetic constellations; something new is incorporated that affects the argumentative moves that are possible and the positions that may be taken. Furthermore, there is a reason to believe that constellation research can be conducted in the social sciences especially if the theoretical component is salient or marked in the constellation under study. A good candidate for being the object of constellation research is, for example, the Columbia milieu around Robert K. Merton and Paul Laszarsfeld, two scholars with very different backgrounds, from the 1940s and onwards. Another example is the Edinburgh school and the genesis and development of the strong program in the sociology of knowledge. 12
Conclusion
I take it as a fact that there exists a rather far-reaching estrangement between philosophers and sociologists – with a few exceptions – in the contemporary intellectual world. This is a bad situation, especially when sociologists take an interest in intellectual history, the history of philosophy and philosophical issues in general and when philosophers are open-minded for the sociological dimensions of doing philosophy. We cannot – again with a few exceptions – expect philosophers to become sociologists or sociologists to become philosophers. However, constellation research and sociology of philosophy may lend each other a helping hand.
Constellation research keeps the door open not only to philosophy (it has been developed by philosophers) but also to sociology. The idea of spaces of thought equipped with various argumentative resources may be integrated into the sociology of philosophy, thereby making the latter more interesting and relevant to philosophers. As long as philosophers experience that the arguments of philosophers aren’t taken seriously enough, there is little chance of convincing them about the relevance and validity of sociological explanations. Constellation research also stresses and works out the relationalism of abstract entities such as problems, concepts, ideas and theories. This is another potential contribution to the sociology of philosophy: a thorough relationalism with both social and intellectual components. In this way constellation research may help realize the micro-sociological research program that, for example, Collins has worked out but not executed. Thus, constellation research may help the sociology of philosophy come closer to the ambitious goal of reaching down to the flow of micro-situations and providing a sociology of thinking.
Constellation research may in turn incorporate ideas from the sociology of philosophy to strengthen its already existing sociological leanings and components. Especially with the help of the concept of power, the sociological profile of constellation research may be strengthened. Constellations are not free from power, neither when it comes to interpersonal relations nor in the way macro-and meso-factors affect them, for example, in terms of the availability of secure positions within the university system. Another contribution is the interest from the side of sociology of philosophy in the meso-level, i.e. the institutional and organizational setting and context of philosophical activity. Furthermore, a Bourdieu-inspired field concept may help constellation research in thinking about the limits of a constellation: a constellation or a space of thought ends where a certain argumentative move does not provoke any positive or negative response.
Thus, I take a cross-fertilization between constellation research and the sociology of philosophy to be not only a real possibility but also an attractive possibility – for philosophers as well as sociologists. In practice this may take the form of research projects into the history of philosophy and contemporary philosophy in which both philosophers and sociologists are taking part. This is a kind of cooperative projects that, to my knowledge, are not at all common today. Such projects would involve a combination of competencies that are seldom found by an individual researcher. However, I also think that there will always remain a healthy tension between philosophical and sociological approaches to philosophical issues. But cooperation and rivalry may very well go together in one and the same research project.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the four anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
