En este estudio se investiga la influencia de dos variables relevantes para la magnitud del efecto de información engañosa. La demora transcurrida entre la percepción del suceso (accidente de tráfico) y la prueba de recuperación; y la redacción de las preguntas críticas del cuestionario post-suceso, que implica información sugerida de distinto carácter perceptivo: un objeto concreto congruente (señal de stop), y una sugestión más sutil a través del verbo empleado para describir el accidente (chocar vs. empotrarse). Los resultados indican que en condiciones de demora los sujetos aceptan esa señal de tráfico, e incluso la enriquecen con información contextual. Por otro lado, sus estimaciones inmediatas de velocidades y tiempos son más elevadas cuando se describe el accidente como un “empotramiento” que cuando se describe como un “choque”, y con la demora esas estimaciones se ajustan más al esquema de interpretación del accidente proporcionado. Por tanto, cuando se facilita el debilitamiento o deterioro de la memoria original (recuperación demorada), los sujetos atribuyen erróneamente información concreta, que han embellecido contextualmente, al suceso original y, además, el esquema de interpretación proporcionado se hace más relevante.
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