Commentary: Narrative Views of Personal Identity and Substituted Judgment in Surrogate Decision Making

See Meisel A. , “The Legal Consensus about Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment: Its Status and Prospects,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 2 (1992): 309–45.

See Blustein J. , “Choosing for Others as Continuing a Life Story: The Problem of Personal Identity Revisited,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 27 (1999): 20–31.

See, for example, Dresser R. , “Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law,” Arizona Law Review, 28 (1986): 379–81; and Robertson J. , “Second Thoughts on Living Wills,” Hastings Center Report, 21, no. 6 (1991): 6–9.

See Dresser R. and Whitehouse P.J. , “The Incompetent Patient on the Slippery Slope,” Hastings Center Report, 24, no. 4 (1994): 6–12.

See Buchanan A.E. and Brock D.W. , Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

See Dworkin R. , Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).

See Rich B.A. , “Prospective Autonomy and Critical Interests: A Narrative Defense of the Moral Authority of Advance Directives,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 6 (1997): 138–47.

See Kuczewski M.G. , “Whose Will is it Anyway? A Discussion of Advance Directives, Personal Identity, and Consensus in Medical Ethics,” Bioethics, 8, no. 1 (1994): 27–48.

See Blustein , supra note 2, at 28.

See Kuczewski M.G. , Fragmentation and Consensus: Communitarian and Casuist Bioethics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997).

Blustein , supra note 2, at 23.

See Tonelli M.R. , “Substituted Judgment in Medical Practice: Evidentiary Standards on a Sliding Scale,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 25 (1997): 22–29.

See Tomlinson T. , “An Empirical Study of Proxy Consent for Elderly Persons,” Gerontologist, 30 (1990): 54–64; Seckler A. , “Substituted Judgment: How Accurate Are Proxy Predictions?,” Annals of Internal Medicine, 115 (1991): 92–98; and Sulmasy D. , “More Talk, Less Paper: Predicting the Accuracy of Substituted Judgments,” American Journal of Medicine, 96 (1994): 432–38.

See Buchanan and Brock , supra note 5, at 116.

See Churchill L.R. , “Trust, Autonomy, and Advance Directives,” Journal of Religion and Health, 28 (1989): 175–83; Kuczewski M.G. , “Legalistic and Contextual Approaches to Living Wills,” American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Medicine, 91, no. 2 (1992): 78–81; and Forrow L. , “The Green Eggs and Ham Phenomena,” Hastings Center Report, 24, no. 6 (1994): S29–S32.

See Levine C. and Zuckerman C. , “The Trouble with Families: Toward an Ethic of Accommodation,” Annals of Internal Medicine, 130 (1999): 148–52.

See Minogue B. and Reagan J.E. , “Can Complex Legislation Solve Our End-of-Life Problems?,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 3 (1994): 115–24.

See Edna M.F. v. Eisenberg, 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997); and Martin v. Martin, 538 N.W2d 399 (Mich. 1995).

See Rawls J. , A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Daniels N. , Just Health Care (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).