Recent Developments in Health Law: Constitutional Law: Despite Reservations,the Second Circuit Defers to State Court's Determination That a Preponderance of the Evidence Standard is Constitutional for Recommitment of NRRMDD Defendants – Ernst J. v. Stonea

452 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2006).

Id., at 202.

Id., at 188–189 (citing Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 101 (2d Cir. 2000)).

Id., at 189 (citing Francis S., 221 F.3d at 101).

N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 220.15 (4) (McKinney 2006) provides that “The court shall not accept a plea of [NRRMDD] without first determining that there is a factual basis for such a plea. The court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary, knowingly made, and not the result of force, threats, or promises…The court must be satisfied that the defendant understands the proceedings against him, has sufficient capacity to assist in his own defense and understands the consequences of a plea of [NRRMDD].”

See N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20(2)-(5) (McKinney 2006).

Ernst J. , 452 F.3d at 189.

“Dangerous mental disorder” means (i) that a defendant currently suffers from a ‘mental illness’ as that term is definition in [Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03(20)], and (ii) that because of such condition he currently constitutes a physical danger to himself or others.” N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20(1)(c) (McKinney 2006).

Ernst J. , 452 F.3d at 189.

“Mentally ill” means that a defendant currently suffers from a mental illness for which care and treatment as a patient, in the in-patient services of a psychiatric center under the jurisdiction of the state office of mental health, is essential to such defendant's welfare and that his judgment is so impaired that he is unable to understand the need for such care and treatment. N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20(1)(d) (McKinney 2006).

“Order of conditions” means an order directing a defendant to comply with [his] prescribed treatment plan, or any other condition which the court determines to be reasonably necessary or appropriate… An order of condition…shall be valid for five years from the date of its issuance, except that, for good cause shown, the court may extend the period for an additional five years.” N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20 (1)(o) (McKinney 2006).

Ernst J. , 453 F.3d at 190; See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20(7) (McKinney 2006).

Ernst J. , 452 F.3d at 190.

Id. See N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20(7) (McKinney 2006).

Id.

Id (citing Francis S., 221 F.3d at 102 (2d Cir.2000)).

N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20(14) (McKinney 2006).

Ernst J., 452 F.3d at 190.

Ernst J. v. Stone, 372 F.Supp. 2d 330, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter Ernst I], aff'd, 452 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2006).

Id.

Ernst J. , 452 F.3d at 191.

See Ernst I , 372 F.Supp 2d at 333.

Id.

. Id.

Id.

Ernst J., 452 F.3d at 191.

Ernst I , 372 F.Supp 2d. at 333.

Id., at 333–334.

Id., at 334.

N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20(14) ( McKinney 2006).

Ernst J. , 452 F.3d. at 194.

28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) (2006).

Ernst J. , 452 F.3d at 188.

The petitioner cites Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (The Court concluded that in civil commitment proceedings, states must prove the elements of mental illness and dangerousness by no less than “clear and convincing” evidence), Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (The Court's decision concerned only the initial confinement of insanity acquittees, and specifically did not address the standard of proof applicable to recommitment or release procedures), and Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (Reaffirming the holding in Jones, but clarified that a state may not, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, continue to confine in a psychiatric facility an insanity acquittee who remains dangerous but who no longer suffers from any mental illness).

Ernst J. , 452 F.3d. at 196.

221 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2000) (Francis was designated a “track two” defendant. He was found to be “mentally ill” but not suffering from a “dangerous mental disorder.” Francis was committed to an impatient psychiatric program for four months before being discharged, subject to an order of conditions. Later, Francis was involuntary recommitted to a secure facility. Francis argued that the state court's post-acquittal determination that he lacked a dangerous mental disorder restored him to the status of a normal citizen, such that if the state wanted him committed, it would have to comply with the more stringent procedures. In light of the standard of review prescribed by AEDPA, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that no clearly established federal law, as enunciated by the Supreme Court, required Francis' claim to be upheld).

Ernst J. , 452 F.3d at 198.

Id.

Id., at 188

Id.

Id., at 202.

Id., at 198.

Id., at 202.

Id., at 202.