Partiendo de la idea propuesta por Karmiloff-Smith en 1992, este comentario se centra en la idea de que la especialización de dominios y la modularidad (re-definida) bien pueden entenderse como productos del desarrollo más que como artefactos del innatismo de los años 80 y 90. Destacando la idea de la especialización interactiva (ver p.e., Johnson y Karmiloff-Smith, 2003) se sugiere que, desde la incipiente neurociencia del desarrollo, la dicotomía entre teorías de dominio general y teorías de dominio específico puede empezar a verse como un debate del pasado.
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