Are All Abortions Equal? Should There Be Exceptions to the Criminalization of Abortion for Rape and Incest?

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Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-705 (1985) (allowing abortion exceptions for rape and incest on minors).

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.7 (2014) (stating the qualifications for certifying a rape or incest exception to the ban on funding for abortions); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-302 (2004).

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Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105–119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006) (historical and statutory notes)).

E.g., Card R. F. , “Two Puzzles for Marquis's Conservative View on Abortion,” Bioethics 20, no. 5 (2006): 264–277, at 264, 275–276;.

Borgmann C. E. , “Roe v. Wade's 40th Anniversary: A Moment of Truth for the Anti-Abortion-Rights Movement?” Stanford Law & Policy Review 24, no. 1 (2013): 245–270;.

Kamm F. M. , Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): At 82–108, 168–169.

Cohen I. G. , “Personhood,” Journal of Law (2 The Post) 2, no. 1 (2012): 437–444, at 438;.

Cohen C. B. , Renewing the Stuff of Life: Stem Cells, Ethics, and Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): At 59–87.

Cohen I. G. , “The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate,” Stanford Law Review 60, no. 4 (2008): 1135–1196, at 1135–1168.

Cohen I. G. , “Circumvention Tourism,” Cornell Law Review 97, no. 6 (2012): 1309–1398, at 1363–1365.

Tribe L. H. , Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (New York City: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992): At 3;.

Schwarz S. D. Latimer K. , Understanding Abortion: From Mixed Feelings to Rational Thought (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012).

See Schwarz Latimer , supra note 10, at 151.

(quoting Sherwin S. , No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992]: At 101.).

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (citing Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner).

Suk J. , “The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse,” Columbia Law Review 110, no. 5 (2010): 1193–1252.

E.g., id., at 1193–1252;.

Aschenbrenner K. , “Ripples against the Other Shore: The Impact of Trauma Exposure on the Immigration Process through Adjudicators,” Michigan Journal of Race and Law 19, no. 1 (2013): 53–111, at 57–59.

Fentiman L. C. , “Pursuing the Perfect Mother: Why America's Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse Is Not the Answer – A Comparative Legal Analysis,” Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 15, no. 2 (2009): 389–469, at 450.

E.g., Fox D. Stein A. , “Dualism and Doctrine,” Indiana Law Journal 90 (forthcoming 2015).

Id.

Chamallas M. , “Unpacking Emotional Distress: Sexual Exploitation, Reproductive Harm, and Fundamental Rights,” Wake Forest Law Review 44, no. 5 (2009): 1109–1130, at 1110.

See Cohen , supra note 8, at 1139–1145.

Id., at 1163;.

Cohen I. G. , “The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?” Southern California Law Review 81, no. 6 (2008): 1115–1196, at 1148–1158.

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.7 (2014); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-302 (2004).

Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-705 (1985).

Cohen I. G. , “Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests,” Minnesota Law Review 96, no. 2 (2011): 423–519;.

Cohen I. G. , “Beyond Best Interests,” Minnesota Law Review 96, no. 4 (2012): 1187–1274.

E.g., Ala. Code § 26–23B-5 (1975).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-201 (1989).

Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–74.1 (1975).

W. Va. Code Ann. § 33-42-8 (1998).

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 1–745.5 (2011).

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14–45.1 (2013).

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-141(c) (2012).

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 1–745.5 (2011).

Volokh E. , “Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs,” Harvard Law Review 120, no. 7 (2007): 1813–1846, at 1824–1827;.

Giles S. G. , “Roe's Life-or-Health Exception: Self-Defense or Relative-Safety?” Notre Dame Law Review 85, no. 2 (2010): 525–620, at 537.

Model Penal Code § 3.04 (1981);.

Skopets M. , Comment, “Battered Nation Syndrome: Relaxing the Imminence Requirement of Self-Defense in International Law,” American University Law Review 55, no. 3 (2006): 753–783, at 760.

See Schwarz Latimer , supra note 10, at 152.

(quoting Whitbeck C. , “Taking Women Seriously as People: The Moral Implications for Abortion,” in Pojman L. Beckwith F. J. , Abortion Controversy: 25 Years After Roe vs. Wade, A Reader (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2d ed. 1998): At 399).

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40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 143 (2014).

For example the Model Penal Code provides that where one negligently or recklessly injures an innocent person in the course of an otherwise legitimate self-defense, one does not have a valid defense in “a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence towards innocent person,” i.e., reckless manslaughter or negligent homicide. Model Penal Code § 3.09(3) (1981).

21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 140 (2014).

E.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05 (1909).

See Cohen , supra note 8, at 1142–1145, 1162, 1185–95.

Cf. Borgmann C. E. , “Roe v. Wade's 40th Anniversary: A Moment of Truth for the Anti-Abortion-Rights Movement?” Stanford Law & Policy Review 24, no. 1 (2013): 245–270, at 260;.

Hendricks J. S. , “Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion,” Harvard Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review 45, no. 2 (2010): 329–374, at 336.

Dworkin R. , Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993): At 94–97.

Id., at 95.

Id., at 95–97.

Will J. F. , “Beyond Abortion: Why the Personhood Movement Implicates Reproductive Choice,” American Journal of Law & Medicine 39, no. 4 (2013): 573–616;.

George R. P. , Book Review, “Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 444–446, at 445;.

Sandel M. J. , Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009): At 251.

Kamm F. , Book Review, “Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life's Dominion,” Columbia Law Review 95, no. 1 (1995): 160–221, at 180.

(citing Dworkin , supra note 35, at 96.).

Jarvis Thomson J. , “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (1971): 47–66.

Id., at 560.

Alvarez Manninen B. , “Rethinking Roe v. Wade: Defending the Abortion Right in the Face of Contemporary Opposition,” American Journal of Bioethics 10, no. 12 (2010): 33–46, at 3;.

McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90, 92 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1978).

See, e.g., Nobis N. Sidique Jarr-Koroma A. , “Abortion and Moral Arguments From Analogy,” The American Journal of Bioethics 10, no. 12 (2010): 59–61, at 60.

See Manninen , supra note 42, at 41.

Cf. Motro S. , “The Price of Pleasure,” Northwestern University Law Review 104, no. 3 (2010): 917–978, at 936–937.

S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).

Faske v. Bonanno, 357 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).

Cnty Mercer . Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex. rel. Imogene T. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992).

see Glenn Cohen I. , “The Right Not To Be a Genetic Parent?” supra note 20 at 1128 n. 37.

See Manninen , supra note 42, at 41–42.

(quoting Thomson , supra note 40, at 58). In response to the burglar analogy, Eberl writes “A fetus, though, is not amoral agent responsible for actions, and, without begging the question at hand, cannot be said to be in violation of civil and moral law by virtue of being present in a pregnant woman's body; a fetus is an innocent, while the burglar is not.”.

Eberl J. T. , “Fetuses Are Neither Violinists nor Violators,” American Journal of Bioethics 10, no. 12 (2010): 53–54, at 53. I am not sure is right that this is the key distinction. Imagine that instead of a burglar, we imagine a homeless man who has accidentally been given your address as a safe house where he can stay (a 9 was put down instead of a 6 in the address on your street). He enters your house through your unlocked door and sets up camp. He, like the fetus, is a moral innocent. And yet that does not give him the right to remain.

Regan D. H. , “Rewriting Roe v. Wade,” Michigan Law Review 77, no. 4 (1979): 1569–1646, at 1601.

See Manninen , supra note 42, at 42.

Id., at 43.

Id.

Id.

Fabre C. , Whose Body Is it Anyways? Justice and the Integrity of the Person (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006).

Kahan D. , “The Secret Ambition of Deterrence,” Harvard Law Review 113, no. 2 (1999): 413–500, at 415–17.

Model Penal Code § 2.02 (1981).

Bedi S. , “Why a Criminal Prohibition on Sex Selective Abortions Amounts to a Thought Crime,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 5, no. 3 (2011): 349–360, at 350, 352.

Id., at 350, 352.

Id., at 353.

(citing. Hurd H. M. , “Why Liberals Should Hate ‘Hate Crime Legislation,”’ Law and Philosophy 20, no. 2 [2001]: 215–32, at 230–231).

Stuart Mill J. , On Liberty ( Colli Stefan ed., Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859), at 9.

Richards N. M. , “Intellectual Privacy,” Texas Law Review 87 (2009): 387–445, at 409.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).

For a good review discussion, see Dillof A. M. , “Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes,” Northwestern Law Review 91, no. 3 (1997): 1015–1079.

Steiker C. S. , “Book Review, Hate Crimes: Criminal Law & Identity Politics. by Jacobs James B. Potter Kimberly ,” Michigan Law Review 97 (1999): 1857–1872;.

e.g., Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 83–84 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding statute treating the fact that murder was for pecuniary gain as an aggravating factor rendering the convicted individual death-eligible).

Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 476 (1993).