This article addresses the interface between law and the morality of civil society. It starts with a review of the discourse between the utilitarian approach to rationality and perspectives which include normative action. It subsequently explores the dynamics of compliance and noncompliance among a group of Norwegian fishermen. The choice of compliance was guided by an informally enforced set of moral norms, which largely dissolved the connection between expected benefit and the likeliness of infractions. This moral system defined instances in which violations could take place without being met with informal sanctions, and thus also allowed for strategic action to some extent. The article illustrates how civil society enforces the law according to moral rather than legal standards, and it ends with a suggested concept of legitimacy of law.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Acheson, J. M.1975. The Lobster Fiefs: Economic and Ecological Effects of Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry. Human Ecology.3, 183–207.
2.
Anderson, L. G. & Lee, D. R.1986. Optimal Governing Instrument. Operation Level, and Enforcement in Natural Resource Regulation: The Case of the Fishery. American Journal of Agricultural Economics.68, 678–690.
3.
Becker, G. S.1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy.76, 169–217.
4.
Berkes, F. 1983. A Critique of the “Tragedy of the Commons' Paradigm. Paper presented at IXth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Quebec City.
5.
Berkes, F. & Farvar, M. T.1989. Introduction and Overview. In F. Berkes (ed.). Common Properly Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development, pp. 1–17. London: Belhaven Press.
6.
Blewett, E., Furlong, W. & Toews, P.1987. Canada's Experience in Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Fisheries Law Enforcement. In J. G. Sutinen & T. M. Hennesey (eds.). Fisheries Law Enforcement: Programs, Problems and Evaluations, pp. 170–207. Kingston: University of Rhode Island.
7.
Boudon, R. 1998. Social mechanisms without black boxes. In P. Hedström & R. Swedberg (eds.), Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, pp. 172–203. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8.
Felt, L. F.1994. Two Tales of a Fish: The Social Construction of Indigenous Knowledge Among Atlantic Canadian Salmon Fishers. In C. L. Dyer & J. R. McGoodwin (eds.). Folk Management in the World's Fisheries: Lessons for Modern Fisheries Management, pp. 251–286. Niwot: University Press of Colorado.
9.
Finlayson, A. C.1994. Fishing for Truth: A Sociological Analysis of Northern Cod Stock Assessments from 1977-1990. St. John's: ISER.
10.
Friedland, N., Thibaut, J. & Walker, L.1973. Some Determinants of the Violation of Rules. Journal of Applied Social Psychology3, 103–118.
11.
Furlong, W. J.1991. The Deterrent Effect of Regulatory Enforcement in the Fishery. Land Economics.67, 116–129.
12.
Glaser, B. G. & Strauss, A. L.1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
13.
Gordon, H. S.1954. The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery. Journal of Political Economy.62, 124–142.
14.
Granovetter, M. 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology76, 1360–1380.
15.
Grasmick, H. G. & Green, D. E.1980. Legal Punishment. Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology71, 325–335.
16.
Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science.162, 1243–1248.
17.
Hogg, M. A. & Abrams, D.1988. Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes. London: Routledge.
18.
Honneland, G. 1995. Ressurskontrollens legitimitetsaspekt. Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift.11, 61–80.
19.
Honneland, G. 1998. Compliance in the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard. Ocean Development and International Law.29, 339–360.
20.
Honneland, G. 1999. Compliance In the Barents Sea Fisheries. Oslo: Institute of Political Science. University of Oslo.
21.
Jennings, M. G.1994a. Fisheries Enforcement: The United Kingdom Approach. In Fislieries Enforcement Issues, pp. 165–171. Paris: OECD.
22.
Jennings, M. G.1994b. Surveillance and Control of Marine Resources. In Fisheries Enforcement Issues, pp. 213–225. OECD.
23.
Jentoft, S. 1989. Fisheries Co-management: Delegating Government Responsibility to Fishermen's Organizations. Marine Policy13, 137–154.
24.
Knudsen, J. C.1979. Nel til tvangsregulering: En analyse av politisk symbolbruk under drivgarnsfiskernes aksjon 1977. Universitetet i Bergen. Sosialantropologisk Institutt.
25.
Kuperan, K., Abdullah, N. M. R., Susilowati, I., Siason, I. M. & Ticao, C.1997. Enforcement and Compliance with Fisheries Regulations in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Universiti Pertanian Malaysia. Diponegoro University, University of the Philippines in the Visayas.
26.
McCay, B. J. & Acheson, J. M.1987. Human Ecology of the Commons. In B. J. MacCay & J. M. Acheson (eds.). The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources, pp. 1–36. Tucson. AZ: University of Arizona Press.
27.
Meier, R. F. & Johnson, W. T.1977. Deterrence as Social Control: The Legal and Extralegal Production of Conformity. American Sociological Review.42, 292–304.
28.
Nielsen, J. R. & Mathiesen, C. 2000. Important Factors Influencing Rule Compliance in Fisheries - Lessons from Danish Fisheries. Paper presented at IIFET Conference. 11-14 July. Corvalis, OR, USA.
29.
Ostrom, E. 1987. Institutional Arrangements for Resolving the Commons Dilemma: Some Contending Approaches. In B. J. McCay & J. M. Acheson (eds.). The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources, pp. 250–265. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
30.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
31.
Parsons, T. [1937] 1968. The Structure of Social Action. Vols 1 and 2. New York: Free Press.
32.
Paternoster, R., Saltzman, L. E., Waldo, G. P. & Chiricos, T. G.1983. Perceived Risk and Social Control: Do Sanctions Really Deter?Law and Society Review, 17, 457–479.
33.
Paternoster, R. & Simpson, S.1996. Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime. Law and Society Review.30, 549–583.
34.
Sagdahl, B. 1982. Struktur, organisasjon og innflytelsesforhold i norsk fiskeripolitikk. In K. H. Mikalsen & B. Sagdahl (eds.). Fiskcripolitikk og forvaltningsorganisasjon. pp. 15–47. Tromso: Universitetsforlaget.
35.
Sagdahl, B. K.1992. Ressursforvaltning og legitimitetsproblemer: En studie av styringsproblemer ved forvaltning av norsk-arktisk torsk. Bodo: Nordland Research Institute.
36.
Silberman, M. 1976. Toward a Theory of Criminal Deterrence. American Sociological Review.41, 442–461.
37.
Spagnolo, M. 1994. The Italian Case. In Fisheries Enforcement Issues, pp. 237–246. Paris: OECD.
38.
Sutinen, J. G.1994. Summary and Conclusion of the Workshop on Enforcement Issues. In Fisheries Enforcement Issues, pp. 7–16. Paris: OECD.
39.
Sutinen, J. G. & Andersen, P.1985. The Economics of Fisheries Law Enforcement. Land Economics.61, 387–397.
40.
Sutinen, J. G. & Gauvin, J. R.1989. An Econometric Study of Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance in the Commercial Inshore Lobster Fishery of Massachusetts. In P. A. Neher, R. Arnason & N. Mollett (eds.). Rights Based Fishing, pp. 414–428. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
41.
Sutinen, J. G., Rieser, A. & Gauvin, J. R.1990. Measuring and Explaining Noncompliance in Federally Managed Fisheries. Ocean Development and International Law.21, 335–372.
42.
Swedberg, R. & Granovetter, M.1992. Introduction. In M. Granovetter and R. Swedberg (eds.). The Sociology of Economic Life, pp. 1–26. Boulder: Westview Press.
43.
Thorlindsson, T. 1994. Skipper Science: A Note on the Epistemology of Practice and the Nature of Expertise. Sociological Quarterly35, 329–345.
44.
Tyler, T. R.1990. Why People Obey the LAW. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
45.
Weber, M. 1978. Economy and SocietyBerkeley, CA: University of California Press.
46.
Wrong, D. 1961. The Oversocialized Conception of Man. American Sociological Review.26, 183–193.
