En este artículo se presentan los problemas de la causalidad mental y de los qualia, seguramente los dos problemas más complicados de resolver dentro de la filosofía de la mente. Se explica que son Especialmente problemáticos dentro del marco, generalmente asumido en ciencias cognitivas, de la teoría representacional de la mente.
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