Vox Clamantis in Deserto: Do You Really Mean What You Say in Spring?

In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).

In re Spring, 399 N.E.2d 493 (Mass. App. 1979).

In re Spring, No. 49076 (P. Ct., Franklin Co., Mass., May 15, 1979) (temporary guardian, his son, was ordered to refrain from authorizing continued dialysis treatments; on July 2, 1979, a revised order was issued that permitted the ward's wife, son and physician to make any treatment decision.)

In addition to the briefs submitted by the petitioners and the guardian ad litem, briefs amicus curiae were submitted by the American Society of Law & Medicine, the Massachusetts Hospital Association, the Massachusetts Medical Society, and the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee.

Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Saikewicz].

The four enumerated “state interests” were: (1) the preservation of life, (2) the protection of third parties, (3) prevention of suicide, and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Id. at 425.

See Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. 1978); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass, App. 1978).

Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979).

Lane v. Candura, supra note 7, at 1233.

A standard of competency similar to that required to execute a will was discussed in Lane v. Candura, supra note 7, but no standard was expressly enunciated or adopted.

In re Spring, supra note 2, at 495–96.

See Boston Globe, January 23, 1980, at 1, 49 (Spring's guardian ad litem responds to affidavits filed by right-to-life advocates and nurses involved in Spring's care by asking for a new hearing).

In re Spring, supra note 1, at 118, n. 1.

See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris Co., Probate Div., N.J. 1978).

In re Spring, No. 80–37 (Mass. SJC, single justice, interlocutory order dated February 4, 1980).

Id. See also Doe v. Doe, 385 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (Mass. 1979) (incompetent ward's preference not to be committed to mental institution is “critical factor” to be considered).

One wonders how a test which requires that the Probate Court determine what the patient would have wanted for himself, could arise from or be applicable to a fact pattern in which the patient, Mr. Saikewicz, had an I.Q. of 10, a mental age of 2 years and 8 months, and was functionally inarticulate.

In re Spring, supra note 1, at 122.

Id.

Id.

Id. at 120–21.

Id. at 121.

Id. at 122.

Id.

Id. at 121.

See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 337 N.E.2d 240 (Ill. App. 1975) (intent to cause death not required by statute that defines killing as murder); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38, &sC;4.5 (Smith-Hurd).

E.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965), and Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972) were cited as authority for the proposition that a patient's right to make treatment decisions is founded upon his right of privacy. In fact, both opinions are based exclusively upon the First Amendment freedom of religious beliefs and do not even discuss a constitutional right of privacy.