Abstract
We study the pricing problem of a “platform” intermediary to jointly determine the selling price of the platforms (hardware) sold to consumers and the royalty charged to content developers for content (software), when the demands for content and for platforms are interdependent. Our model elucidates the impact of supply chain replenishment costs and demand uncertainty on the strategic issues of platform pricing in a two‐sided market.
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